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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Times Mirror Co. v. United
States and a Qualified First Amendment Right of
Public Access to Search Warrant Proceedings and
Supporting Affidavits
Police break into a citizen's home and seize papers. The police claim

the search was authorized by a search warrant based upon probable
cause. Charges have not yet been filed against the citizen and she wants
to know whether probable cause supported the warrant. The citizen cannot find out. The news media hears of the case and wants to know
whether probable cause supported the warrant. It cannot find out. The
reason? The search took place in a district where the public has no first
amendment right of access to search warrant proceedings or materials.
In Times Mirror Co. v. United States,' the Ninth Circuit ruled that the

first amendment did not establish a right of public access to search warrant proceedings and supporting affidavits while a preindictment investigation was still underway. 2 The Times Mirror decision expressly rejected
the reasoning and holding of the Eighth Circuit in In re Search Warrantfor
SecretarialArea Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp.3 The
McDonnell Douglas Corp. court held that the first amendment did establish
a qualified right of public access to documents filed in support of search
warrants. 4 In reaching their respective conclusions, both the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit applied a "two-prong" test that the Supreme
Court developed in a series of cases establishing a first amendment right
of public access to preliminary hearings, voir dire, and criminal trials. 5
Under the two-prong test, courts consider whether the proceeding has a
historical tradition of openness, and whether public access would play a
"significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
'6
question."
1 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989).
2 Id3 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter McDonnell Douglas Corp.].
4 Idl The court first ruled that the public did have a first amendment right of access to search
warrant materials while a preindictment investigation was underway. The court then held, however,
that this right was a qualified one that could be restricted if the party seeking the sealing order could
show that it was necessitated by a compelling governmental interest.
5 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise
II]; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I];
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555'(1980). In the above cases the Supreme Court ruled that the media had a first
amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. In Times Mirror Co. and McDonnell Douglas
Corp. the media was not seeking access to search warrant proceedings but to the materials generated
by the proceedings. This Comment focuses on whether there is a qualified right of public access to
the materials generated by a search warrant proceeding. It does not argue that there should be a
right of access to the actual proceeding where the search warrant is issued. See infra note 50.
6 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.
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This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit was correct in ruling
that search warrant materials do not satisfy the two-prong test developed
by the Supreme Court. This Comment concludes, however, that courts
should apply a different test to search warrant materials. Under that test,
the public should have a qualified right of access to search warrant materials unless an interested party affirmatively shows that a substantial governmental or private interest necessitates the sealing of the materials.
Part I of this Comment examines the Supreme Court's two-prong
test and the public's first amendment right of access to preliminary hearings, voir dire, and criminal trials. Part II discusses the facts and rulings
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Times Mirror. Part III analyzes the Ninth
Circuit's application of the two-prong test in Times Mirror and explains
the court's reasoning. Part IV argues that courts should apply a different
test, that considers the framer's intent and a presumption of openness, to
search warrant materials. Part V concludes that this new test provides a
qualified first amendment right of public access to search warrant
materials.
I.

The First Amendment Right of Public Access to Preliminary
Hearings, Voir Dire, and Criminal Trials

The Supreme Court first held that the public had a first amendment7
right of access to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.
In a series of subsequent cases, the Court has extended the first amendment right of public access to the voir dire examination of prospective
jurors8 and to preliminary hearings. 9 In these cases, the Court developed a two-prong test for determining whether a particular proceeding
should be open to the public. Under this two-prong test a right of public
access exists if "the place and process have historically been open to the
press and general public"' 10 and "public access plays a significant positive
role in the functioning of the particular process in question.""
In Richmond Newspapers, a suspect was indicted for the murder of a
hotel manager. 12 At the commencement of the suspect's trial, the court
granted his motion to close the trial to the public.' 3 That same day the
court denied a motion made by members of the press to vacate the closure order.14 The Virginia Supreme Court denied the press' petition for
appeal' 5 and the United States Supreme Court granted the press' petition for a writ of certiorari. 16 The Court held that the public had a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials.' 7 Six of the seven Justices
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 555.
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in the plurality, however, filed separate opinions making the basis for the
decision unclear. 18
The Court ruled on a similar case in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court.19 In Globe, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law requiring
judges to exclude the public from trials involving sex crimes when the
victim was a minor under eighteen years of age. 20 The Court held that
the first amendment guarantees the right of public access to criminal trials. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated the right of access to
criminal trials exists because the "criminal trial historically has been
open to the press and general public" and because "the right of access to
criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the
judicial process and the government as a whole." 2 1 Justice Brennan went
on to say, however, the right of public access was not absolute. 22 It could
be denied if the State could show that "the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
23
interest."
In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled, in Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court (Press-EnterpriseI), that the public also has a first amendment right
of access to voir dire proceedings. 24 The Court based its decision on
historical evidence revealing that the process ofjuror selection has been
presumptively open since the development of jury trials. 2 5 It further
concluded that openness plays an important role in the administration of
justice by enhancing "both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the
6
2
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."

In Press-EnterpriseI, the Court emphasized the trial court's failure to consider alternatives to closure, 2 7 and stated that in the absence of such consideration, the trial court could not close voir dire proceedings. 28
Decided in 1986, Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise
I) was the Supreme Court's last major "right of public access" case. In
Press-EnterpriseII, a magistrate granted a murder suspect's motion to exclude the public from a preliminary hearing under a California statute
requiring such proceedings to be open unless "exclusion of the public is
necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial
trial." 29 In holding that the first amendment right of public access to
criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings, the Court applied
the two-prong test developed in Globe Newspapers and Press-EnterprisesI.
The Court stated the first prong was "whether the place and process
18 See id. at 558-81 (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion); id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring); id. at
582-584 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
20 Id.
21 Id at 605-06.
22 Id. at 606.
23 Id at 607.
24 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1982).
25 Id. at 505.
26 Id. at 508.
27 Id. at 511.
28 Id.
29 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
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have historically been open to the press and general public." 3 0 The second prong was "whether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process in question." 3' The Court then
concluded that there was a historical tradition of public access to preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates.3 2 The
Court also found that preliminary hearings of the type conducted in California were sufficiently like a trial to justify the conclusion that public
access was essential to their proper functioning.3 3 Since preliminary
hearings met the two-prong test, the Court held that the public had a first
amendment right of access to the proceedings. 3 4 Therefore, the proceedings could not be closed unless the trial court made specific findings
on the record showing closure was necessary to preserve higher values
and reasonable alternatives to closure could not achieve the same
35
purpose.
Within the context of the above cases the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
reached different conclusions as to whether the public has a first amendment right of access to search warrant materials.
II.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Times Mirror

Both McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Times Mirror resulted from Operation Ill Wind, an investigation of fraud and bribery in the defense contracting industry, after federal agents served and executed more than
36
forty search warrants throughout the nation on one day.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. arose after the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri issued two of these search warrants. 37 After agents
executed the search warrants, the district court granted the government's
ex parte motion to seal one of these search warrants, the attached affidavits, and other materials.3 8 After members of the news media made an
unsuccessful informal request for access to the sealed documents, they
made a formal motion for access in the district court.3 9 When the district
court denied this motion, the members of the news media appealed to
40
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
30

Id. at 8.

31

Id.

32
33

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12. The Court explained the similarities between preliminary hearings and trials.

Before a felony trial in California the prosecutor must either secure a grand jury indictment or a
finding of probable cause in a preliminary hearing. Id. Even if there has been a grand jury indictment, the accused has the right to a preliminary hearing. Id. The preliminary hearing must be
conducted before a neutral magistrate, and "the accused has the right to personally appear at the
hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to present exculpatory

evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence." Id The Court concluded that, in light of the
above procedures, a finding of probable cause usually leads to a guilty plea. Id.
34

35
36
1211
37
38
39
40

Id. at 13.

Id.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 570 (8th Cir. 1988); Times Mirror, 873 F.2d 1210,
(9th Cir. 1989).
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
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In holding that there was a first amendment right of public access to
search warrant materials, the Eighth Circuit applied the two-prong test
established in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. 4 1 The Eighth Circuit
found that search warrant materials satisfied the first prong of the test,
the "historical openness" prong, because search warrant applications
42
and receipts are routinely filed with the clerk of the court without seal.
The court said, "[u]nder the common law judicial records and documents have been historically considered to be open to inspection by the
43
public."
The Eighth Circuit also concluded that search warrant materials satisfied the second prong of the test, the "significant positive role" prong,
because "public access to documents filed in support of search warrants
is important to the public's understanding of the function and operation
of the judicial process and the criminal justice system and may operate as
44
a curb on prosecutorial or judicial misconduct."
Based on these conclusions, the Eighth Circuit held that search warrant materials satisfied the two-prong test, thus, there was a first amendment right of public access to the materials. 4 5 But the Eighth Circuit
went on to hold that the right was a qualified one. The court stated "the
district court properly concluded that these documents should be kept
under seal" because the district court specifically found that sealing was
necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest and that less re46
strictive alternatives were impracticable.
The facts in Times-Mirror were almost identical to those in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. Media members, in two separate district courts, made motions to unseal search warrant materials generated by Operation Ill
Wind. 4 7 Both district courts denied the motions and on appeal the Ninth
Circuit consolidated the two cases. 48 The Ninth Circuit also applied the
Supreme Court's two-prong test. However, in this case, it held that the
public had no first amendment right of access to search warrant materials
during an ongoing preindictment investigation. 4 9 The Ninth Circuit con41
d at 572-73.
42 Id at 573.
43 Id
44 Id
45 Id at 575.
46 Id at 574-75. After the Eighth Circuit's ruling the district court granted the government
several 30-day extensions of the sealing order. Certain Interested Individuals v. Pulitzer Publishing
Corp., 895 F.2d 460, 462 (1990). The government then informed the district court that it no longer
opposed disclosure of the search warrant materials. Id The next day the Pulitzer Publishing Company made a motion for disclosure of the sealed search warrant materials. Id. Shortly thereafter,
McDonnell Douglas Corp., and several of its employees, filed motions opposing disclosure. Id. The
district court recognized that McDonnell Douglas Corp. and its employees had qualified fourth
amendment privacy rights. Id.The court held, however, that these privacy rights were outweighed
by the public's qualified first amendment right of access, and it ordered the materials released. Id.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. appealed. Id The Eighth Circuit held that it was improper to disclose the
search warrant materials at this time because the materials contained information obtained by wiretaps. Id. at 467. This fact, the court stated, tipped the balance in favor of the privacy interests and
against disclosure. d
47 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 1989).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1216. See also In re The Baltimore Sun Co., 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989)(The Fourth
Circuit agrees with the Ninth Circuit's analysis and decision in Times Mirror.).
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cluded that search warrant materials did not satisfy the "historical openness" prong of the test because "the issuance of warrants had
traditionally been carried out in secret."'50 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that search warrant materials were generally available to the public.
But the court concluded that this did not amount to a historical tradition
of openness because the government "has always been able to restrict
access to warrant materials by requesting a sealing order, which courts
have granted freely upon a showing that a given criminal investigation
requires secrecy." 5 '
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that search warrant materials did
not satisfy the second prong of the test. While noting that public access
to search warrant materials advanced clearly legitimate interests, the
Ninth Circuit determined that it would "hinder, rather than facilitate, the
warrant process and the government's ability to conduct criminal investigations." 52 The court stated that, in this regard, search warrant proceedings were indistinguishable from grand jury proceedings, which are
conducted in secret. 53 The court then reasoned that because search war50 Times Mirror,873 F.2d at 1214. In Times Mirror,however, the media was not seeking access to
the proceeding in which the search warrants were issued. Rather, the media was seeking access to
the search warrant materials filed with the clerk of the court after agents executed the search warrants. The Ninth Circuit said the two-prong test applied to documents generated as part of the
judicial proceeding as well as to the proceeding itself. Id. at 1213, n.4.
"The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question whether the first amendment right of
access also applies to written documents submitted in connection with judicial proceedings which
themselves implicate the right of access." In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir.
1986). However, several courts have extended the first amendment right of public access to documents generated in connection with these proceedings. See Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist.
Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988) (documents filed in connection with pretrial detention
proceeding); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1988) (plea agreement); In re New
York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (documents filed in connection with suppression
motions); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 390; United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 111112 (3d Cir. 1985) (bill of particulars); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143,
1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (pretrial documents in general).
Regarding the application of the two-prong test to documents in general, Times Mirror stated
that "[a]lthough Press-EnterpriseII concerned access to judicial proceedings themselves, we have previously indicated that the two-part analysis applies as well to documents generated as part of a judicial
proceeding."[court's emphasis] Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1213 n.4. See also Seattle Times Co. v.
United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1988); cf United States v. Brooklier, 685
F.2d 1152, 1172 (9th Cir. 1982).
Partly in response to McDonnell Douglas Corp.'s attempt to distinguish between search warrant
proceedings and search warrant documents, Times Mirror stated, "[t]he warrant process-which...
would be jeopardized if warrant proceedings were conducted openly-would be equally threatened if
the information disclosed during the proceeding were open [in the form of documents] to public scrutiny,
since in either case disclosure would frustrate the government's efforts to investigate criminal activity." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217 (emphasis in original). Therefore, Times Mirror applied the twoprong test simultaneously to warrant proceedings and materials.
51 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1214. The court limited its analysis of search warrant history to a
brief examination of Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. Rule 41(g)
provides:
(g) Return of Papers to Clerk. The federal magistrate before whom the warrant is
returned shall attach to the warrant a copy of the return, inventory and all other papers in
connection therewith and shall file them with the clerk of the district court for the district in
which the property was seized.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
52 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
53 Id. at 1215. See also Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v.
Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979)).
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rant proceedings were one step back in the judicial process from grand
jury hearings, matters leading up to the hearings could be conducted in
secret. 5 4 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that "the first amendment
does not establish a qualified right of access to search warrant proceedings and materials while a pre-indictment investigation is still
ongoing." 5 5
III.

Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Application of the Two-Prong Test

A. HistoricalTradition of Openness
Neither the Eighth Circuit in McDonnell Douglas Corp., nor the Ninth
Circuit in Times Mirror, applied the historical openness prong of the twoprong test with the same thoroughness as the Supreme Court did in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. 5 6 In Times Mirror, the Ninth Circuit's
historical analysis extended only to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 41(g) requires magistrates to file returned
search warrant materials with the clerk of the district court. 57 In McDonnell Douglas Corp., the Eighth Circuit merely concluded that "under the
common law judicial records and documents have been historically considered to be open to inspection by the public."' 58 This limited historical
analysis is probably due to the scarcity of information regarding the early
history of search and seizure. 5 9
In reviewing the history of search warrants for purposes of determining historical openness, it is not necessary to examine the origins and
early practices of search and seizure. Such an examination is unnecessary because the history of search and seizure, unlike the history of criminal trials and voir dire, was fundamentally altered by the Revolutionary
War. 60 It is necessary, however, to examine search and seizure in colonial America and the context in which the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution evolved. 61
54 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215-16. Grand jury proceedings are not conducted in secret solely
because public access to such proceedings would not play a "significant positive role in the functioning of the process." Grand jury proceedings do not have a historical tradition of openness. Therefore, under the two-prong test the public does not have a first amendment right of access to those
proceedings. In reasoning that proceedings one step back in the judicial process should likewise be
closed to the public, the Ninth Circuit was incorrect.
55 Id. at 1216.
56 In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger reviewed the history of trials from the days
before the Norman conquest through colonial America up to the time "our organic laws were
adopted." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565-69. In Press-Enterprise I the Court made a similar
examination and concluded "since the development of trial by jury, the process of selection ofjurors
has presumptively been a public process with exceptions only for good cause shown." Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 505.
57 See supra note 51.
58 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d at 573.
59 "Very little information is available about early practices in the area of what we now know as
search and seizure ....
P. POLVvIOU, SEARCH & SEIZURE 1 (1982). But see N. LAssoN, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(1987). De-

spite the thoroughness of Lasson's research, it provides little insight into the historical openness of
search and seizure.
60 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
61 As the Supreme Court stated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886): "In
order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' it is only necessary to recall the con-
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1. The Writs of Assistance and General Warrants
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution 62 arose
from the controversy surrounding the writs of assistance in colonial
America and general warrants in England.6 3 British customs officers
used the writs of assistance in the colonies to search places suspected of
containing smuggled goods. 6 4 Colonial courts issued the writs, and once
issued, the writs operated as "continuing licenses in the hands of their
holders, expiring only at the end of six months after the death of the
monarch in whose reign they were issued." 6 5 The death of King George
II in October, 1760, and the subsequent expiration of outstanding writs
set the stage for the "famous debate" between James Otis and Jeremiah
66
Gridley concerning whether the colonial courts should grant new writs.
The debate took place in the colonial courts and concluded in Paxton's
Case where the court granted the new writs. 6 7 It is generally agreed that

the debate regarding the continued use of the writs of assistance was
"perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of
the colonies to the oppression of the mother country." 6 8 This resistance
led to the Revolutionary War where the colonists gained their independence from England.
temporary or then recent history of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in
England."
62 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63 The writs of assistance were themselves a general warrant. Both the colonists and the citizens
of England objected to these warrants because they did not identify persons or places to be searched
and they did not specify papers and effects to be seized. "[Elverything was left to the discretion of
the bearer of the warrant." N. LAsSON, supra note 59, at 26.
64 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; N. LAssON, supra note 59, at 51; P. PoLvviou, supra note 59, at 9.
The American colonists smuggled goods to bypass various trade regulations and requirements that
the British Government had enacted to protect England's own industries and commerce. The writs
were so named because they commanded all officers and subjects of the crown to assist their holders
in executing them. N. LASSON, supra note 59, at 51, 54-55.
65 Reynard, Freedom From UnreasonableSearch and Seizure-A Second Class ConstitutionalRight, 25 IND.
L. J. 259, 271 (1950). The writs were general as to the places and persons to be searched and the
things to be seized. This allowed their holders to abuse the power the writs bestowed upon them.
This abuse outraged the colonists and ultimately led to the Revolutionary War. Id.
66 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; N. LAssoN, supra note 59, at 58. This debate took place in the
superior court of Massachusetts after 63 Boston merchants petitioned the court for a hearing on the
question of granting new writs. Id. at 57-58. Interestingly, the debate over whether the colonial
courts should grant general warrants took place in open court. The debate focused on the legality of
general warrants as opposed to particular warrants. Id. The present controversy concerns whether
today's courts should grant the public access to materials generated by a search warrant proceeding.
It is almost a forgone conclusion that the public does not have a right of access to such a proceeding.
Did the public give up its right of access to search warrant proceedings when it demanded particularized warrants?
67 Reynard, supra note 65, at 271-72.
68 See, e.g., Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. John Adams witnessed this famous debate as a young man.
Adams later remarked: "Otis was a flame of fire.... American independence was then and there
born.... Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms
against writs of assistance. Then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born. In fifteen years,
namely in 1776, he grew up to manhood, and declared himself free." 10 WORKS OFJOHN ADAMS
247-48 (Boston 1856).
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While the colonists fought against the writs of assistance, the citizens
of England objected to the use of general warrants. 69 But the controversy in England was resolved by the courts rather than by revolution. In
Entick v. Carrington,70 Lord Camden ruled that a general warrant to seize
and carry away a party's papers was illegal and void. 7 1 After noting that
the use of general warrants resembled the search and seizure for stolen
goods, 7 2 Lord Camden discussed the checks that must govern search and
seizure: "There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft committed.
The owner must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place. He
must attend at the execution of the warrant, to show them to the officer,
who must see that they answer the description. ' 73 He then stated that if
these procedural safeguards existed for search and seizure, similar safeguards should also protect the subjects of general warrants. 74 General
warrants "would require proofs beforehand; would call up the servant to
stand by and overlook; would require him to take an exact inventory,
and deliver a copy." '7 5 Because these checks did not exist in Entick, Lord
Camden ruled general warrants 7illegal.
Parliament eventually abolished
6
the general warrant in England.
In the context of these events, Virginia established the first state
constitutional predecessor to the federal constitution's fourth amendment in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776. 77 Between 1776 and the
Constitutional Convention in 1787 every state except New Jersey
78
adopted a similar provision in its state declaration or bill of rights.
With these provisions as a guide, the First Congress created the fourth
amendment. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to
79
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The framers' memory of the writs of assistance and their knowledge of
Entick influenced the creation and adoption of the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment does not state that the public has a right of access
to search warrant materials. Given the framers experiences with general
69 The writs of assistance were, of course, a general warrant. See supra note 63.
70 19 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029 (1769). The United States Supreme Court has called Entick
"one of the landmarks of English liberty." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626.
71 19 HOWELL'S STATE TRALS 1029 (1769).
72 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 628. 'Even though general warrants resembled search and seizure for stolen
goods, Lord Camden stated that the difference between the two processes was apparent.
In the one, I am permitted to seize my own goods, which are placed in the hands of a public
officer, till the felon's conviction shall entitle me to restitution. In the other, the party's own
property is seized before and without conviction, and he has no power to reclaim his goods,
even after his innocence is declared by acquittal.
Id
73 Id.
74 Id
75 Id.
76 See N. LASSON, supra note 59, at 48-50; Reynard, supra note 65, at 269.
77 N. LAssos, supra note 59, at 79.
78 Id at 80. For a detailed history of the development of these provisions, see id at 79-83.
79

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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warrants, however, the framers arguably intended that the public have
the right to know whether probable cause supports a warrant. The framers objected to Britain's use of the writs of assistance because they were
80
general as to the places to be searched and the things to be seized.
This allowed agents of the British government to abuse the writs. 8 ' Consequently, the framers' intended that the fourth amendment prevent the
United States government from similarly abusing its search warrant powers. One way the fourth amendment prevents the government from
abusing its search warrant power is the requirement that search warrants
must be supported by probable cause.
The question then becomes whether the public should be able to
review a court's or magistrate's determination that probable cause exists.
Courts and magistrates constitute a branch of the government. If the
public cannot review a court or magistrate's determination of probable
cause, the potential for government abuse still exists. Therefore, the
public should be able to review a court's or magistrate's determination of
probable cause. The only way the people themselves can review whether
probable cause exists in a particular situation is by having access to
82
search warrant materials.
2.

Whether Search Warrant Materials Have a Historical Tradition of
Openness

The first prong of the two-prong test requires a proceeding to have a
historical tradition of openness before the public has a first amendment
right of access to it.83 When the framers drafted the first amendment,
criminal trials and voir dire were open to the public. Therefore,
criminal
84
trials and voir dire have "historical traditions of openness."
The search warrant process, as it exists today, did not exist when the
framers drafted the first amendment.8 5 Consequently, the courts must
examine the post-framing history of search warrant materials to determine whether the materials have a "historical tradition of openness."
An examination of the post-framing history shows that almost a century passed before the Supreme Court, in Boyd v. United States,8 6 made its
80 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
81 N. LASSON, supra note 59, at 54; P. PoLyvIou, supra note 59, at 10; Reynard, supra note 65, at
262.
82 The public should not have access to search warrant materials prior to the warrants execution,
however. Such access would allow the subject of a search warrant to learn of the pending search
before agents can execute the warrant. This would totally frustrate the search warrant process.
83 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
84 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
595 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
85 See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text.
86 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd involved a forfeiture proceeding under the customs revenue laws.
Pursuant to a federal statute, a district court issued an order directing the claimants to produce an
invoice of 29 cases of imported plate glass. Id. at 618. The claimants complied with the order, and
subsequently, ajury found that the claimants had violated the customs revenue laws. Id. The claimants then appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the
statute requiring the production of the invoice violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616. But seven members of the Court went further and argued that
the statute authorized unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
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first important decision interpreting the fourth amendment. Another
ninety years passed before the courts began ruling on whether there was
a public right of access to search warrant proceedings. During this period, the modern search warrant evolved and general patterns developed
surrounding its use. Both the Eighth Circuit and Ninth Circuit agreed
that "although the process of issuing search warrants has traditionally
not been conducted in an open fashion, search warrant applications and
receipts are routinely filed with the clerk of court without seal." 8 7 But

the Ninth Circuit went on to say that the government "has always been
able to restrict access to warrant materials by requesting a sealing order,
which courts have granted freely upon a showing that a given criminal
investigation requires secrecy."8 8 This evidence does not demonstrate
conclusively that the warrant process has a historical tradition of openness, nor does it demonstrate a historical tradition of secrecy.
Other courts have also ruled on whether the public has a right of
access to search warrant materials. In 1980, the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island, in In re Search Warrantfor Second
Floor Bedroom,8 9 rendered the first ruling on whether the public has a
right of access to search warrant materials. The district court noted that
Rule 41 (g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a magistrate to file search warrant materials with the clerk of the district court.9 0
Because all papers filed with the clerk are public records available for
inspection, the court ruled that the public had a right of access to them. 9 1
The court did state, however, that it had the power to seal the materials
in proper circumstances. 92 Until McDonnell Douglas Corp., this was the
only federal case ruling on the question.
87 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988); Times Mirror Co. v. United
States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 1989). Federal magistrates are required to follow the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41 (g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires magistrates to file warrant materials with the district court clerk. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g). Unless the government requests a sealing order, the warrant materials become public records like any other
document filed with the court. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1214.
In the absence of a state counterpart to Rule 41(g), the states do not follow any uniform procedure in filing search warrant materials. The Supreme Court of Washington has conducted an informal survey of that State's counties to determine what procedures were followed in the filing of search
warrant materials. This survey revealed that no uniform procedure existed within the State. Some
counties allowed free access to the documents unless they were sealed by a court order. Other
counties allowed judges to keep them in their chambers where the public had no right of access at
all. Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wash. 2d 584, 637 P.2d 966, 969 (1981)).
88 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1214.
89 489 F. Supp. 207 (D.R.I. 1980). In an earlier case, In re Sealed Affidavit(s) to Search Warrants
Executed on February 14, 1979, 600 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held that
district courts have the inherent power to seal search'warrant materials "within certain constitutional
and other limitations." But the Ninth Circuit did not explain these "constitutional and other limitations." Id. 'On remand the district court held that sealing was a discretionary matter. In re Sealed
Affidavit(s) to Search Warrants Executed on February 14, 1979, No. 79 Misc.Civ. 722, slip op. at 3
(D. Nev. 1979).
90 See supra note 51.
91 In re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. 207, 212 (D.R.I. 1980).
92 Id. at 209. The "proper circumstances" limitation required the government to show that a
real possibility of harm would arise if the search warrant materials were disclosed. The governments
"mere speculation" that disclosure might frustrate an on-going grand jury investigation did not
meet this requirement. Id. at 212.
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A number of state courts have considered the issue, and the vast
majority of these courts have ruled that the public has no right of access
to search warrant materials. 93 In People v. Christopher,94 for example a
New York court held that the public did not have a right of access to
search warrant materials. But, unlike the federal government, New York
did not have a statute requiring magistrates to file such documents with
95
the clerk of the court.

In 1981, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that search warrant materials were not public records. 9 6 But the court stated that these
materials should be filed, and thus be open to the public, unless an interested party could demonstrate that such disclosure would present a substantial threat to that party's interests. 9 7 In 1986, the Supreme Court of
Washington again ruled that the public did not have a right of access to
search warrant materials. 98 In this case, however, the court expressly
ruled that neither the common law nor the first amendment required
such access. 9 9
Most recently, a Massachusetts's court held that even though a
search warrant affidavit was a public record, the public did not have a
right of access to it before indictment.1u
These cases illustrate the lack of consensus as to whether there is a
public right of access to search warrant materials. Since the evidence
does not conclusively show that search warrant materials have historically
been open to the public, courts should rule that the "historical openness" prong has not been met.
B.

Significant Positive Role in the Functioningof the Process

The second prong of the current first amendment right of access
inquiry is "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question."' 10 1 The "particular
process in question"' 1 2 is not the warrant proceeding isolated from the
rest of the judicial process. To the contrary, the courts have analyzed the
right of access to the particular proceeding in light of its role in the functioning of the overall judicial process.10 3 Applying this analysis to search
warrant proceedings and materials, Times Mirror balanced the interests
the open warrant process would further against the damage it would
cause to the judicial process. 10 4 The court concluded that the second
93 See Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Mag., 403 Mass. 628, 531 N.E.2d 1261 (1988);
People v. Christopher, 109 Misc. 2d 767, 443 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1981); Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter,
105 Wash. 2d 144, 713 P.2d 710 (1986); Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wash. 2d 584, 637
P.2d 966 (1981).
94 109 Misc. 2d 767, 443 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1981).
95 Id. at 769, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
96 Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wash. 2d 584, 637 P.2d 966 (1981).
97 Id.
98 Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter, 105 Wash. 2d 144, 713 P.2d 710 (1986).
99 Id.
100 Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Mag., 403 Mass. 628, 531 N.E.2d 1261 (1988).
101 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
102 Id.
103 See id. at 12; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
104 Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1214-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
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prong was not satisfied because Times Mirror Company's contentions
were "more than outweighed by the damage to the criminal investigatory
process that would result from open search warrant proceedings."'' 0 5
Applying this same analysis to similar facts, 10 6 McDonnell Douglas
Corp. implicitly held that public access to search warrant materials would
play a significant positive role in the functioning of the judicial process. 107 The Eighth Circuit conceded that the public probably could not
claim a first amendment right of access to warrant proceedings because
"the very objective of the search warrant process, the seizure of evidence
of crime, would be frustrated if conducted openly."' 0 8 The court, however, then held that "the qualified first amendment right of public access
extends to the documents filed in support of search warrants ...."109 In so
holding, the court failed to carefully consider the potentially frustrating
effects access to search warrant materials could have on the judicial process.1 10 These potentially frustrating effects are incorporated in the following analysis of Times Mirror's application of the second prong.
Although Times Mirror correctly concluded that the warrant process
does not satisfy the significant positive role prong as it previously has
been applied, it applied this prong incorrectly in some respects and inadequately in others.
1. Interests Supporting Access to the Search Warrant Process
Times Mirror Company stated three general interests in support of
its claim that public access to search warrant materials would serve a significant positive role in warrant proceedings."' It claimed:
[T]hat open warrant proceedings are essential to self-government because observation of all aspects of the judicial process promotes open
discussion of the process and permits the public to serve as a check on
possible governmental abuses. Second, appellants argue that public
scrutiny of warrant proceedings enhances the 'quality and safeguards
the integrity of the fact-finding process,' as is true with public scrutiny
of the criminal trial. Finally, appellants argue that open-warrant proceedings and access to warrant materials would have the same 'community therapeutic value' as open criminal trials, by serving as an
105 Id at 1215.
106 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
107 The court indicates that they applied the two-prong test. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d
569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1988). They then stated findings that supported the second prong: "[P]ublic
access to documents filed in support of search warrants is important to the public's understanding of
the function and operation of the judicial process and the criminal justice system and may operate as
a curb on prosecutorial or judicial misconduct." Itd at 573. Although the court did not expressly
state that public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the judicial process, they
did hold that the "qualified first amendment right of public access extends to the documents filed in
support of search warrants .. " Id. at 575. The application of the two-prong test together with the
holding necessarily implies that the court found that public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the judicial process.
108 McDonnell Douglas Corp, 855 F.2d at 573 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986)
(citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979))).
109 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d at 575 (emphasis added). See supra notes 5, 50.
110 See infra text accompanying note 115.
111 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
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outlet for the sense of outrage, insecurity and need for retribution that
12
a community feels when a crime occurs."

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that these were clearly legitimate interests. It held, however, that the damage to the criminal investigatory process that could result from 1open warrant proceedings outweighed these
clearly legitimate interests.' 3
Potential Damage to the Criminal Investigatory Process
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the potential damage to the criminal
investigatory process is more detailed than are the general interests
Times Mirror Company argued would be furthered by access to search
warrant materials. The court implied that the justification for granting
public access to criminal trials did not apply with equal force to search
warrant proceedings because of the types of potential damages
involved. 114
2.

In explaining these potential damages, the Times Mirror court dis-

cussed the burden open warrant proceedings could place on the investigatory process, the privacy interests of those identified in warrants and
supporting affidavits, and the current safeguards against governmental
abuse of the search warrant process.' 15
112 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 606 (1982)).
113 Id. Times Mirrordid not explain why appellant's arguments are clearly legitimate, but they are
fairly self-explanatory. Many other courts have also expressed these same general interests concerning access to judicial proceedings and documents:
(1) Public access serves as a check on governmental abuse, in that it gives "assurance that the
proceedings [are] conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discourage[s] perjury, the misconduct of
participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980). See also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); Gannet Co. v.
Despasquale, 443 U.S. 375, 394 (1982) (Burger, CJ., concurring); Id. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606 ("And in the broadest terms,
public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the
judicial process-an essential component in our structure of self-government."); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
(2) "Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of
factfinding process .....
fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process." Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at
606. Times Mirror Co. claimed these concerns apply equally to warrant proceedings. Times Mirror,
873 F.2d at 1213. See also Press-Enterprise Co. I, 464 U.S. at 508; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
569-71; Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550,
556 (3d Cir. 1982); Publicker Industries, Inc. V. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (3d Cir. 1984). But
c.f. Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1988) (concedes that public access concerns
are important, but contends that they are not served after the case is closed with prejudice).
(3) Press-Enterprise I explained the "therapeutic value" access to proceedings has for the public. "When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is
functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions. Proceedings
Press-Enterprise I,
held in secret would deny this outlet and frustrate the broad public interest ....
464 U.S. at 509. See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983); Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-71.
114 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
115 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1212-18.
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The Burden an Open Search WarrantProcess Could Place on the
Investigatory Process

Use of a balancing approach" 16 in applying the significant positive
role prong implicitly recognizes that some processes would be ineffective
if, at least initially, 1 7 conducted openly. This point was expressly recognized in Press-EnterpriseI1. In that case, the court stated that "[a]lthough
many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes
little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of government
18
operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly.""
Times Mirror analogized warrant proceedings to grand jury proceedings 19 - the "classic example" of the kind of "government operation[]
that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly . . . [since] 'the
proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings.' "120 The court used this analogy to discuss the
hindering effects public access to the search warrant process would have
12
on the government's ability to conduct criminal investigations. '
Times Mirror cites several reasons, previously articulated by the
Supreme Court, why secrecy is imperative in grand jury proceedings:
First, if pre-indictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing
that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony.
Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be
less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those
about to be indicted would flee, or would
try to influence individual
12 2
grand jurors to vote against indictment.
The court interpreted these reasons to mean that "the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings is maintained in large part to avoid jeopardizing the
2
criminal investigation of which the grand jury is an integral part."'
The court stated that these reasons for keeping grand jury proceedings secret are equally applicable to warrant proceedings: "[S]ecrecy is
no less important to the process of investigating crime [including warrant
proceedings] for the purpose of obtaining evidence to present to a grand
jury."' 124 If the warrant proceedings or supporting affidavits were open
to the public, the subject of the warrant could learn of the warrant and
116 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
117 Times Mirrordecision is limited only to access to warrant proceedings while a preindictment
investigation is still ongoing. The court did not decide the "question whether the public has a First
Amendment right of access after an investigation is' concluded or after indictments have been returned." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1211, 1221 (emphasis added).

118

Press-Enterprise Co. II, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).

119 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
120 Id- (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979))).
121 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215. In fact, the court said that "(in this regard warrant proceedings are indistinguishable from grand jury proceedings ....
Id.
122 Id. (quoting Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219). See also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 577, 681-82 n.6 (1958) (approving similar reasons for grandjury secrecy given in United States

v. Rose, 215 F.2d 517, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
123 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
124

Id.
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destroy criminal evidence or flee before the government executed the
search warrant. Even after execution of the warrant, but while the investigation was ongoing, there would be the risk that other persons identified in the affidavits as being under suspicion of criminal activity might
1 25
destroy evidence, coordinate their stories or flee the jurisdiction.
There is also the risk that public access to search warrant materials would
discourage witnesses and informants from providing free and full
1 26
information.
The opinion in Times Mirror initially focused on the common need
for secrecy in grand jury and warrant proceedings stemming from their
role in the investigatory process. However, the court also set forth an
additional line of reasoning to support its view that search warrant proceedings, like grand jury proceedings, require secrecy. The court cited
reasoning expressed byJudge Harvey of the United States District Court
for Maryland:
If proceedings before and related to evidence presented to a grand
jury (including subpoenas, documents and even hearings before the
court for the immunization of witnesses) can be kept secret, afortiori,
matters relating to a criminal investigation leading to the development
of evidence to be presented to a grand jury may also be kept secret.
Indeed search warrant proceedings are one step back from the convening of a grand jury. 127
Apparently to clarify Judge Harvey's reasoning, the court cited In re
Search Warrantfor Second FloorBedroom as stating the contrary of his proposition.1 28 In re Search Warrantfor Second Floor Bedroom held that "the rule
of grand jury secrecy extends only to the grand jury proceeding themselves, not to the subject matter of the investigation or to any material
prpared prior to a grand jury proceeding, including search warrant
29
affidavits."1
The combination of these references to Judge Harvey and In re
Search Warrantfor Second Floor Bedroom suggests that the court's additional
support for secrecy in the warrant process is merely an extension of
grand jury secrecy.13 0 Attempts to expand the scope of the grand jury's
secrecy to include prior warrant proceedings are unnecessary. The need
for secrecy in the warrant process is independently justified by the dan13 1
ger public access would pose to the ongoing investigatory process.
There is no need to force the warrant process under the grand jury's own
125 Id.
126 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. This is a further analogy to a grand jury's need for
secrecy.
127 In re Sealed Search Warrants and Affidavits, Criminal No. h-88-0427, at 12-13 (D.Md. August
30, 1988) (oral opinion).
128 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1216.
129 Id. (summarizing the holding in In re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp.
207, 211 (D.R.I.1980) (emphasis added)). While not expressly rejecting this holding, the court uses
Judge Harvey's contrary reasoning to support its "view that search warrant proceedings, like grand
jury proceedings, require secrecy." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215-16.
130 For a brief history of grand jury secrecy and its codification by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, see Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 217 n.9 (1979); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e).

131

See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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well established veil of secrecy.' 3 2 The court's argument would have
been stronger if it had limited the "grand jury-warrant proceeding" analogy to the their common, although independent, need for secrecy to protect the criminal investigatory process.
b.

Privacy Interests of Those Identified in Search Warrants and Supporting
Affidavits

The Supreme Court has stated that another reason for maintaining
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is to "assure that persons who are
accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public
ridicule."' 3 3 Times Mirror stated that this concern applied with equal
force to search warrant proceedings and reinforced its holding that the
first amendment did not establish a qualified right of access to search
warrant proceedings and materials during an ongoing preindictment
investigation. 134
The court analogized the individual privacy rights that would be at
risk if the public had access to search warrant materials to those concerning public access to a bill of particulars which names unindicted members
of a criminal conspiracy.1 3 5 In United States v. Smith,' 3 6 the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's decision to seal a bill of particulars which
named unindicted coconspirators. Smith held that the risks to individual
privacy rights resulting from allowing public access to the bill of particulars seriously undermined the social utility of releasing the names. 13 7
Times Mirror concluded that the risks identified in Smith' 3 8 were also
present when the public is allowed access to search warrant materials:
Persons who prove to be innocent are frequently the subjects of government investigations. Like a bill of particulars, a search warrant affidavit may supply only the barest details of the government's reasons
for believing that an individual may be engaging in criminal activity.
Nonetheless, the issuance of a warrant-even on this minimal information-may indicate to the public that government officials have reason
to believe that persons
named in the search warrant have engaged in
39
criminal activity.'
Therefore, in addition to interests in the ongoing criminal investigatory
process, the concern for the privacy rights of those unindicted persons
named in search warrants weighs against public access to the warrant
process.
132

See supra note 130.

133 Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 220 (1979); see also United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29
(3d Cir. 1954).
134 Times Mirror Co v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1989).
135

Id.

136
137
138
139

United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id at 1113-14. See also United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1581 (9th Cir. 1988).
Smith, 776 F.2d at 1113-14.
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1216.
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Current Safeguards Against GovernmentalAbuse of the Search Warrant
Process

Another factor weighing in favor of not allowing public access to the
warrant process, is the existence of safeguards already in place to deter
governmental abuse of the warrant process. 140 One of Times Mirror
Company's principally asserted reasons for allowing public access to
search warrant materials was that public access would "serve as a check
on possible governmental abuses."' 4 1 In McDonnell Douglas Corp., the
Eighth Circuit also relied heavily on this same assertion that public access
"may operate as a curb on prosecutorial or-judicial misconduct [in the
search warrant process]."'1 4 2 In response, Times Mirror acknowledged the
validity of this assertion, 143 but briefly concluded that the safeguards currently in place reinforced its holding that the government's interest in
warrant prosecrecy outweighed the value of public access to the search
14 4
cess at this stage of an ongoing criminal investigation.
For example, judicial determination of probable cause by a neutral
and detached magistrate serves as a check on an investigating "officer
14 5
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."'
The subject of the warrant can also file a civil suit for a violation of constitutional rights. 14 6 Furthermore, a suppression motion provides 4a7
means to seek supression of any unconstitutionally gathered evidence.'
In addition, when an investigation results in a filed criminal charge,48 public scrutiny will occur during later pretrial and trial proceedings.
By disallowing public access to the warrant process, public scrutiny
is not denied, it is simply delayed "until a time when the affidavit is integrally related to a proceeding in which the public [already] enjoys a first
amendment right of access."' 14 9 While Times Mirror does not deny that
"the public has a vital role to play in policing the government's use of the
warrant process, [it] fail[s] to see how the public can play such a role at
this stage without risk of damage to the [ongoing] investigation."' 150 As
recognized in Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter,'5 ' the delay protects the privacy of the subjects of warrants and the informants, and fosters effective
140 Id. at 1218.
141 Id. at 1215.
142 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988).
143 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217.
144 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218. See also Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter, 105 Wash. 2d 144,
151-57, 713 P.2d 710, 714 (1986).
145 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947). The Ninth Circuit is not insinuating that
this safeguard alone is sufficient. "We recognize that the Supreme Court has noted that there must
be some process by which society can monitor law enforcement officials' decisions ... beyond relying on the judgement of the neutral detached magistrate." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218 n. 11.
146 Times Mirror,873 F.2d at 1218.
147 Id. See also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
148 Seattle Times Co., 105 Wash.2d at 152, 713 P.2d at 714. See generally Richmond Newspapers Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
149 Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep't,
403 Mass. 628, 637 n. 11, 531 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 n. II (1988)(commenting on Seattle Times, 105
Wash.2d 144, 713 P.2d 710).
150 Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218 n. 11 (emphasis added).
151 105 Wash.2d 144, 152-53, 713 P.2d 710, 714 (1986).
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law enforcement. 152 Here again, Times Mirror balanced the interests advanced by public access to the warrant process against the potential risk
to the investigatory process. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit seems to ignore the possibility that the case will not go any farther in the criminal
process, such that public access would not be available in a later
153
proceeding.
In conclusion, Times Mirror correctly held that, the search warrant
process failed to satisfy the significant positive role prong of the twoprong test as it is presently applied. The Ninth Circuit supported its conclusion that during the preindictment stages of an ongoing investigation,
the legitimate interests1 54 supporting public access to the search warrant
process are outweighed by the risk to the investigatory process,' 55 the
privacy interests of those individuals named in the w/arrant,1 56 and the
preexisting checks on possible governmental abuse.' 5 7 However, as exemplified by the holding in McDonnell Douglas Corp.,158 not all courts
agree and the issue is not as clear cut as the Ninth Circuit has reasoned it
to be.
IV.

A Proposal For a Revised Two-Prong Test

The two-prong test is useful in determining whether the public has a
right of access to preliminary hearings, voir dire, and criminal trials. As
the Supreme Court has stated, these processes have "historical tradition[s] of openness." 5 9 In light of these "historical tradition[s] of openness", it is arguable that the framers of the Constitution intended that
these processes remain open, and that therefore, there should be a first
amendment right of public access to them. But the two-prong test
proves inadequate when applied to processes which did not exist when
the Constitution was framed. Courts should not uphold the assertion
that processes not existing at this time are not entitled to Constitutional
protection.' 6 0 If the current version of the two-prong test is rigidly ap152 Id See Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wash. 2d 584, 589, 637 P.2d 966, 969-70 (1981).
153 If the government fails to bring criminal charges against the subject of the search warrant, the
search warrant materials could remain sealed. Thus, the public's right of access to these materials
would not merely be delayed, it would be lost. In fact, it is more likely that this would happen in a
situation where the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Presumably, if the police found
what they were looking for, the government would bring-charges.
154 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of interests supporting public
access to the search warrant process.
155 See supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential risks public
access to the search warrant process would pose to the investigatory process.
156 See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the privacy interests of those
named in search warrants.
157 See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the preexisting checks on
possible governmental abuse of the search warrant process.
158 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988).
159 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe
Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
160 There is strong support for the position that the Constitution is a living, breathing document
which is constantly evolving to adapt and better serve changing interests and needs. See generally
Note, First Amendment Right of Access, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 292, 322-325 (1982); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 60-63 (1980).
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plied, processes of recent origin will never be open to the public under
the first amendment.
The process of applying for search warrants and filing materials generated by the proceeding with the clerk of the court is of recent origin.
Thus, the search warrant process fails the two-prong test by default.
Rather than indulging in the legal fiction of determining whether a process of recent origin has a "historical tradition of openness", courts
should try to determine whether the framers would have intended the
public to have a first amendment right of access to the process in question. In determining the intent of the framers regarding search warrant
materials, several facts must be considered. First, the abuse of the writs
of assistance was a primary cause of the Revolutionary War.1 61 Second,
at the time the Constitution was framed, there existed a basic distrust of
government.1 62 Third, the entire Constitutional
scheme favors an in1 63
formed citizenry over a secretive government.
Even though the framers may have intended the public to have a first
amendment right of access to search warrant materials, there will be
those who argue, as the Ninth Circuit did in Times Mirror, that such access
would not play a "significant positive role" in the functioning of the
process.
Beginning with Richmond Newspapers and continuing through PressEnterprise II, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of access to
judicial proceedings and developed the two-prong test as the standard
for determining when the public possessed a qualified right of access to
certain judicial proceedings.1 64 Press-EnterpriseII described the standard
for the second prong as "whether public access plays a significant posi65
tive role in the functioning of the particular process in question."'
This standard was based on Globe Newspaper's description of the right of
public access to criminal trials as playing "a particularly significant role in
the functioning of the judicial process ... ."166 Press-EnterpriseII's use of
the "significant positive role" standard was arbitrary in the sense that
although Globe Newspaper used similar language, 67 it used it in describing
the important role public access played in the functioning of the judicial
process in general. It did not expressly use it as a measuring stick for
allowing public access. Perhaps under Globe Newspaper, a court should
allow public access when that access would play a less than significant
positive, but still a positive, role in the functioning of the judicial process.
Considering the Supreme Court's emphasis on first amendment
rights and the important role of public access, it is ironic that the resulting two-prong test requires the public to make an affirmative showing
161
162

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., F. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7 (1922);

1-2 (1978); C.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-

79-82
(1935).
163 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) (discussing the benefits of an informed citizenry as opposed to a powerful government).
164 See supra notes 7-35 and accompanying text.
165 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
166 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
167 Id.
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that public access would play a "significant positive role" to overcome a
presumption of nonaccess. It seems more appropriate to presume that
public access to the proceeding benefits the judicial process, unless it is
shown that public access to that proceeding would play a negative role in
the functioning of the judicial process. This minimizes the risk of unnec168
essary total denial of public access to the particular proceeding.
First amendment protections are strong and the court should hesitate to deny them. Unless, after balancing the competing interests, the
court determines that public access would serve a negative role in the
process in question, the public should have a first amendment qualified
right of access to the process-assuming it is consistent with the framers'
intent.
If a court determines that there is a qualified first amendment right
of public access to a particular proceeding, such as search warrant proceedings, then courts should make a case by case determination as to
whether the qualified right should be denied. For example, in appropriate circumstances it may be reasonable for the government to request a
temporary sealing order for search warrant materials. One such circumstance may arise during an ongoing criminal investigation. But the mere
fact that the government is still conducting an investigation is not, in and
of itself, sufficient to deny the public a first amendment right of access to
search warrant materials. 169 The government must show not only that an
investigation is still underway, but also that public access to the search
warrant materials would pose a substantial threat to that particular investigation. If the government makes such a showing, it would be proper
for a court to grant a temporary sealing order. This order would expire
upon completion of the investigation, indictment, or after a specified
time period. At the expiration of this time period the government could
request an extension of the sealing order. This extension would be subject to the same requirements as the original sealing order.
An individual named in a search warrant may also petition the court
for a sealing order. In this case the court should grant a sealing order if
the individual demonstrates that a legitimate interest 170 would be substantially threatened by public access to the search warrant materials. In
making this determination, the court should first consider whether the
individual's claim is valid. If it is valid, the court should consider whether
portions of the search warrant could be redacted to protect these legitimate interests. If redaction would not be practicable, the court could
168 This suggestion reverses the current presumption and creates a presumption of openness
which may be dispelled by the party seeking closure showing that access to the particular process in
question would serve a negative role in the functioning of the judicial process. For example, the
burden would be on the prosecutor, seeking closure of the search warrant proceeding, to show that
public access to the proceeding would play a negative role in the functioning of the judicial process.
This determination would be based on the current method of balancing the interests supporting
public access and the interests against public access. See supra note 102-4 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
170 Public access to search warrant materials may pose a substantial threat to an individual's privacy interest if the individual is named in the search warrant. This interest would vanish, however, if
the individual is indicted. Courts should redact the names of informants as a matter of routine
practice.
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grant the sealing order conditioned upon the continued existence of the
legitimate interests.
In the absence of either of the above situations, the public should
have a first amendment right of access to search warrant materials. In no
case should public access to search warrant materials be restricted without a showing, either by the government or an interested individual, that
access would substantially threaten a legitimate interest.
V. Conclusion
Thus far, the Supreme Court has required judicial proceedings to
satisfy the two-prong test in order for the public to have a qualified first
amendment right of access to them. Applying the current two-prong test
to warrant proceedings, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the public
does not have a qualified first amendment right of access to search warrant proceedings and materials while a preindictment investigation is underway. The evidence does not reveal a "historical tradition of
openness," and therefore, search warrant materials do not satisfy the
"historical openness" prong of the two-prong test. Furthermore, the interests in favor of access do not significantly outweigh the burdens of
access. Therefore, search warrant materials do not satisfy the "significant positive role" prong of the two-prong test.
However, a revised two-prong test should be applied to search warrant materials and other proceedings that have relatively short histories.
In applying the historical openness prong, the court should focus on determining whether the framers of the Constitution would have intended
for the public to have a first amendment right of access to the particular
proceeding. In analyzing such proceedings the court should take into
consideration the severe consequences of ruling that no first amendment
right, qualified or unqualified, exists. In addition, the court should consider other means that are available to protect the qualified right against
interests weighing in favor of closed proceedings. Furthermore, the significant positive role prong of the two-prong test should be altered so
that it would be satisfied unless public access to a proceeding would play
a negative role in the functioning of the process. Under this revised test, it
is likely that the public would have a qualified first amendment right of
access to search warrant materials during the preindictment stages of an
ongoing criminal investigation.
Robert J. Brantman
Scott K. Martinsen

United States v. Nofziger and the Revision of
18 U.S.C. § 207: The Need for a New Approach to the
Mens Rea Requirements of Federal Criminal Law
In 1980, the United States Congress gazed into the future of federal
criminal law, beheld the opportunity for reform of mens rea '-and turned
away. 2
In the same year, the United States Supreme Court gazed into the
future, beheld a similar opportunity-and paused, at least long enough
to sketch a bare outline of what it saw. 3 The
succeeding years, however,
4
appear to have clouded the Court's vision.
As a result, federal criminal law still lacks a unified, workable model
for determining the state of mind requirements of a criminal statute.
The recent decision in United States v. Nofziger 5 manifests this shortcoming. Noftiger involved one defendant and one statute. It produced two
opinions-both mistaken. The amended version of the statute Nofziger
interpeted also manifests the shortcoming. Congress attempted to eliminate the statute's confusion. It enacted a new subsection-still
ambiguous.
The statute in question was a product of Congress' desire to slow
the swirl of the "revolving door" involving personnel rotating between
government and private industry.6 In 1978, it strengthened the Ethics in
I For the purposes of this Comment, "mens rea ... mean[s] a state of mind that is criminal if
there is the requisite act, and actus reus ... mean~s] an act that is criminal if there is the requisite
mind." G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 642 (2d ed. 1961).
2 The reform was embodied in the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) [hereinafter S. 1722]. The bill was referred to the Committee on the judiciary, which
reported the bill favorably, recommending passage. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
The bill as a whole "can be regarded as a... truly momentous advance toward fulfillment of one of
the most basic demands of our society, viz, justice in the administration of criminal law." Id. at 2.
Sections 301-03 of the bill would have reformed the determination of state of mind in federal criminal law. See infra notes 92-120 and accompanying text.
Despite theJudiciary Committee's enthusiasm for reform, Congress never passed a comprehensive reform bill. S. 1722 fell victim to the constraints of the political process: "In the 96th Congress, both the Senate and the House Committees on the judiciary reported criminal code bills;
however, insufficient time remained in the press of the election year to complete the process." S.
REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). The reform movement slowed after this failure. "In
the 1980's the steam went out of the effort to adopt a comprehensive criminal code revision, and
Congress began again to consider crime bills that treat substantive criminal law piecemeal." N.
ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 67 (1986).
3 In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), the Court discussed and endorsed criminal
law reform proposals aimed at producing "workable principles for determining criminal culpability
...a byproduct [of which] has been a general rethinking of traditional mens rea analysis." Id. at 403.
For a brief discussion of the facts and holding of Bailey, see infra note 93; for an explanation of its
significance to contemporary state of mind jurisprudence, see infra notes 94-120 and accompanying
text.
4 The Court's decisions in United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984), and Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), indicate that the Court has not completely grasped the assumptions
aimed at reforming the determination of mens rea. See infra notes 86 and 108.
5 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
6 For a discussion of the "revolving door" problem, seeJohnson, Agency "Capture" The "Revolving Door" between RegulatedIndustriesand Their RegulatingAgencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1983).
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Government Act, 7 further limiting the involvement former government
employees may have in matters related to their past responsibilities. Because Congress was concerned with officials actually or apparently using
public office for private gain,8 it imposed criminal penalties on former
employees who violated additional post-employment restrictions. 9 One
restriction prohibits a former government employee from making certain
business contacts with the employee's prior agency for one year after
leaving government service. Title 18 of the United States Code currently
provides, in relevant part:
Whoever, [being a covered government employee], within one year
after such employment has ceased, knowingly acts as agent or attorney
for, or otherwise represents, anyone other than the United States in
any formal or informal appearance before, or, with the intent to influence, makes any oral or written communication on behalf of anyone
other than the United States, to(1) the department or agency in which he served as an officer
or employee, or any officer or employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with any.., particular matter, and
(3) which is pending before such department or agency or in
which such department or agency has a direct and substantial
interestshall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
two years, or both.' 0
In February of 1988, Franklyn C. Nofziger was tried and convicted
under subsection 207(c). The District of Columbia Circuit, by a divided
panel, overturned his conviction in June, 1989.11 The majority interpreted the statute's mens rea element to require knowledge of each element in the offense. Because the government did not prove that Mr.
Nofziger knew his former agency had a "direct and substantial interest"' 12
in certain matters, the majority ruled that his guilt was not established.' 3
Responding to this decision, in November of 1989 Congress amended
7 Pub. L. No. 95-521, Title V, 92 Stat. 1864 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-28, §§ 1, 2, 93
Star. 76 (1979), current version codified at 18 U.S.C § 207 (1988).
8 According to the Senate Report:
[The revision] is an attempt to prevent corruption and other official misconduct before
it occurs, as well as penalizing it once it is uncovered....
18 U.S.C. 207, like other conflict of interest statutes, seeks to avoid even the appearanceof
public office being used for personal or private gain. In striving for public confidence in the
integrity of government, it is imperative to remember that what appears to be true is often
as important as what is true. Thus government in its dealings must make every reasonable
effort to avoid even the appearance of conflict of interest and favoritism.
S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216,
4247-4248 (emphasis in original).
9 Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 207 describe the three post-employment restrictions.
See Mundheim, Conflict of Interest and the Former Government Employee: Rethinking the Revolving Door, 14
CREIGHTON L. REV., 707, 711-14 (1981) (briefly describing the historical development and practical
effect of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
10 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1988).
11 United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 564 (1989).
12 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(3) (1988).
13 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 454.
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subsection 207(c). 14 Part of the revision eliminated the requirement that
the communication or appearance relate to matters of direct and substantial interest to the former agency.
Obviously, Nofziger was important to Nofziger; it kept him out of
prison. Nevertheless, its legal significance lies in the reasoning the majority and the dissent used in interpreting the statute. In fact, Nofziger
graphically illustrates a problem of interpreting the federal criminal code
that is altogether too common. Title 18 gives no explicit direction to
judges, jurors, lawyers, or citizens on how to determine the mens rea requirements, if any, for each element of offenses defined in it.15 Thus,
different courts may require different states of mind for the same elements of the same offenses.' 6 Where order should reign, chaos prevails.
14 Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 101(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1724 (1989) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(c) (West Supp. 1990)) (effectiveJan. 1, 1991). For the text and
an analysis of the new section, see infra Part V, notes 202-27 and accompanying text.
Unless otherwise noted, all references in this Comment to § 207(c) refer to the section under
which Mr. Nofziger was prosecuted. The present § 207(c) will remain effective until Dec. 31, 1990.
15 The Senate Judiciary Committee reported that:
No Federal statute attempts a comprehensive and precise definition of the terms used to
describe the requisite state of mind. Nor are the terms defined in the statutes in which they
are used. Instead the task of giving substance to the "mental element" used in a particular
statute, or to be inferred from a particular statute, has been left to the courts.
S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980).
16 The varying interpretations of the mens rea requirement in the National Firearms Act, 26
U.S.C. §§ 5841-72 (1988), illustrate the confusion in the courts regarding construction of federal
criminal statutes. The Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person(b) to receive or possess a firearm transferred to him in violation of the provisions of this
chapter [relating to taxation and registration]; or
(c) to receive or possess a firearm made in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or
(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record ....
26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988). "Firearm" is defined in § 5845 to include shotguns and rifles with shortened barrels, automatic weapons, silencers, and other "destructive devices."
Initially, several courts held that the government need not prove that a defendant knew that his
weapon was a "firearm" subject to registration under the Act. Thus, no state of mind was necessary
regarding the characteristics of the weapon. An early case that interpreted the Act stated:
The statute makes the mere possession of an unregistered firearm transferred in violation
of law an offense. If an accused possess such firearm, the offense is complete.... Scienter is
not involved.
United States v. Decker, 292 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1961) (citation omitted). This interpretation was
followed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 836 (1973). The court held that the
Government was not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge that the physical
characteristics of the weapon rendered it subject to registration.
Idt at 732.
Nevertheless, some courts were troubled by the possible ramifications of this interpretation. In
United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983), the Ninth Circuit
created a limited exception to the general rule that knowledge of the weapon's characteristics need
not be proven. The court required the government to prove the defendant's state of mind as to
weapons which could have been lawfully possessed but had been internally modified to become
"firearms" under the Act. The court stated that, if the law were otherwise,
then any person who possessed an internally modified weapon with absolutely no knowledge or method of verification of the modification would be in violation of the law. We are
sure Congress did not intend that this statute be so draconian.
Id at 986-87.
Recently, two federal circuit courts have expanded the reasoning of Herbert to require proof of
state of mind regarding the weapon's characteristics. In United States v. Williams, 872 F.2d 773, 777

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:803

This Comment examines the Nofziger decision and subsection 207(c)
as prototypes of the problems in interpreting federal criminal statutes.
Part I outlines the facts and ruling in Nofziger. Part II discusses the language difficulties found in interpreting all statutes and explains the jurisprudential assumptions 17 that federal courts are supposed to use to
interpret the mens rea requirement of the federal criminal code. The assumptions provide a framework for analyzing federal criminal statutes.
Part III analyzes the ruling in Nofziger. It argues that the Nofziger majority
incorrectly interpreted subsection 207(c) when it required the prosecution to prove that the defendant acted knowingly with respect to each element of the crime. Part IV analyzes the present subsection 207(c)
according to the framework outlined in Part II(B) (2). It argues that the
statute should be interpreted to require knowledge for the "appearance
offense," purpose for the "communication offense," and recklessness for
the statute's remaining elements.' 8 This interpretation reflects the grammatical structure of subsection 207(c) and uses the analytical framework
outlined in Part II(B)(2). Part V briefly discusses the amended statute
and applies the analytical framework to interpret it. This Comment concludes that federal courts should apply the suggested analytical framework when interpreting all federal criminal statutes.
I.

Summary of the Facts and Holding of United States v. Nofziger

Franklyn C. Nofziger served as Assistant to the President for Political Affairs under President Ronald W. Reagan from January 21, 1981, to
January 22, 1982. After his resignation, Mr. Nofziger formed the political consulting firm of Nofziger-Bragg Communications. 19 In February of
(6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit cited to Herbert in requiring proof of the defendant's knowledge
that the weapon was automatic and thus fell under the Act.
The Fifth Circuit faced this issue in United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989).
In an en banc decision, the judges split as closely as possible-eight to seven-on the issue of whether
mens rea was required for conviction. The eight judge majority required proof that the defendant
knew the guns were automatic weapons. The majority required that the defendant have "knowledge
of the relevant physical characteristics of the items possessed." 885 F.2d at 1253 n.8. According to
the majority, the "rule [allowing conviction without proof of this knowledge] is aberrational in our
jurisprudence-a jurisprudence largely based on the Anglo-Saxon common law-[so] we discard it."
Id. at 1249. The majority thus overruled Vasquez. The seven dissenting judges strongly disagreed
with requiring proof of mens rea for conviction. According to the dissent, "the pertinent question is
whether Congress intended to place on the owner a reasonable duty of inquiry; by far the better view
is that it did." Id. at 1261. These cases demonstrate the need for a uniform method of interpreting
federal criminal statutes.
17 This Comment utilizes a framework incorporating these assumptions. We refer to them as
"assumptions" because they are not codified as law in Title 18. Nevertheless, modem criminal law
developed these assumptions: in the Model Penal Code, adopted at the state level; in the products
of criminal law reform bills, proposed at the federal level; and in Supreme Court holdings. See infra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
18 The "appearance offense" means the portion of § 207(c) that prohibits "act[ing] as agent or
attorney for, or otherwise represent[ing], anyone other than the United States in any formal or informal appearance before [the official's former department or agency]."
The "communication offense" means the portion of § 207(c) that prohibits a former official
from "mak[ing] any oral or written communication on behalf of anyone other than the United States,
to [the official's former department or agency]."
The remaining elements are described in parts (1) - (3) of § 207(c). 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1988).
19 Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 883058), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
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1988, a jury convicted Mr. Nofziger of three violations of subsection
20
207(c) of the Ethics in Government Act.
Three separate communications formed the basis of Mr. Nofziger's
conviction. The first offense was an April 8, 1982, letter to Edwin Meese
III, Counselor to the President, urging the White House to support the
Welbilt Electronic Die Corporation's efforts to obtain an Army contract.
The second offense was a letter to James Jenkins, Deputy Counselor to
the President, urging support of a labor union. Finally, the third offense
was Mr. Nofziger's lobbying of White House officials to support additional export sales of the Fairchild Republic Corporation's A-10 antitank
2
aircraft. '
The jury found (1) that Mr. Nofziger intended to influence his former agency, 22 and (2) that the communications were made within one
year after Mr. Nofziger left the government, and that the White House
23
had "a direct and substantial interest" in the matters.
20 Nofiger, 878 F.2d at 444. For the text of the statute, see text preceding supra note 10.
21 Brief for the United States at 6-14, Nofziger (No. 88-3058). The following is a summary of the
context in which Mr. Nofziger made the communications that were the basis of his conviction.
First Offense: Mr. Nofziger lobbied on behalf of the Welbilt Electronic Die Corporation, a minority-owned manufacturer located in the South Bronx of New York City. The White House was
interested in economic development of this area, and Welbilt was identified under a minority setaside program of the Small Business Administration as a possible manufacturer of small gasoline
engines for the Army. In March 1982, with an apparently irreconcilable $15 million difference between the Army offer and Welbilt's proposal, the company retained Nofziger-Bragg Communications as its lobbyist. Pursuant to this arrangement, Mr. Nofziger sent the April 8 letter to Edwin
Meese III, Counselor to the President. The trial court found that because the White House had a
direct and substantial interest in this matter, Mr. Nofziger violated § 207(c) by contacting his former
agency about the matter within a year after he resigned.
Second Offense: The Marine Engineers Beneficial Association (MEBA), a private labor union,
retained Mr. Nofziger in April 1982 to convince the Reagan Administration to expand the use of
civilian manning-as opposed to the use of Navy personnel-on United States ships. Previously,
President Reagan made a campaign promise to implement civilian manning, and the matter was
discussed at a Cabinet meeting. The trial court found that because the White House had a substantial interest in civilian manning, Mr. Nofziger's letter on behalf of MEBA to James Jenkins, Deputy
Counselor to the President, violated § 207(c).
Third Offense: In 1982, Fairchild Republic Corporation retained Mr. Nofziger to lobby for
retention of U.S. budget funds for additional purchases of its A-10 antitank aircraft. On August 20,
1982, President Reagan urged the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to encourage export
sales of the A-10 or otherwise keep the aircraft in production at current levels. The trial court found
that because President Reagan had a substantial interest in this matter, Mr. Nofziger violated
§ 207(c) by urging the National Security Council staff to implement President Reagan's directive.
22 The jury instruction on intent to influence read as follows:
An intent to influence is an intent to affect either opinion or action. For you to find that
Defendant Nofziger made a communication with the intent to influence that is required for
a 207(c) offense, you must find that he intended on behalf of someone, other than the
United States, to have that communication influence the opinion or action of the person
who is alleged to have received the communication in connection with the alleged particular
matter.
Record at 4129-30, United States v. Nofziger, No. 87-0309 (D.D.C. 1987), cited,in Brief for United
States at 30-31, Nofziger (No, 88-3058). The instruction only required the jury to find that the defendant possessed the intent to influence the person receiving the communication. It did not require the jury to find that the defendant intended or hoped that parts (1) - (3) of § 207(c) existed.
23 The jury instruction oh "direct and substantial interest" read as follows:
Another element is that the alleged particular matter must have been a matter in which
the White House had a direct and substantial interest at the time of the alleged communication.
The term "direct" refers to the nature of the interest or involvement of the White
House in the matter. You may find that the interest of the White House in the matter was a
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The District of Columbia Circuit overturned Mr. Nofziger's conviction. The majority, Judges Stephen F. Williams and James L. Buckley,
initially decided that subsection 207(c) was ambiguous as to the mens rea
requirements. 2 4 The majority then used two canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity. First, the majority invoked the rule of
lenity, which requires a court to interpret an ambiguous criminal statute
in favor of the defendant. 2 5 Second, the majority employed the rule that
a statute's mens rea requirement should be presumed to apply to every
element of the offense unless a clear legislative intent to the contrary
exists. 26 Therefore, the majority decided that the mens rea of "knowingly"
should apply to all elements of subsection 207(c). Because the government failed to prove that Mr. Nofziger possessed knowledge of each element-especially the requirement that the matter be of direct and
substantial interest to the White House-the majority overturned the
conviction. 2 7 The majority ruled that, in order to obtain a conviction, the
government must prove Mr. Nofziger knew of the elements that made his
communications a violation of subsection 207(c).
Judge Harry T. Edwards filed a dissenting opinion. He argued that
subsection 207(c) is not ambiguous, so the rule of lenity was inapplicable. 28 Judge Edwards interpreted "knowingly" to apply to the clause it
directly precedes-the appearance offense. For the communication offense, he argued that the applicable mens rea should be "intent to infludirect interest if you find that an officer, employee, or other representative of the White
House was actively involved with the matter. Such active interest may be shown, for example, by giving advice, by making recommendations, or by giving approval or disapproval.
The White House may have a direct interest in the matter even if the final action or decision
making concerning the matter may have been the responsibility of an agency other than the
White House.
The term "substantial" refers to the extent and the significance of the interest or involvement of the White House in a particular matter. It is not necessary for you to find that
a particular matter was of major importance to the White House as compared to other
matters. In deciding whether the White House had a substantial interest in the matter, you
may consider the effort devoted by officers, employees, or other representatives of the
White House on the matter and importance of the matter to the White House.
To find the defendants guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular matters alleged in the indictment were of both direct and substantial interest to the
White House on the dates alleged in the indictment.
Id. at 4128-29, cited in Brief for United States at 36-37. The instruction does not require the jury to
find that the defendant had any state of mind as to whether the matter was of direct and substantial
interest to the White House. Rather, all the jury had to decide was whether the matter was in fact of
direct and substantial interest to the White House.
24 United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442,446-52 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 10 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
"Having concluded that subsection 207(c) is ambiguous, we must next decide how to resolve the
ambiguity." Id. at 452.
25 "The first of these [two canons] is the rule of lenity: '"Ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."'" Id. (quoting United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (citation omitted)).
26 "The second applicable rule states that absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent, courts
should presume mens rea is required." Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 452 (citing United States v. Liparota, 471
U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
27 "[W]e must be guided by the rule of lenity and the presumption of mens rea. These clearly
require that the conviction of Nofziger be set aside because it is not based on a finding that he had
knowledge of each element of the offenses charged." Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 454.
28 "To my mind, the language and structure of section 207(c) reveal no ambiguity or uncertainty, making the rule of lenity completely irrelevant in this case." Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 457 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
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ence." 2 9 Because the jury found that Mr. Nofziger communicated with
his former agency with an intent to influence its decisions, and that the
subjects of his communications were of direct and substantial interest to
Mr. Nofziger's former agency, Judge Edwards would have upheld the
jury's verdict.
The government petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing of the
Nofziger decision en banc. The rehearing was denied, although four of the
30
nine members of the circuit felt that the decision was "clearly wrong."
The government then filed a petition for certiorari in the United States
31
Supreme Court, which was also denied.
II.

Background on the Framework for Analyzing Criminal Statutes

In order to make a useful analysis of the Nofziger decision and its
interpretation of subsection 207(c), this Comment first must discuss two
fundamentals for interpreting federal criminal statutes: (1) the possible
bases of uncertainty arising from statutory language; and (2) the prevailingjurisprudential assumptions that courts should use when determining
the state of mind requirements in federal criminal statutes.
A.

Uncertainty of Meaning Arisingfrom Language
A court should begin its interpretation of a statute by analyzing the
language of the relevant section.8 2 Unfortunately, many statutes contain
defects that hinder a reader's ability to interpret the statute. Difficulties
with the language of a statute usually fall into one of three areas: generality, vagueness, or ambiguity.
The first problem is generality. It is present when a term "is not
limited to a unique referent and thus can denote more than one."'33 The
term "permits simultaneous reference," 3 4 therefore, the reader may be
29 "The language of the statute clearly indicates that 'knowingly' is the mens rea requirement only
for the 'appearance offense,' while 'with the intent to influence' is the mens rea requirement for the
'communication offense.'" Ia at 455 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 460. Circuit Judge Edwards wrote a concurrence in which Judges Wald, Mikva, and
Ginsburg, Ruth B. joined. The concurrence, in its entirety, stated:
I think that the majority opinion in this case is clearly wrong; however, this is not a
basis for en banc consideration by the court. Therefore, I concur in the denial of the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Any further consideration of this case must be pursuant to review by the Supreme Court.
Id
31 United States v. Nofziger, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
32 The Supreme Court endorsed this approach. It held that the "starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 69
(1987) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language").
This approach of focusing on the text of the statute seems obvious; however, Professor Dickerson noted that "[t]he tendency to neglect the specifics of statutes in favor ofjudicial commentary
corrupts students, lawyers, and evenjudges." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

OF STATUrES 17 (1975). The better view is that "[t]he starting point in statutory construction is to
read and examine the text of the act and draw inferences concerning the meaning from its composition and structure." 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.01 (N. Singer 4th

ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
33 R. DICKERSON, supra note 32, at 51.
34 hd An example of a general term is "American citizen," which can refer to all members of a
class with over 200 million members. See id.at 284.
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unable to choose the correct referent from a finite number of possible
referents.
The second problem is vagueness. Vagueness "refers to the degree
to which, independent of equivocation, language is uncertain in its respective application to a number of particulars.- 35 Vagueness differs
from generality because a term's generality leaves the reader uncertain as
to what members of a given group the term refers, while a term's vagueness leaves the reader uncertain as to the boundaries of the term's meaning. A term's vagueness is "indicated
by the finite area and lack of
36
specification of its boundary."
The third problem is ambiguity. In its most basic sense, ambiguous
language is equivocal; it is "capable of double interpretation. ' 37 An ambiguous term differs from a general term in that an ambiguous term permits alternative, "either-or" reference, while the general term permits
simultaneous reference. 38 Ambiguity differs from vagueness because the
uncertainty that stems from ambiguity leaves the reader with alternative
interpretations, while the uncertainty that stems from vagueness leaves
the reader with questions of degree. 39 Ambiguity differs from both generality and vagueness because generality and vagueness are not always
40
diseases of language but can instead serve as useful drafting tools,
whereas ambiguity always hinders the interpretation of language. 4 ' An
35

R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 39 (1986).

36

M. BLACK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 31 (1949).

Professor Dickerson used the following

example:
The generality of ["automobile"] ... is exemplified by its capacity for simultaneously covering both Fords and Chevrolets without a tinge of uncertainty. Its vagueness is exemplified
by the uncertainty whether it covers three-wheeled vehicles that bear a strong resemblance
also to motorcycles.
R. DICKERSON, supra note 32, at 52. Nevertheless, there is a limit on how broadly a term similar to
automobile may be interpreted. In interpreting the word "vehicle" to exclude airplanes, Justice
Holmes noted: "No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance
working on land, water or air ....
But in everyday speech 'vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing
moving on land." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931).
37

R. DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 33 (citing 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 263 (1933)).

"[Aln

ambiguity presupposes at least two particular alternatives each of which, taken alone, is free of ambiguity and not so vague as to be meaningless." R. DICKERSON, supra note 32, at 55 (footnote
omitted).
38 "In the sentence 'A grandmother sometimes has heavy responsibilities,' the word 'grandmother' is general. In the sentence 'My grandmother sometimes has heavy responsibilities,' it may
well be ambiguous, if both grandmothers are living." R. DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 42.
39 Id. at 40. Professor Dickerson provided the following contrasting examples:
Language can be ambiguous without being vague. If in a mortgage, for example, it is not
clear whether the word "he" in a particular provision refers to the mortgagor or the mortgagee, the reference is ambiguous without being ... vague or imprecise. Conversely, language can be vague without being ambiguous. An example is the written word "red."
Id.
40 See id. at 42. Vagueness and generality can be utilized by the drafter of the statute to give
leeway to those charged with administering the statute. Id. at 43.
41 [T]he ambiguous word carries the threat, in specific use, of competitive thrusts of meaning that are almost never desirable or justifiable. Because of its potential for deception or
confusion, an ambiguous word should not be used by the draftsman in a context that does
not clearly resolve the ambiguity.
Id. at 34.
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ambiguous text prevents a court from utilizing only the words of the4text
2
to interpret the statute and compels a court to search for meaning.
Three kinds of ambiguity may be distinguished. 43 The first is semantic ambiguity, which occurs when a word has multiple possible meanings. 44 The second is syntactic ambiguity, which is "uncertaint[y] of
modification or reference within the particular instrument. '4 5 The third
42

When a court declares a statute ambiguous, it asserts that some of the words used may
refer to several objects and the manner of their use does not disclose the particular objects
to which the words refer.... It is then the function of the court to make the referent clear
or as clear as possible from the information and evidence which is presented to it.
2A C. SANDS, supra note 32, § 45.02.
43 See generally R. DICKERSON, supra note 32, at 46-48. Professor Dickerson provided a brief synopsis of the different types of ambiguity:
Semantic ambiguity is uncertainty of multiple meaning that tends to follow particular words
(e.g., "residence," "child") into the contexts of actual use. Syntactical ambiguity is uncertainty of modification or reference (e.g., a squinting modifier). Contextual ambiguity is
uncertainty as to how a statement affects or is affected by another statement with which it is
inconsistent.
R. DICKERSON,supra note 32, at 283.
44 R. DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 36. Professor Dickerson illustrated semantic ambiguity by
attempting to determine the referent of the word "residence" in the following example: "[iun the
statement, 'His rights depend on his residence,' it is not clear whether they depend on place of
abode or on legal home." R. DxCERSON, supra note 32, at 44.
The use of the word "willfully" in criminal statutes is an example of semantic ambiguity. Federal courts have given the term two different meanings. The first meaning requires the prosecution
to prove that the accused acted with the purpose to break the law. In Screws'v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945), the Supreme Court interpreted a section of the federal civil rights statute, which
provides: "[w]hoever, under color of any law.., willfully subjects ... any inhabitant of any State...
to the deprivation of any rights [shall be fined or imprisoned]." 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1940) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988)). It held that punishment is imposed "only for an act knowingly
done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits." Screws, 325 U.S. at 102 (emphasis
added).
The second meaning requires the prosecution to prove only that the accused acted with the
knowledge that his conduct would have a certain result. Recently, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the
federal arson statute, which provides: "[w]hoever, within the... jurisdiction of the United States,
willfully and maliciously sets fire to or bums ... any building [shall be fined or imprisoned]." 18
U.S.C. § 81 (1988). In upholding the conviction, the court noted that "[o]ne of the most common
state-of-mind terms in statutory crimes is 'willfully.' The Model Penal Code follows many judicial
decisions in declaring that knowing conduct is sufficient to establish willfulness." United States v.
M.W., 890 F.2d 239, 240 (10th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The court concluded that
in this context, "willfully and maliciously" includes acts done with the knowledge that burning
of a building is the practically certain result: "A person acts knowingly with respect to a
material element of an offense when... if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result."
Id at 241 (quoting the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985)) (emphasis added). Judge Learned Hand expressed the most sensible view regarding the
word "willfully": "It's an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a statute that I
know. If I were to have the index purged, 'wilful' would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the
end of the alphabet." ALI PROCEEDINGS 160 (1955), quoted in MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, comment
10, n.47 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
45 R. DICKERSON, supra note 35, at 36. Professor Dickerson used the following example to illustrate syntactic ambiguity: "'The trustee shall require him promptly to repay the loan.' . . . Does
'promptly' modify 'require' or 'repay'?" ME at 36 and n.8.
The statute at issue in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), exhibits syntactic ambiguity in a definition of a criminal offense. The statute, punishing food stamp fraud, provides in relevant part: "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons .. .in any
manner not authorized by this chapter. . . shall ... be guilty of a felony." 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)
(1988). The syntactic ambiguity arises because there is a question of "how far down the sentence
the term 'knowingly' travels." Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434 (White, J., dissenting).
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is contextual ambiguity, which is "uncertainty as to how a statement af46
fects or is affected by another statement with which it is inconsistent."
Differentiating the kinds of uncertainty facilitates the resolution of
the uncertainty. Misidentifying an uncertainty allows a court to stray
from the meaning of the statute's language and accept less valid
interpretations.47
A court should read a statute to identify any sources of uncertainty.
This will allow it to determine if the language is clear enough to ascertain
meaning. If the language is clear and plain enough, then the court need
not use any extrinsic aids. 48 If the language is not clear enough to for the
court to ascertain the meaning of the
statute, the court should to look
49
elsewhere to establish the meaning.
B. JurisprudentialAssumptions in Federal CriminalLaw Regarding the
Determination of Mens Rea
The jurisprudential assumptions that contemporary federal courts
should use grew out of the determined efforts of criminal law reformers
to solve the problems that developed as common law crimes gave way to
statutory crimes. This Subpart will begin by briefly outlining the historical evolution of several state of mind issues. This Subpart will then explain the assumptions that courts should use to determine the proper
state of mind for each element of a criminal offense.
1. Historical Background
An American criminal law maxim is that a every crime needs the
"concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand." 50 Thus,
46 R. DICKERSON, supra note 32, at 283. Professor Dickerson used the example of a will to illustrate contextual ambiguity: "in a gift to the testator's daughter for life and then to the testator's
heirs, it is sometimes uncertain whether the daughter is to be included as an 'heir.'" R. DICKERSON,
supra note 35, at 37.
47 The Noftiger majority followed this errant path. The majority held that, "[h]aving concluded
that subsection 207(c) is ambiguous, we must next decide how to resolve the ambiguity." United
States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989). The court then
incorrectly resolved the ambiguity. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
48 "The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] begins ... with the language of the statute itself....

[I]t is also where the inquiry should end ...

where ... the statute's

language is plain, [for] 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.' "
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030 (1989) (citing Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) and quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917)).
49 Professor Dickerson explained the process more fully:
Whether the statute is clear or obscure, whether or not it adequately resolves the current
issue, and whether it can be applied as it came from the legislative oven or must be
remolded, the court should first examine it in its proper context to discover, if possible,
what it most probably means. Then, after measuring the legislative contribution, the court,
where necessary, may add its own contribution.
R. DICKERSON, supra note 32, at 15. The Supreme Court recently held that "[in determining the
meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the
statute as a whole and to its object and policy." Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1001
(1990) (citations omitted).
50 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no
provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as

1990]

CASE COMMENTS

the general rule is that every crime must include mens rea-the mental
element-as well as an actus reus-the act.5 1
The major exceptions to this general requirement of mens rea fall
into two groups. The first group is composed of those crimes, developed
in the English common law, that did not require a guilty state of mind.
Leading examples of this group are the doctrine that ignorance of the
law is no defense, the felony-murder/misdemeanor-manslaughter rule,
and the law of statutory rape.5 2 The doctrine of ignorantiajurisnon excusat
(ignorance of the law is no excuse) was first expounded by Chief Justice
Sir John Popham in the Trial of Sir ChristopherBlunt.5 3 This rule, as developed by English courts, held that state of mind need not be proven as to
the legal element of the offense. Ignorance of the law is thus no defense
to a criminal prosecution. In the area of homicide, the courts developed
the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter rules.5 4 Under these
rules, an accidental killing, otherwise not punishable, became murder if it
occurred during the commission of a felony and manslaughter if during a
misdemeanor. The offender was held strictly liable for any deaths occurring during the crime.
The statutory crime of sexual intercourse with a minor developed in
England as a strict liability offense. Statutory rape required no mens rea as
belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
Idt at 250.
51 "The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). The
Latin maxim actus notfadt reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilti unless his mind is
guilty) encapsulates this principle. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw, § 3.4, at 212
(2d ed. 1986).
The origins of the mens rea requirement date back to the 1500s. Professor Williams noted that
"the requirement of a guilty state of mind (at least for the more serious crimes) had been developed
by the time of Coke, which is as far back as the modem lawyer needs to go." G. WILLIAMS, supra note
1, at 30.
Although mens rea has long been a part of Anglo-American criminal law, in ancient legal systems
scienter was not a requirement. For example, consider the plight of King Oedipus, punished even
though he lacked an "evil-meaning mind." Judge Richard A. Posner explained:
[Ejarly legal systems, in which the roots of law in revenge still show, rely on strict liability
more heavily than modern legal systems do. The protagonist of Oedipus Tyrannus is guilty of
parricide and incest, and must be punished terribly even though he neither knew nor had
reason to know that the man he had killed was his father and the woman he had married was
his mother.
R. POSNER, LAw AND LrrERA-URE 35 (1988) (footnote omitted).
52 See S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 300-01 (5th ed. 1989).
53 1 St. Tr. 1415, 1450 (1600). The ChiefJustice stated that "I am sorry to think, that Englishmen should seem to excuse themselves by ignorance of the law, which all subjects are bound to
know, and are born to have the benefit of." Id.
54 For two thorough and thoughtful discussions of the common law evolution of the felonymurder rule and its development in America, and two different conceptioris of the jurisprudential
consequences of the rule, see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). All seven
justices joined in the holding abolishing the felony-murder rule in Michigan. Nevertheless, the two
chief opinions disagreed on whether felony-murder created a special type of malice. Justice Fitzgerald, writing for the majority, held that "the felony-murder doctrine... provid[es] a separate definition of malice, thereby establishing a fourth category of murder. The effect of this doctrine is to
recognize the intent to commit the underlying felony, in itself, as a sufficient mens rea for murder."
409 Mich. at 707, 299 N.W.2d at 321. Justice Ryan, in a separate opinion, argued that "[mI]alice has
nothing to do with common-law felony-murder; it is not an element of the crime, and is not properly
considered by the jury. Except for its name, felony-murder bears little if any resemblance to the
offense of murder." 409 Mich. at 742, 299 N.W.2d at 333 (RyanJ., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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to the age of the victim, although the victim's age was an element of the
offense bearing on liability. 5 5 This crime seems to provide a historical
analog for a strict liability offense. Nevertheless, this view of statutory
rape ignores the actual role that the victim's age played in the definition
of the offense. Because a statutory rape defendant could have been convicted of fornication in an ecclesiastical court regardless of the victim's
age, the age was not the deciding factor in imposing criminal liability;
rather, it determined the level of punishment and proper court. 56
55

The traditional view of statutory rape is that an accused can be convicted of the offense even if

he possessed no state of mind as to the age of the victim. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 58-59

(1881). The prosecution need not prove that the accused possessed any state of mind as to an
element of the offense that goes to liability: the age of the victim. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text for the definition of an element that goes to liability.
An early formulation of statutory rape appears in the 1828 English statute "consolidating and
amending the Statutes in England relative to Offences against the Person." Offences Against the
Person Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, preamble (emphasis in original). The relevant sections read as
follows:
XVII. And be it enacted, That if any Person shall unlawfully and carnally know and abuse
any Girl under the age ofTen Years, every such Offender shall be guilty of Felony ...;and
if any Person shall unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any Girl, being above the age of
Ten years and under the Age of Twelve years, every such Offender shall be guilty of a
Misdemeanor....
XX. And be it enacted, That if any Person shall unlawfully take, or cause to taken, an unmarried Girl, being under the Age of Sixteen Years, out of the Possession and against the
Will of her Father or Mother ...every such Offender shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor....
Ide
The English statutes were later codified in 24 & 25 Vict. ch. 100. Section 50 made carnal knowledge of a girl under ten years old a felony; § 51 made carnal knowledge of a girl between ten and
twelve a misdemeanor; and § 55 made it a misdemeanor to take a girl under sixteen out of the
possession of her parents. Because twelve was the age of consent, carnal knowledge of a girl over
twelve could only be punished by § 55. According to one commentator, "there must have been
many cases in which the real culpability of those accused under section 55 lay in the seduction [and
sexual intercourse] rather than in the abduction of a girl between the ages of 12 and 16." Cross,
Centenary Reflections on Prince'sCase, 91 LAw Q.REV. 540, 541 (1975).
Section 55 was at issue in the celebrated case of Regina v. Prince, L.R.-2 Cr. Cas. 154, 13 Cox
Cr. Cas. 138 (1875). The defendant was convicted of taking the underage victim out of the possession of her parents. The court upheld the conviction, despite its acceptance of the jury's finding that
the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was over sixteen. Baron Bramwell wrote the
majority opinion, concluding that the defendant should be punished because
[t]he act forbidden is wrong in itself... I do not say illegal, but wrong.... I say that done
without lawful cause is wrong, and that the Legislature meant it should be at the risk of the
taker whether or no she was under sixteen.... It seems to me impossible to say that, where
a person takes a girl out of her father's possession, not knowing whether she is or is not
under sixteen, that he is not guilty.
Prince, 13 Cox Cr. Cas. at 141-43 (emphasis added). Thus, the court stressed the immoral nature of
the defendant's actions. Because of the relatively high sentence imposed upon Prince by the trial
court, the suggestion has been made that the judges suspected him of sexual intercourse with the
girl. See Cross, supra, at 550. The victim was over the age of consent, however, so the only crime
Prince could be convicted of was taking her from her parents.
Later English cases interpreted Prince to also dispense with the state of mind requirement for
the carnal knowledge offenses (§§ 50-51). Prince was taken as precedent for all three offenses.
56 The interpretation of statutory rape as a strict liability crime rests on the assumption that, at
the time the English statute was originally enacted, the age of the girl was a material element of the
offense that went to the liability of the defendant for his conduct. This is not a correct view of this
element of the crime. Instead, the age of the victim should more properly be viewed as an element
that goes to the either the jurisdiction over or the grading of the offense. Assume that the girl in a
statutory rape case is over sixteen. In this case, the defendant could still be convicted of a crime: the
crime of fornication. He could not, however, be convicted in a temporal court; rather, such a trial
would be held in an ecclesiastical court. In 1828, at the time the original statute was enacted, ecclesiastical courts possessed the jurisdiction to convict defendants of fornication. The leading commen-
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Several American states adopted the English statutory rape and car-

nal knowledge laws. 57 Courts in these states followed English precedent

by making statutory rape a strict liability offense, 58 despite the existence
of applicable state statutes expressly requiring a criminal state of mind
for conviction. 59 Because the underlying act of fornication was often not
tators on English law noted this situation. William Blackstone, although critical of the practice,
traced the development of the ecclesiastical court jurisdiction:
In 1650, when the ruling powers found it for their interests to put on the semblance of a
very extraordinary strictness and purity of motive, not only incest and wilful adultery were
made capital crimes; but also the repeated act of keeping a brothel, or committingfornication,
were (upon a second conviction) made felony without the benefit of clergy. But at the restoration, when men from an abhorrence of the hypocrisy of the late times fell into a contrary extreme, of licentiousness, it was not thought proper to renew a law of such
unfashionable rigour. And these offences have been ever since left to the feeble coercion of
the spiritual court, according the rules of canon law.
4 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 64 (r.

Green facsimile ed. 1979) (Ist

ed. 1769) (emphasis added). William Holdsworth, also critical of the practice, noted that "[tihis
jurisdiction [over the private affairs of life] was restored to the ecclesiastical courts in 1661; and there
is no legal reason why at the present day they should not try cases of adultery and fornication." 1 W;
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621 (3d ed. 1922). Parliament itselfimplicitly recognized
this right of ecclesiastical courts in 1787, when it passed a statute establishing that "no suit shall be
commenced in any ecclesiastical court for fornication or incontinence ..
after the expiration of
eight calendar months from the time when such offence shall have been committed." The Ecclesiastical Suits Act, 1787, 27 Geo. 3, ch. 44, quoted in 6 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 177 (1929).
Since the defendant in a statutory rape case could have been tried and convicted in an ecclesiastical court regardless of the age of the victim, the age of the victim is an element of the offense going
to jurisdiction or grading and not to liability. Elements that relate to jurisdiction and grading have
been traditionally viewed as requiring no mens rea. Contemporary criminal law also does not require
that a state of mind be proven for these elements. See infra note 108; cf. Feola v. United States 420
U.S. 671 (1975) (holding that the defendant need not be aware of the circumstances that caused his
offense to be a federal crime); United States v. Holland 810 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1057 (1987) (holding that the defendant need not be aware of the circumstances that caused his
offense to be a more serious crime).
Thus, the traditional view that statutory rape is historically a strict liability offense is not correct.
The earliest case law interpreting this crime can be harmonized with modera assumptions for the
determination of mens rea, assumptions that exempt matters ofjurisdiction or grading from the state
of mind requirement. For an explanation of these assumptions, see infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. The statutory rape provisions should be interpreted utilizing the modern assumptions
with the element of the victim's age going not to liability, but rather to jurisdiction or grading.
57 The drafters of the New York Field (Penal) Code explicitly credit the English statute as the
predecessor of their law against taking an underage girl out of her parent's possession. See PENAL
CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 329, comment (1865) (proposed 'Field Code') (citing to the
Offences Against the Person Act, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 20).
Although never adopted in New York, the New York Field Code was used as a basis for the
California Penal Code of 1872; see McMurray, CaliforniaJurisprudence, 13 CAL. L. REv. 445, 461
(1925). The Field Code influenced the penal codes of many other states.
58 In People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 P. 915 (1896), the California Supreme Court explicitly
cited Regina v. Prince as support for strict liability statutory rape. In this case, the defendant urged
that he lacked criminal state of mind because he believed that the prosecutrix was over the age of
consent. The court rejected his contention, stating:
The whole question is learnedly and elaborately discussed in Reg. v. Prince, L.R. 2 Crown
Cas. 154.... [The English court] held that neither defendant's honest belief [of the victim's
maturity], nor the reasonable ground afforded him for such belief, relieved him from the
consequences of his act.
Ratz, 46 P. at 916. Thus, the California Supreme Court held that an honest misbelief regarding the
victim's age was no defense to statutory rape.
Other state courts also cited Prince in holding a statutory rape defendant strictly liable for the
element of the victim's age. See, e.g., State v. Newton, 44 Iowa 45 (1876); Commonwealth v. Murphy,
165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1895); Edens v. State, 43 S.W. 89 (Tex. Crim. 1897); Miller v. State, 16
Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918).
59 The California Penal Code contains a prefatory section specifying that "to constitute a crime
there must be unity of act and intent." CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988) (originally enacted as
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a crime, the interpretation of statutory rape by American courts transformed it into an offense in which the defendant was held strictly liable
for a liability element. Regardless of a defendant's state of mind as to the
age of the victim, if the victim was under the statutory age, the defendant
was guilty of rape; if the victim was over the age, the defendant was not
guilty of any crime. A misunderstanding of the role played by the victim's age in the offense caused American courts to erroneously create a
strict liability crime. 60 Although courts in some states-notably California-have allowed the defendant's reasonable mistake regarding the victo hold a statutory
tim's age as a defense, most American courts continue
61
rape defendant strictly liable as to the girl's age.
THE PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA, Feb. 14, 1872). This section seems to negate strict liability criminal

offenses. But in People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 P. 915 (1896), the California Supreme Court endorsed strict liability statutory rape by not allowing the defense of mistake as to the victim's age.
According to the court, the defendant had assumed the risk of his victim being underage, so his
lack of state of mind was not a defense. By invoking the assumption of risk doctrine, the court
effectively negated the criminal state of mind requirement. The California Supreme Court thus disregarded a state statute requiring mens rea for all criminal offenses. Instead, it followed English case
law and made statutory rape a strict liability offense.
60 When the California Supreme Court decided People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 P. 915 (1896),
the California Penal Code contained no crime of fornication. See THE PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA,

Feb. 14, 1872. Thus, there was no lesser offense, and the age of the victim served as a basis for
criminal liability. The English precedent cited by Ratz dispensed with state of mind for the victim's
age because it served as a basis for grading and jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Ratz court followed
this precedent when the victim's age served as a basis for liability. Because the contexts of the
statute were not analogous, the application of Prince by Ratz was erroneous.
As additional support for strict liability statutory rape, the California Supreme Court in Ratz
cited to its earlier decision in People v. Fowler, 88 Cal. 136, 25 P. 1110 (1891). In this case, the
defendant was convicted of taking an underage female out of the possession of her parents for purposes of prostitution. In upholding the conviction, the court noted that "[lt is claimed that the
information is defective because it is not alleged that the defendant knew the girl was under age. We
think that under this statute the people are not bound to allege or prove that the defendant knew the
girl was under 18 years of age." Id. at 1110. As proof of this contention, the Fowler court cited § 632
ofJ. BISHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES (1873).

This section simply quotes the holding in State v. Ruh, 8

Iowa 447 (1859). In Ruhi, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the conviction of a man accused of
taking an unmarried female out of her parents' custody for the purposes of prostitution. The trial
court had excluded testimony offered by the defendant "to show that [the] defendant believed, or
had good reason to believe, that the prosecuting witness was, at the time of taking.., over fifteen
years of age." Ruhl, 8 Iowa at 450. To support its decision upholding the trial court, the Iowa
Supreme Court used the doctrine of transferred intent. According to this doctrine, "[t]he wrong
intended, but not done, and the wrong done, but not intended, coalesce, and together constitute the
same offence ... as if the prisoner had intended the thing unintentionally done." Id. at 451 (quoting
J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 254 (1st ed. 1856)). At the heart of this doctrine lies the assumption that
had the facts been has the defendant believed them to be, his conduct would still have been blameworthy. According to Bishop, "this doctrine seems to be qualified by the proposition, that the thing
intended must not be merely malum prohibitum; it must be malum in se." J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 257 (1st ed. 1856). Fornication was not a crime in California at the time Ratz was decided. Thus,
the California Supreme Court incorrectly applied the doctrine of transferred intent to support its
holding.
The two cases on which Ratz relied, Prince and Fowler, do not support the holding that knowledge of the victim's age was not required of the defendant.
61 In People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964), the California Supreme Court held that the defendant's reasonable belief that the prosecutrix had reached the
age of consent could constitute a defense to a statutory rape charge. The court recognized that the
state of mind requirement of § 20 of the California Penal Code could not be satisfied by references
to the defendant's assumption of the risk. According to the court, while many cases have ruled that
criminal state of mind is presumed in statutory rape,
[t]he courts have uniformly failed to satisfactorily explain the nature of the criminal intent
present in the mind of one who in good faith believes he has obtained a lawful consent
before engaging in the prohibited act. As in the Ratz case, the courts often justify convic-
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The second group of exceptions to the mens rea requirement arose
when both English and American courts developed a body of law to interpret the growing number of "public welfare" offenses. 62 These crimes
"depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or
omissions." 63 Unlike the traditional crimes codified in statutes, public
welfare offenses have no common law antecedents but instead are "creatures of statute." 4 Public welfare offenses came into existence when the
legislature decided to promote the public good by enacting regulations
accompanied by criminal sanctions. The new regulations allowed the
government to convict violators without proving that the defendant possessed a state of mind for each and every element of the offense.
The law of public welfare offenses began to develop in England in
1846 with Regina v. Woodrow. 65 The court upheld the conviction of a tobacco dealer for possessing adulterated tobacco, even though he had no
knowledge of its character. In 1866, the famous case of Regina v. Stephens 66 began the general trend in England to dispense with the requirement of mens rea for public nuisance offenses. The defendant in Stephens,
tions on policy reasons which, in effect, eliminate the element of intent. The Legislature, of
course, by making intent an element of the crime [in § 20], has established the prevailing
policy from which it alone can properly advise us to depart.
Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 676. The criminal state of mind necessary for conviction was not present
unless the defendant acted with utter disregard of, or lacked grounds for his belief in, the victim's
age. The court therefore overturned Ratz, and it required a incs rea of criminal negligence or recklessness for statutory rape convictions.
A few recent decisions have followed Hernandez by eliminating the inconsistency of strict liability
rape. Courts in a few states have allowed the defendant's reasonable mistake regarding the victim's
age as a defense to the crime of statutory rape. See, e.g., State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839-40 (Alaska
1978) (relying on a general disapproval of strict criminal liability); and State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727,
729 (Utah 1984) (holding that "there must be proof of a culpable mental state which establishes that
the defendant was at least criminally negligent as to the age of the partner" after noting that the
prefatory section of the Utah Penal Code requires that a state of mind be proven with respect to each
element of an offense). Nevertheless, most courts continue to hold that the defendant's knowledge
of the female's minority is not an element of a statutory rape crime. These courts have usually cited
considerations of public policy-problems with enforcement and the protective purposes of the statute-as justifications for this divergence from the general state of mind requirement. Despite these
explanations, statutory rape, with its extensive common law antecedents, does not fit into the framework for strict liability public welfare offenses, see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. Thus,
requiring no mens rea for this offense is an anomaly of modem criminal law.
62 Professor Sayre recognized that
there has grown up within comparatively recent times a group of public welfare offenses,
consisting of violations of police regulations which are punishable without proof of any
individual blameworthiness and which form an exception to the general established doctrines of the criminal law.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 70 (1933).
63 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1952).
64 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985).
65 15 M. & W. 404 (Exch. 1846). Judge Pollock stated that regarding
the case of provisions, or of any matter that affected the public health, it would not be at all
unreasonable to require persons dealing in them to be aware of their character and quality,
and to be responsible for their goodness, whether they know it or not;-they are bound to
take care.
Id at 415.
66 1 L.R.-Q.B. 702 (1866). Judge Mellor stated:
Inasmuch as the object of this indictment is not to punish the defendant, but really to prevent the nuisance from being continued, I think that the evidence which would support a
civil action would be sufficient to support an indictment.
I at 710.
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a quarry owner, was charged with creating a public nuisance because his
employees obstructed a river with rubbish from the quarry. The court
upheld Stephen's conviction even though his workmen had acted "without his knowledge and against his general orders." 67 The elimination of
a mens rea requirement for adulterated foods and public nuisances spread
68
to other areas of the law.

A parallel movement occurred in America when the states began to
enact their own public welfare statutes. In Barnes v. State, 69 the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted the crime of selling liquor to a common
drunkard as requiring no state of mind as to the character of the buyer.
Thus, the defendant was convicted even though he had no knowledge
that the buyer was a drunkard. The doctrine became firmly established
in the United States as a result of several Massachusetts cases interpreting public welfare statutes. Decisions involving liquor and adulterated
foods began the trend. In Commonwealth v. Boynton, 70 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction of a defendant for selling
intoxicating liquor although he did not know it to be intoxicating. Commonwealth v. Farren,7 1 following Boynton, held that a defendant need not
possess any state of mind as to adulterated character in a conviction for
selling adulterated milk. Other states followed Massachusetts' lead in enacting public welfare crimes and requiring no state of mind for some ele72
ments of these offenses.
The Supreme Court applied this public welfare exception to the mens
rea requirements of a federal criminal law in United States v. Balint.73 This
case involved a prosecution under the Narcotic Act of 1914,74 which restricted traffic in narcotics. The Court held that if a federal criminal statute is silent as to state of mind for an element, then no state of mind
need be proven for that element. 75 The Supreme Court followed Balint
67 Id. at 708.
68 These areas included prosecutions for receiving lunatics into a house which was not a registered asylum (Reg. v. Bishop, 5 Q.B.D. 259 (1880)), for selling liquor to a drunken person (Cundy v.
Le Cocq, 13 Q.B.D. 207 (1884)), and for killing a tame house pigeon (Horton v. Gwynne, 2 K.B. 661
(1921)).
69 19 Conn. 398 (1849).
70 83 Mass. 160 (2 Allen 1861).
71 91 Mass. 489 (9 Allen 1864).
72 See generally Sayre, supra note 62, at 65-67.
73 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
74 Narcotic Act of December 17, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, §§ 1-2, 38 Stat. 785, 786 (1914)
(superceded by Internal Revenue Code of 1939). The relevant sections provide:
It shall be unlawful for any person required to register under the terms of this Act to produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away any
of the aforesaid drugs without having registered and paid the special tax provided for in this
section. [In addition] ... it shall be unlawful for any person to gell, barter, exchange, or
give away any of the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to
whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for
that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
75 The Supreme Court recognized that
[w]hile the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the
indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes
even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it... there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be
obstructed by such a requirement.
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in United States v. Dotterweich,7 6 in which the Court interpreted the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 77 The Court held that state of mind need
78
not be proven as to the mislabeled character of the drugs.
The expansion of the doctrine that statutes containing no state of
mind terms were construed so as not to require state of mind for some
elements met with criticism. Commentators urged that this rule should
be limited. 79 Further, the federal courts were becoming increasingly confused as to the proper state of mind requirements for federal crimes with
common law antecedents.8 0
Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-252 (citation omitted). The Court decided that the purposes of the Narcotic
Act, especially that of minimizing drug use, would be best served by not reading a mens rea requirement into the statute. The Court thus did not require proof that the defendant knew he was dealing
with narcotics. According to the Court: "Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the
drug, and concluded thai the latter was the result preferably to be avoided." Id at 254.
76 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
77 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988). The defendant was prosecuted under § 331(a), which prohibits
"[tihe introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device,
or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded."
78 In this case, the defendant was guilty of shipping misbranded drugs, even "though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting." Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. The Court approved oflegisla-

tion that
dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a
person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.
Id. at 281. In these "public welfare" statutes, the."penalties serve as effective means of regulation,"
so strict liability is justified. Id. at 280-8 1.
79 Professor Sayre stated:
The group of offenses punishable without proof of any criminal intent must be sharply
limited. The sense ofjustice of the community will not tolerate the infliction of punishment
which is substantial upon those innocent of intentional or negligent wrongdoing; and law in
the last analysis must reflect the general community sense ofjustice.
Sayre, supra note 62, at 70.
Professor Sayre delineated "two cardinal principles" for determining whether or not an offense
fits into this "public welfare" exception to the mens rea requirement:
The first relates to the character of the offense .... Crimes created primarily for the
purpose of singling out individual wrongdoers for punishment or correction are the ones
commonly requiring mens rea; police offenses of a merely regulatory nature are frequently
enforceable irrespective of any guilty intent.

Il

The second criterion depends upon the possible penalty. If this be serious, particularly
if the offense be punishable by imprisonment, the individual interest of the defendant
weighs too heavily to allow conviction without proof of a guilty mind.
at 72.
Professor Sayre outlined the following eight areas into which public welfare offenses generally

fall:
1. Illegal sales of intoxicating liquor;
2. Sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs;
3. Sales of misbranded articles;
4. Violations of anti-narcotic acts;
5. Criminal nuisances;
6. Violations of traffic regulations;
7. Violations of motor-vehicle laws;
8. Violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or well-being of the community. Id. at 73.
80 Justice Jackson noted: "[t]he unanimity with which [courts] have adhered to the central
thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity
and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element." Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
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The Supreme Court attempted to remedy the confusion in Morissette
v. United States. 8 1 The Court interpreted the federal conversion of property statute. 8 2 It held that mens rea is an essential element of the crime of
knowing conversion of Government property, since conversion was originally a common law offense. The Court thus distinguished between
common law crimes, which require mens rea, and regulatory or "public
welfare" crimes, which can be subject to strict liability if no mens rea re83
quirement exists in the statute.
The Supreme Court's decision in Morissette has not succeeded in
bringing order to the determination of the appropriate states of mind in
federal criminal law.8 4 Morissette failed because it established a vague rule
for the application of an ambiguous concept. Morissette's division of
crimes into common law offenses or public welfare offenses is vague because there is no clear distinction between the two categories.8 5 This
vagueness caused subsequent decisions to make arbitrary and confusing
distinctions. 86 Morissette's requirement of mens rea for common law offenses is ambiguous because the decision did not specify which state of
81 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
82 The statute, in relevant part, reads: "[w]hoever embezzles, steals, purloins or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority sells, conveys or disposes of any record,
voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States ....Shall be fined... or imprisoned." 18
U.S.C. § 641 (1988).
83 The Court stated that "we have not found, nor has our attention been directed to, any instance in which Congress has expressly eliminated the mental element from a crime taken over from
the common law." Morisselte, 342 U.S. at 265.
Conversely, in justifying the application of strict liability to regulatory offenses, the Court stated
that
whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter
of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will
the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction
does no grave damage to an offender's reputation.
Id. at 256.
84 The Supreme Court, assessing the state of federal criminal law nearly thirty years after Morissette, observed in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980), that
[flew areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea
required for any particular crime. In 1970, the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws decried the "confused and inconsistent ad hoc approach" of the federal
courts to this issue and called for "a new departure."
85 Even in Morisselte, the Court seemed to realize this fact:
Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a
precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and those that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law
on the subject is neither settled nor static.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260.
86 When applying this distinction to crimes contained in the federal criminal code, courts have
difficulty identifying those possessing common law antecedents. There often is nothing intuitive or
logical about these distinctions. For example, a law regulating hand grenades has been held to be a
regulatory offense, United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), while food stamp regulations have
not been so held, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
In Freed, the Supreme Court held that the regulations on hand grenades in the National Firearms Act, §§ 5841-72 (1988), fit into the category of public welfare offenses. The Court stated:
"[t]his is a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which may well be premised on the
theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an inno-
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mind a court should apply, in spite of both the panoply of state of mind
8
terms8 7 and the different possible meanings of a single term.
The distinction between common law and welfare offenses is vague,
and thus causes more confusion than it cures. Nevertheless, a certain
amount of vagueness is not fatal to criminal law if the vagueness plays an
appropriate role. For example, when a statute defines illegal conduct, it
may do so using clear standards, as opposed to overly precise rules.8 9 A
person risks violating these standards when engaging in some given conduct.90 The point at which conduct becomes unlawful should be a question for the jury. To guide the jury, however, each criminal statute
should contain identifiable standards that describe what the prosecution
must prove to convict the defendant. The appropriate mens rea for an
cent act." Freed, 401 U.S. at 609. For the defendants to be convicted, the Court thus required no
specific knowledge that the grenades were unregistered.
In Liparota, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C
§ 2024 (1988), was not a public welfare offense. Thus, the Court held that the government must
prove that the defendant knew his acquisition or possession of food stamps was unauthorized by law.
Because this was not proven, the Court reversed the conviction. According to the Court,
the offense at issue here differs substantially from those "public welfare offenses" we have
previously recognized. In most previous instances, Congress has rendered criminal a type
of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation
and may seriously threaten the community's health or safety.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33. However, this distinction is dubious, since a reasonable person would
expect food stamp use to be subject to "stringent public regulation."
The Court is correct: hand grenades and food stamps (perhaps the modern analog to "guns
and butter") are not comparable as items. Nevertheless, the regulations are comparable as laws, and
the laws both strictly regulate the items. Although the legal distinction seems illusory, the Court
held that laws concerning food stamps are not "regulatory," while those concerning hand grenades
are "regulatory."
87 Morisselte noted:

[Congress] has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or
more such terms as "intentional," "wilful," "knowing," "fraudulent" or "malicious," will
make criminal an otherwise indifferent act, or increase the degree of the offense or its
punishment.
Morisselte, 342 U.S. at 264. For the modern hierarchy of state of mind terms, see infra notes 94-100
and accompanying text.
88 Consider the different meanings of the term "wilfully." See supra note 44.
89 Justice Black, writing for the majority in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), stated:
It would strain the requirement for certainty in criminal law standards too near the breaking
point to say that it was impossible judicially to determine whether a person knew when he
was wilfully attempting to compel another to hire unneeded employees.... The Constitution has erected procedural safeguards to protect against conviction for crime except for
violations of laws which have clearly defined conduct thereafter to be punished; but the
Constitution does not require impossible standards.
Jd at 7 (citations omitted).
90 In Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913),Justice Holmes wrote for the majority that
"the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a
fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death."
The standards must, however, be clear enough to satisfy the requirement that the public be
given notice of what is criminal and what is not. This necessity of notice derives from the constitutional principle of due process. Justice Douglas, in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957),
described the role of notice in due process:
Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is sometimes
essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is required before
property interests are disturbed, before assessments are.made, before penalties are assessed. Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a penalty or forfeiture might be
suffered for mere failure to act.
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offense is the most important standard of a criminal statute because it
mandates the minimum level of culpability necessary for conviction.
2.

Modern Assumptions for Interpreting Criminal Statutes

Modern crimifial law is moving away from traditional notions of
criminal states of mind and towards more sophisticated conceptions regarding states of mind and how they should be determined. Three different sources embody this reform. The first and earliest source is the
Model Penal Code section "General Requirements of Culpability. " 90 1 The
second source is the "Culpable States of Mind" chapter in the Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1979.92 The third source is Part II(A) of the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Bailey.93
Three jurisprudential assumptions embody the thrust of contemporary criminal law reform on the proper determination of a state of mind
required by a criminal offense. The analytical framework utilized by this
Comment incorporates all three. The first assumption is that all state of
91 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). The American Law
Institute approved this provision in May, 1962. See id. at 225-26.
"Section 2.02 may appropriately be considered the representative modern American culpability
scheme." Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining CriminalLiability, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 692
(1983) (footnote omitted).
92 S. 1722, supra note 2, §§ 301-303. Although Congress never enacted S. 1722 or its successor
bills, commentators praised its reforms. "S. 1722 replaces the confusing and inconsistent ad hoc
approach to culpability that now characterizes federal criminal law with a new system that has its
genesis in the Model Penal Code, the recommendations of the National Commission, and recent
state codifications." Feinberg, Toward a New Approach to Proving Culpability: Mens Rea and the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 129 (1980). Professor Feinberg continued:
S. 1722 attempts to reform, modernize, and streamline the way the federal criminal law
currently treats the issue of culpability....
...
[S. 1722 has the ability to] clarify the law and make it more readily understandable
to lawyer and layman alike. Although the new rules of construction may, on first reading,
appear to be complex, the rules are easily mastered and should promote fairness, consistency, and discipline in drafting.
Id. at 142, 143.
93 444 U.S. 394, 403-406 (1980). The Court, when it began its analysis, noted that "[tihis ambiguity [involving the determination of mens rea] has led to a movement away from the traditional
dichotomy of intent and toward an alternative analysis of mens rea." Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404.
Bailey interpreted the federal escape statute, which provides: "[w]hoever escapes or attempts to
escape from ... any institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General... shall ... be fined.., or imprisoned." 18 U.S.C. § 751 (a) (1988). At trial, the defendants
attempted to present a defense of duress based on jail conditions. The District Court refused their
proposed jury instruction on duress.
The appellate court reversed, holding that
[s]ection 751(a) required the prosecution to prove that a particular defendant left federal
custody voluntarily, without permission, and "with an intent to avoid confinement" . . .
[which] encompass[es] only the "normal aspects" of punishment prescribed by our legal
system. Thus, where a prisoner escapes to avoid "non-confinement" conditions such as
beatings or homosexual attacks, he would not necessarily have the requisite intent to sustain a conviction under § 751(a).
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 401 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 585 F.2d 1087, 1093 (1978)). The Supreme
Court decided that the statute did not contain "such a heightened standard of culpability or such a
narrow definition of confinement." Id. at 408. It therefore held that "the prosecution fulfills its
burden under § 751 (a) if it demonstrates that an escapee knew his actions would result in his leaving
physical confinement without permission." Id. The Supreme Court thus reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction.
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mind terms may be reduced to a four-part hierarchy. 9 4 This assumption
rejects the traditional division between specific and general intent. 9 5 The
Model Penal Code and S. 1722 use a similar hierarchy of culpability:
purpose/intent, 9 6 knowledge, 9 7 recklessness, 98 and negligence. 9 9 One of
94 The state of mind hierarchy can only be understood in relation to the three different types of
elements that constitute an offense. The three types of elements are conduct, surrounding circumstance, and result. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
The variety of terms now used in federal criminal statutes to describe states of mind is tremendous. "Present Federal criminal law is composed of a bewildering array of terms used to describe
the mental element of an offense. The National Commission's consultant on the subject identified
78 different terms used in present law." S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980).
95 The Supreme Court criticized the traditional distinction: "[a]t common law, crimes generally
were classified as requiring either 'general intent' or 'specific intent.' This venerable distinction,
however, has been the source of a good deal of confusion." Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403. Professors
LaFave and Scott noted:
The meaning of the word "intent" in the criminal law has always been rather obscure,
largely as a result of its use in such phrases as "criminal intent," "general intent," "specific
intent," "constructive intent," and "presumed intent." Intent has traditionally been defined to include knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences
when he desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences
are substantially certain to result from his acts.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 51, § 3.5, at 216. The concept of "specific intent" has been
particularly troublesome:
The term "specific intent" has been productive of untold confusion, partly because
courts have not been consistent in their use of it and partly for the more fundamental reason that it is often quite difficult to determine whether a statute should be interpreted to
require specific intent-that is, the Code concept of a true "purpose."
S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 277 (4th ed. 1983)
(emphasis in original).
96 The Model Penal Code employs the term "purpose" to express the highest state of mind and
defines it as follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if
the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object
to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element
involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or
he believes or hopes that they exist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
S. 1722 retains the term "intentional," and defines it as follows:
A person's state of mind is intentional with respect to(1) his conduct if it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct; or
(2) a result of his conduct if it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.
S. 1722, supra note 2, § 302(a).
In Bailey, the Supreme Court preferred the use of"purpose": "a person who causes a particular
result is said to act purposefully if' "he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of
that result happening from his conduct."' " Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 (quoting United States v. United
States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (quoting W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw § 28, at
196 (1st ed. 1972))).
There are two noticeable differences between these two definitions. First, the Model Penal
Code uses the term "purpose," while S. 1722 uses the term "intentional." This is a distinction
without a difference, since the heart of both definitions is the concept of conscious objective. The
Supreme Court noted that "the respondents acted with the purpose-that is, the conscious objective-of leaving the jail.. ." Bailey, 444 U.S. at 408.
Second, the Model Penal Code applies "purposely" to elements that are surrounding circumstances, while S. 1722 limits "intentional" to elements that are either conduct or result. This distinction does make a meaningful, albeit slight, difference. The analytical framework of this Comment
utilizes the limited application of S. 1722. A court would not be'able to meaningfully apply a state of
mind of intent or purpose to an element that is a surrounding circumstance. "[A] person cannot
intend an existing circumstance, but can only have knowledge of, or be reckless or negligent with
respect to, its existence." Feinberg, supra note 92, at 133.
97 According to the Model Penal Code:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if
the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware
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that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element
involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will
cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
According to S. 1722:
A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to(1) his conduct if he is aware of the nature of his conduct;
(2) an existing circumstance if he is aware or believes that the existing circumstance
exists; or
(3) a result of his conduct if he is aware or believes that his conduct is substantially
certain to cause the result.
S. 1722, supra note 2, § 302(b).
In Bailey, the Supreme Court defined knowingly as follows: "a person who causes a particular
result.., is said to act knowingly if he is aware ' "that that result is practically certain to follow from
his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result."' " Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 (quoting Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 445 (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rt, supra note 96, at 194)).
98 The Model Penal Code defines "reckless" as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
S. 1722 defines "reckless" as follows:
A person's state of mind is reckless with respect to(1) an existing circumstance if he is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance
exists but disregards the risk; or
(2) a result of his conduct if he is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur
but disregards the risk;
except that awareness of the risk is not required if its absence is due to self-induced intoxication. A substantial risk means a risk that is of such a nature and degree that to disregard
it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
exercise in such a situation.
S. 1722, supra note 2, § 302(c).
The differences between the definitions are not significant. The first difference is that the Model
Penal Code's application of "recklessness" to result and attendant circumstances is implicit, while S.
1722's application of "reckless" to result and existing circumstances is explicit. The second difference is the Model Penal Code's use of "unjustifiable" in defining the type of risk that an offender
may disregard. The Senate Committee felt that "substantial" risk included the meaning of "unjustifiable": "As the proposed Code uses the term 'reckless,' the risk consciously disregarded must be
substantial and unjustifiable .... The Committee believes that use of the term 'substantial' in conjunction with the last sentence in subsection (c) ...encompasses this concept [of unjustifiable]." S.
REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1980).
99 The Model Penal Code defines negligence:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to
perceive it, considering the nature of and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that reasonable person
would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
S. 1722 defines negligence as follows:
A person's state of mind is negligent with respect to(1) an existing circumstance if he ought to be aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists; or
(2) a result of his conduct if he ought to be aware of a substantial risk that the result
will occur.
A substantial risk means a risk that is of such a nature and degree that to fail to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
exercise in such a situation.
S. 1722, supra note 2, § 302(d).
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the most important distinctions drawn by the hierarchy is between its
definitions of purpose and knowledge. l0 0
The second assumption underlying the interpretation of modem
criminal statutes is that element-by-element analysis can advance the determination of a statute's state of mind requirements. l0 ' Element-by-element analysis recognizes that different states of mind may apply to
different elements of the crime. 10 2 When courts utilize element-by-element analysis, they do so step by step. Initially, the court classifies the
100

The Court noted in Bailey that "[p]erhaps the most significant, and most esoteric, distinction

drawn by this analysis is that between the mental states of 'purpose' and 'knowledge.'" 444 U.S. at
404. Professors LaFave and Scott noted that "the modem approach is to define separately the
mental states of knowledge and intent (sometimes referred to as purpose, most likely to avoid confusion with the word 'intent' as traditionally defined). This is the approach taken in the Model Penal
Code." W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 51, § 3.5(b), at 218 (footnote omitted).
In some cases, including prosecutions for complicity, this distinction is crucial. The Comment
to the Model Penal Code notes:
It is true, of course, that this distinction is inconsequential for most purposes of liability; acting knowingly is ordinarily sufficient. But there are areas where the discrimination is
required and is made under traditional law, which uses the awkward concept of "specific
intent." This is true in treason, for example, insofar as a purpose to aid the enemy is an
ingredient of the offense, and in attempts, complicity and conspiracy, where a true purpose
to effect the criminal result is requisite for liability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 2, at 234 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
An analysis of the state of mind requirements for the offense of complicity reveals the importance of the difference between "purpose" and "knowledge." One view, propounded vigorously by
Judge Learned Hand, is that the proper state of mind for complicity is a purpose to promote the
criminal result. Judge Hand noted that the traditional terms describing complicity
have nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden result would follow
upon the accessory's conduct; and that they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the venture.... that he seek by his action to make it succeed. All the words usedeven the most colorless, "abet"--carry an implication ofpurposive attitude towards it.
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938) (emphasis added). The other view, argued
by Judge John J. Parker, holds that the state of mind of knowledge is sufficient for complicity:
Guilt as an accessory depends, not on "having a stake" in the outcome of crime.., but on
aiding and assisting the perpetrators.... One who sells a gun to another knowing that he is
buying it to commit a murder, would hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by showing that he had received fill price for the gun....
Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940) (emphasis added). The former view was
adopted by the Model Penal Code, establishing that "[a] person is an accomplice of another person
in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense... " that person either acts or fails to act. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985) (emphasis added).
The distinction is similarly important to the law of conspiracy and attempt. The Court noted in
Bailey that "[a]nother such example [where heightened culpability merits special attention] is the law
of inchoate offenses such as attempt and conspiracy, where a heightened mental state separates criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior." Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405.
101 The Court explicitly praised this technique for determining the proper states of mind of a
statute. "[T]he suggested element-by-element analysis is a useful tool for making sense of an otherwise opaque concept." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,406 (1980). The "opaque concept" to
which Bailey referred is the concept of mens rea.
102 The Supreme Court in Bailey reflected this:
Is the same state of mind required of the actor for each element of the crime, or may some
elements require one state of mind and some another? In United States v. Feola ... we were
asked to decide whether the Government, to sustain a conviction for assaulting a federal
officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111, had to prove that the defendant knew that his victim was a
federal officer. After looking to the legislative history of§ 111, we concluded that Congress
intended to require only "an intent to assault, not an intent to assault a federal officer." ...
What Feola implied, the American Law Institute stated: "[C]lear analysis requires that the
question of the kind of culpability required to establish the commission of an offense be
faced separately with respect to each material element of the crime."
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405-06 (citations omitted).
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elements 10 3 of the offense as either conduct,1 0 4 surrounding circumstances, 10 5 or prohibited result.' 0 6 Next, the court, having identified the
elements that are surrounding circumstances, must further classify them
as either requiring a state of mind 0 7 or not requiring a state of mind.
The elements that do not require a state of mind relate to grading,
venue, jurisdiction, or a question of law.' 0 8 The surrounding circum103

The Model Penal Code defines "element of an offense" as follows:
"[E]lement of an offense" means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or
(iii) such a result of conduct as
(a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; or
(b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or
(c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or
(d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or
(e) establishes jurisdiction or venue.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
To apply these definitions to 18 U.S.C. § 207(c), the requirement that the nature of the communication be "in connection with any.., particular matter.., in which such department or agency has
a direct and substantial interest," 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(2)-(3), is a surrounding circumstance included
in the description of the forbidden conduct.
104 The Model Penal Code provides a useful definition of conduct. Conduct is "an action or
omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts or omissions."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(5) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
105 Surrounding circumstances are referred to as "attendant circumstances" by the Model Penal
Code, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985), and "existing circumstances" by S. 1722, supra note 2, § 301(a).
106 An element classified as a result is similar to an element classified as a surrounding circumstance in that all four states of mind can be applied to both types of elements under either Model
Penal Code § 2.02 or S. 1722 § 302. An element classified as conduct is different: the only applicable states of mind are purposely (Model Penal Code) or intentionally (S.1722), and knowingly. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) and S.1722, supra note 2,
§ 301(c).
107 The Model Penal Code provides that a person is not guilty unless he acted with some state of
mind "with respect to each material element of the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (emphasis added). The Code had earlier defined "material element" by negative example:
"[M]aterial element of an offense" means an element that does not relate exclusively to the
statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue, or to any other matter similarly unconnected with
(i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct ....
Id., § 1.13(10). Thus, no state of mind is necessary for the non-material elements, such as the statute
of limitations, jurisdiction, venue, and questions of law.
108 Elements not requiring a state of mind relate to one of five matters, as outlined in S. 1722:
MATrERS OF LAW REQUIRING No PROOF OF STATE OF MIND.(1) EXISTENCE OF OFFENSE.-Proof of knowledge or other state of mind is not required
with respect to(A) the fact that particular conduct constitutes an offense, or that conduct or another
element of an offense is pursuant to, or required by, or violates, a statute or regulation,
rule, or order issued pursuant thereto;
(B) the fact that particular conduct is described in a section of this title; or
(C) the existence, meaning, or application of the law determining the elements of an
offense.
(2) JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND GRADING MATrERS.-Proof of state of mind is not required with respect to any matter that is solely a basis for federal jurisdiction, for venue, or
for grading.
(3) MATTERS DESIGNATED A QUESTION OF LAw.-Proof of state of mind is not required
with respect to any matter that is designated as a question of law.
S. 1722, supra note 2, § 303(d). This section includes grading, one matter that is not included by the
Model Penal Code in its section defining which elements are not material and thus do not require a
state of mind; see supra note 107. For elements of grading, the Model Penal Code would require
some state of mind. "[T]he culpability structure of section 2.02 is meant to apply to grading criteria
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stance elements that require a state of mind are those elements that do
not relate to grading, venue, jurisdiction, or a question of law, but rather
relate to liability for the substantive offense. Finally, the court, having
classified all the elements, examines the statute and attempts to assign a
as well as to the formal elements of the Model Penal Code offenses." Low, The Model Penal Code, the
Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERs LJ. 539, 546
(1988).
The framework utilized in this Comment includes grading as an element for which no state of
mind need be required. This position follows the common law, id. at 546-47, and present federal
case law. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057
(1987) (upholding a conviction for selling a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school, without proof that the defendant knowingly was in the school zone, where the element of being within
1000 feet of a school resulted in a different offense and a more serious penalty); United States v.
Falu, 776 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988) (upholding a conviction under statute providing for enhanced
penalties for selling "crack," without proof that the defendant knew the specific controlled substance
he possessed).
The Model Penal Code and S. 1722 agree that a matter ofjurisdiction requires no state of mind.
This position follows the controlling Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S.
671, 684 (1975), the Court held that the federal assault statute "cannot be construed as embodying
an unexpressed requirement that an assailant be aware that his victim is a federal officer." The
Court further noted that "the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one
in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute. The
question, then, is not whether the requirement is jurisdictional, but whether it is jurisdictionalonly."
Id. at 676 n.9 (emphasis added).
The specific language of both the Model Penal Code and S. 1722, excluding elements that are
jurisdictional from the state of mind requirement, flows from this requirement that an excluded
element be "jurisdictional only." The Model Penal Code uses the phrase "an element that does not
relate exclusively to.. .jurisdiction", § 1.13(l0), supra note 107 (emphasis added). S. 1722 uses the
phrase "to any matter that is solely a basisfor federal jurisdiction," § 303(d), supra (emphasis added).
Ifjurisdiction is necessarily part of the substantive offense, it will require a state of mind. See, e.g.,
United States v. Schankowski, 782 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that knowledge was required for
conviction under the mail fraud statute, since "there can be no separation of the crime from the
predicate act. Unless mail is involved there is nothing to prohibit...").
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's more recent holding in United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S.
63 (1984) clouds its clear holding in Feola. The statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), which,
in relevant part, provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations ... shall be fined.., or imprisoned ....
The Court began by noting that "[t]he statutory language requiring that knowingly false statements
be made 'in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States' is a
jurisdictional requirement." Yermian, 468 U.S. at 68. It concluded that "proof of actual knowledge of
federal agencyjurisdiction is not required under § 1001." Id. at 75 (emphasis added). Nevertheless,
in a footnote, the Court seemed to back away from the clear holding of Feola that a jurisdictional
element requires no state of mind at all:
It is worth noting that the jury was instructed ... that the Government must prove that
respondent "knew or should have known" that his false statements were made within the
jurisdiction of a federal agency.
As the Government did not object to the reasonable-foreseeability instruction, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether that instruction erroneously read a culpability requirement into thejurisdictional phrase.... The jury's finding that federal agency jurisdiction
was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, combined with the requirement that the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsiy of those statements, precludes the possibility
that criminal penalties were imposed op the basis of innocent conduct.
Id at n.14. This footnote cannot be explained. The Court could have held that the federal agency
jurisdiction was part of the substantive offense by noting that the states do not prosecute people who
lie on federal forms. If the Court had done this, then the surrounding circumstance element it views
as jurisdictional would instead go to liability, thus requiring a state of mind. See infra notes 113-14
and accompanying text. Alternatively, the Court could have held that no state of mind at all is required for the jurisdictional matter, which would have followed its holding in Feola. The Court declined to do either, and the decision seems to cast doubt on the continued vitality of Feola.
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state of mind term to each element. The Supreme Court has reiterated
its support of this tool,' 0 9 and it has been praised by several commentators."10 Federal appellate courts have recognized and utilized this
approach. IIIIn the words of one court, using element analysis is simply
109 The Court held in Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 n.4 (1985), that "[t]he required mental state may of course be different for different elements of a crime." This approach has
been called either "element analysis" or "element-by-element analysis."
110 Professors Robinson and Grall argued:
Element analysis provides the comprehensiveness, clarity, and precision needed to give
fair notice and to limit governmental discretion ....
Element analysis, by providing a precise statement of all separate elements of an offense definition, has the conceptual advantage of increased simplicity. It eliminates the
need for separate bodies of law such as mistake and accident by demonstrating that these
apparently independent doctrines are actually concerned with culpability as to particular
objective elements. In addition, the clarity and precision of element analysis has the practical effect of reducing litigation by reducing ambiguities in offense definitions.
Robinson & Grall, supra note 91, at 703-04 (footnotes omitted).
Professors LaFave and Scott recognized the heart of element-by-element analysis: "the mental
ingredients of a particular crime may differ with regard to the different elements of the crime." W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 51, § 3.4(d), at 215.
111 The Fifth Circuit recognized the utility of element-by-element analysis in United States v.
Adamson, 665 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), aff'd in partand rev'd in part on rehearing,700 F.2d 953
(5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983) [hereinafter Adamson I]. The court was attempting
to determine the appropriate state of mind necessary for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982),
which provides:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of... any Federal Reserve bank
willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits of such bank ... , shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both ....
Prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit and other circuits had "uniformly construed the statute to include
the 'intent to injure or defraud the bank' as a material element of the crime." Adamson 1, 665 F.2d at
652 (citations omitted).
The presidingjudge for the trial of Adamson had charged thejury that "[a] reckless disregard of
the interest of the bank is the equivalent of the intent to injure or defraud the bank." Id at 651.
This instruction explicitly tracked the Fifth Circuit holding in United States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d
203, 210 (5th Cir. 1979), which Adamson I cited: "Welliver thus has interpreted the 'intent to injure or
defraud' element of willful misapplication to import a mens rea of merely recklessness." Adamson I,
665 F.2d at 655. This state of mind requirement was thus satisfied if the prosecution could prove
that the defendarit had acted with reckless disregard for the interest of the bank.
The court was uneasy with this conception of mens rea, and noted that "[n]o other circuit has
approved a jury instruction equating 'recklessness' with 'intent to injure or defraud.'" Adamson I,
665 F.2d at 654 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court explained how the Fifth Circuit rule
could be harmonized with the positions of other circuits by applying element-by-element analysis:
This interpretation begins with the premise that an offense can have a different state of
mind requirement for different elements of the crime. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 405-06 [1980].... The recklessness charge approved in Welliver might be said to refer
only to the ultimate consequences-whether the acts in question will tend to injure or defraud the bank-and not to the constituent parts of the offense. Under this analysis, the
defendant in Welliver would have violated the statute if he knew he was in effect arranging a
loan without a written obligation for repayment but need only have been reckless with regard
to whether such a loan would tend to injure or defraud the bank ....
Id. at 655 n.17 (emphasis in original). The court continued:
In the present case, under this analysis, to violate § 656 the defendant would have to know
that the named borrower lacked the ability or intent to repay, but the defendant need only
be reckless with regard to whether such a loan would tend to injure or defraud the bank.
Id. (emphasis in original). The court did not adopt this interpretation because "[tihe charge approved by Welliver, however, is not consistent with this analysis." Id. The panel thus upheld the
conviction of Adamson, relying on Welliver.
One year later, in an en banc rehearing of the case, the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel and
overruled Welliver by an 8-4 decision. United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983) [hereinafter Adamson H]. The court held that
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"heeding the advice of the Supreme Court.""12
The third assumption that courts should make builds on the traditional assumption that a state of mind is presumed when not expressed.
Generally speaking, a court will read into a statute a state of mind if that
statute does not expressly require a state of mind.' " The analytical
framework of this Comment, drawn from modem criminal law, improves
the traditional presumption by specifying the particularstate of mind that
should be presumed for a particulartype of element. For elements that are
either surrounding circumstance or result elements, a court should require
that at least the state of mind of recklessness be proved for that element.
For elements that are conduct elements, a court should require that at
least the higher state of mind of knowledge be proved for that element.
This requirement of a minimum state of mind adopts S. 1722's explicit
the appropriate mens rea standard for § 656 is knowledge. In order to convict a defendant
for willfully misapplying funds with intent to injure or defraud a bank, the government must
prove that the defendant knowingly participated in a deceptive or fraudulent transaction.
The trier of fact may infer the required intent, i.e., knowledge, from the defendant's reckless
disregard of the interest of the bank ....
Adantson H1, 700 F.2d at 965 (emphasis in original). Thus, the interpretation urged in Adamson I,
which called for a state of mind of knowledge as to the ability of the borrower to pay and a state of
mind of recklessness as to the effect on the bank, was implicitly adopted by the entire circuit in
Adanson HI.
112 United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 777 (1st Cir. 1989). The court stated that "we have
avoided specific intent terminology and instead have used the Model Penal Code's element-by-element approach towards intent." Id See also United States v. M.W., 890 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1989)
(adopting element-by-element analysis and Model Penal Code view of "knowingly").
113 Unless the statute expressly indicates that no state of mind is required, a court should infer
that the legislature intended to require that some state of mind be proved for an offense.
The Court affirmed this doctrine in Bailey: "mere omission [from the statute] of any mention of
intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced." Bailey, 444
U.S. at 406 n.6 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 252, 263 (1952)) (insert in original).
This general component of the assumption is not a contemporary development. Since Morissette,
American law has contained a presumption against strict liability for common law crimes. Thus,
express legislative intent is necessary to eliminate the requirement of a state of mind, making a
criminal statute subject to strict liability. As the Court recently held in Liparota:
[I]n United States v. United States Gypsum Co.... we noted that "certainly far more than
the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to
justify dispensing with an intent requirement" and that criminal offenses requiring no mens
rea have a "generally disfavored status." Similarly, in this case, the failure of Congress
explicitly and unambiguously to indicate whether mens rea is required does not signal a departure from this background assumption of our criminal law.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (citation omitted).
The Model Penal Code and S. 1722 adopt this assumption in the context of element-by-element
analysis. The Model Penal Code formulates this presumption in two sections. Section 2.02(1) establishes that "[e]xcept as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material
element of the offense." Section 2.05 defines "When Culpability Requirements Are Inapplicable to
Violations and to Offenses Defined by Other Statutes." MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), 2.05 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
S. 1722 notes, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the following provisions apply to an offense
under any federal statute:
(a) REQUIRED PROOF OF STATE OF MIND.A state of mind must be proved with respect

to each element of an offense, except that(1) no state of mind must be proved with respect to a particular element of an offense
if that element is specified in the description of the offense as existing or occurring "in fact"
S. 1722, supra note 2, § 303.
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position and the Model Penal Code's implicit position.' 14 These inferences for a minimum state of mind operate when a statute does not specify the required state of mind for an element of the offense, whether that
element relates to conduct, a surrounding circumstance, or a result.
The framework adopted by this Comment also follows S. 1722's guidance as to when a given section does or does not "specify" a state of
mind for a given element. The Model Penal Code contains a section that
applies any state of mind expressed in an offense to all the elements of
that offense unless "a contrary purpose plainly appears."' 1 5- This section
undermines the utility of element-by-element analysis,' 16 and the frame114 S. 1722 and the Model Penal Code differ in the way this presumption is presented. The relevant section of the Model Penal Code, its "default culpability provision," reads:
When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). Professors Robinson
and Grall explained that "Model Penal Code section 2.02(3) requires recklessness for any element
for which the offense definition does not specify culpability." Robinson & Grall, supra note 91, at
712.
Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code implicitly presumes a different minimum state of mind for
elements of an offense that relate to conduct. In its definition of recklessness at § 2.02(2)(c), supra
note 98, the Code does not define "recklessly" with respect to conduct. Professors Robinson and
Grall explained the result of the interaction between § 2.02(2)(c) (recklessness definition) and
2.02(3) (default culpability provision):
[A] person must be at least "reckless" with respect to circumstance and result elements and
at least "knowing" with respect to conduct elements. The difference between circumstance
and result elements and conduct elements occurs because "recklessly" is not defined with
respect to conduct.
Robinson & Grail, supra note 91, at 700 n.84.
S. 1722, on the other hand, explicitly reads in recklessness for elements that are surrounding
circumstances or results, and knowledge for elements that are conduct. S. 1722 provides:
REQUIRED STATE OF MIND FOR AN ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE IF NOT SPECIFIED.-Except as

provided in subsection (a), if an element of an offense is described without specifying the
required state of mind, the particular state of mind that must be proved with respect to(1) conduct is "knowing";
(2) an existing circumstance is "reckless"; and
(3) a result is "reckless".
S. 1722, supra note 2, § 303(b).
Recklessness is the appropriate state of mind to presume because it requires a subjective component in the mind of the defendant. The distinction between recklessness and negligence "hinges
upon the awareness of the defendant." Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS LJ. 815, 820 (1980) (emphasis in original). The requirement of awareness justifies the use
of recklessness as a minimum level of culpability.
115 The entire section reads:
Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements. When the law defining an
offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense,
without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to
all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(4) (Original Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (emphasis in original).
116 Section 2.02(4), applying a prescribed culpability requirement to all material elements, is not
consistent with § 2.02(3), requiring at least recklessness unless otherwise provided, because
§ 2.02(4) directs a court to apply a state of mind expressed in the offense to all the elements of the
offense regardless of the role those elements play. Professors Robinson and Grall noted that
"[s]ection 2.02(3) is, in fact, central to the implementation of element analysis" yet the drafters of
the Model Penal Code included § 2.02(4), which "is characteristic of an offense analysis model of
offense definition." Robinson & Grail, supra note 91, at 715-16. Professors Robinson and Grall used
the following example:
Consider the definition of harassment:

A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he
insults ...another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly response.

. .
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work suggested by this Comment rejects it. 117 Instead, this Comment follows S. 1722's guidance for the proper application of an expressed state
of mind term in a section. S. 1722 limits the reach of an expressed state
of mind term "to the element that it immediately introduces."' 11 8 If an
element of the offense lacks a state of mind term immediately modifying
it, then a court should apply S. 1722's provision requiring that a certain
minimum state of mind must be proven for that elemefit. 1 19
In sum, when a court interprets a criminal statute, it should take
several steps. The court should (1) analyze the section element by element, classifying each element as either conduct, surrounding circumstance, or result; (2) as to those elements that are surrounding
circumstances, determine if they require a state of mind;120 (3) determine
if the statute specifies a state of mind for each element that requires a
state of mind; if it does, then apply the expressed state of mind terms; (4)
when a statute does not specify a state of mind term for each element
that requires a state of mind, decide how to apply any state of mind terms
that are included; and finally (5) as to those elements lacking a state of
mind modifier, require the prosecution to prove the state of mind of
recklessness for elements that are surrounding circumstances or results,
and a state of mind of knowing for elements that are conduct.
These three assumptions-the state of mind hierarchy, element-byelement analysis, and the requirement of state of mind when one is not
expressed-will give greater predictability and certainty to interpretation
of the statute. Although these assumptions are not codified, ample precedent exists in Supreme Court opinions to justify viewing the framework as the preferred approach to interpreting the federal criminal law.
Ifsection 2.02(3) is applied, the defendant must be purposeful only as to harassing another,
and need be only reckless with respect to all other elements. If section 2.02(4) is applied,
the actor must act purposely with respect to all elements.... [T]he section 2.02(3) recklessness requirement should be preferred.
Robinson & Grail, supra note 91, at 715 (first two ellipses in original, third ellipsis added).
117 The value of element-by-element analysis and the Supreme Court's expressed preference for
it, see supra notes 101-02, 109-12 and accompanying text, justify the rejection of § 2.02(4) (applying
the prescribed culpability requirement to all material elements) in order to allow for more effective
element-by-element analysis.
118 The Senate Report noted that § 303(b) of S. 1722:
[P]rescrib[es] the requisite degree of culpability that must be proved with respect to an
element of the offense where none immediately modifies the element.
The rule of construction provided in this subsection [§ 303(b)] applies, except as
otherwise provided by subsection (a), where a statute specifies a mental state but it is unclear whether the mental state applies to all the elements of the offense or only to the element
that it immediately introduces ....

S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1980) (emphasis added). For the text of S. 1722 § 303(b),
see supra note 114.
119 The level of state of mind depends on the type of element that the offense definition does not
modify. "Where a state of mind does not immediately introduce an actus reus element of an offense,
the state of mind which must be proved with respect to conduct is knowing and to an existing circumstance or a result is reckless." S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1980).
120 Elements that relate to jurisdiction, grading, venue, or question of law do not require a state
of mind. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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Analysis of the Opinions in Nofziger

The analysis of both Nofziger opinions centers on the proper interpretation of the state of mind required by subsection 207(c). Judge
Thomas A. Flannery, the presiding judge in Mr. Nofziger's trial, recognized the shortcomings of this provision: "[T]he big problem with this
case is that we are dealing with a statute that is hardly a model of clarity." 1 2 1 Likewise, the big problem with Nofziger is that trial courts are now
dealing with a decision that is hardly a model of clarity.
The Nofziger majority analyzed the statute in two steps: it determined that the statute was ambiguous, and then used extrinsic aids to
resolve the ambiguity. The majority's analysis of the ambiguity turned
on the following question: "whether . . .Congress has manifested an
unambiguous intent to impose strict liability for the communication of1 22
fense by limiting the reach of 'knowingly' to the appearance offense."'
The majority felt that the referent of "knowingly" was uncertain. Because the majority formulated the issue in this manner, it felt compelled
to examine whether the statute was syntactically ambiguous. 23 The majority focused on whether "knowingly" refers to (1) the appearance offense plus the rest of the subsection, or (2) the appearance offense alone.
The majority thus perceived two plausible readings of subsection
207(c). One reading would not limit the reach of "knowingly" to the
appearance clause, but would allow it to modify both the communication
offense and parts (1) - (3). The other reading would limit the reach of
"knowingly" to the appearance clause, which, in the majority's view,
eliminated any state of mind requirement for both the communication
offense and parts (1) - (3).124 If both of the readings were in fact plausible, then the statute was ambiguous and the majority properly used extrinsic aids to resolve the ambiguity.
A.

The Majority's Conclusion that the Statute Is Ambiguous

The Nofziger majority began its analysis of subsection 207(c) by assuming that one plausible reading of the statute was the one used by the
district court, which limited the reference of "knowingly" to the appear121 Record at 3416, United States v. Nofziger, No. 87-0309 (D.D.C. 1988), cited in United States v.
Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 445 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
122

Nofiger, 878 F.2d at 446. By "communication offense," the majority referred to the portion

of § 207(c) that prohibits a former official from "mak[ing] any oral or written communication on
behalf of anyone other than the United States, to [his former department or agency]."
By "appearance offense." the majority referred to the prohibition on "act[ing] as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represent[ing], anyone other than the United States in any formal or informal
appearance before [the official's former department or agency]." 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1988).
123 The majority did not utilize the specific terminology "syntactic ambiguity." However, this is
exactly the type of ambiguity the majority examined. Recall that the definition of syntactic ambiguity
is an uncertainty of reference. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. When the majority tried to
determine the "reach" of the ambiguous term "knowingly," it was, in effect, trying to determine to
what "knowingly" refers.
124 The majority believed that the effect of the statute's syntax was "to strand the mens rea 'knowingly' in a grammatical no man's land in which it is uncertain whether it applies to both offenses ....
or just the appearance offense .... Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 450.
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ance offense. 12 5 To prove that another plausible reading would extend the
reach of "knowingly" to the entire subsection, the majority presented
five arguments. The opinion: (1) analogized to present case law; (2) analyzed the legislative history of the statute; (3) analyzed the grammatical
structure of the subsection; (4) analogized to the Model Penal Code; and
(5) cited interpretations by executive agencies.
The majority cited two principal cases to support its contention that
the statute is ambiguous. Liparota v. United States' 2 6 addressed a statute
penalizing anyone who "knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or
possesses coupons [food stamps] or authorization cards in any manner
not authorized ...."127 The Liparota majority determined that the statute
was syntactically ambiguous, 28 and then invoked the rule of lenity to
apply "knowingly" to all the elements.' 29 The Nofziger majority used
125 The district court rejected the reading of the statute that applies "knowingly" to the communication offense and requires actual knowledge of parts (1) - (3). Noftiger, 878 F.2d at 446. The
district court stated:
The court does not believe this pervasive, super-modifying role [assigned the word "knowingly"] can be reconciled with common usage. Nor can the court accept this reading without some clear indication that Congress intended such a less-than-obvious result.
United States v. Nofziger, No. 87-0309, memo. op. at 22 (D.D.C. 1988) quoted in Noftiger, 878 F.2d at
446.
The presiding judge at the trial, Thomas A. Flannery, faced the problem of deciding how to
interpret "knowingly" in a different context as chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United
States Subcommittee on Pattern Jury Instructions. He noted that
[w]e have made a particular effort to develop clear statements of the state of mind that is
necessary for a finding of guilt.... [W]e have avoided the word "knowingly," a term that is
a persistent source of ambiguity in statutes as well as jury instructions.... LaFave and Scott
observed some years ago that it is often unclear how far down the sentence the word
"knowingly" is intended to travel.
Flannery, Introduction to FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, PATrERN CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONs at III-IV &
n. 2 (1988) (citation omitted).
126 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
127 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988).
128 The Liparota majority found that the statute was syntactically ambiguous when it noted that
there were two different interpretations which turned on exactly what the word "knowingly" modifies. It noted:
Although Congress certainly intended by use of the word "knowingly" to require some
mental state with respect to some element of the crime defined in § 2024(b)(1), the interpretations proffered by both parties accord with congressional intent to this extent. Beyond
this, the words themselves provide little guidance. Either interpretation would accord with
ordinary usage.
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424 (emphasis in original).
129 "In the instant case, the rule [of lenity] directly supports petitioner's contention that the Government must prove knowledge of illegality to convict him under § 2024(b)(1)." Liparota, 471 U.S.
at 427-28.
Section 2024(b)(1) is sufficiently different from § 207(c) so as to render Liparota's interpretation
of § 2024(b)(1) unhelpful to the correct interpretation of § 207(c). See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
Further, Liparota has been criticized for seeming to create an ignorance of the law defense. See,
e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 51, § 3.8, at 242 n.1; Note, Ignoranceof the Law as an Excuse, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1392, 1399-1400 (1986). In Liparota, the Supreme Court held that a defendant
could not be convicted of violating the food stamp statute unless he knew that his acquisition or use
of the stamps was not authorized by law. According to the majority, this result was supported by the
"generally disfavored status" of strict liability offenses. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426. The majority was
mistaken. Limiting the reach of "knowingly" in the food stamp statute would not create a strict
liability crime. The dissent revealed what the majority actually did: "In relying on the 'background
assumption of our criminal law' that mens rea is required . . .the Court ignores the equally well
founded assumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse." Id at 441 (White, J., dissenting). If
"knowingly" is not read to apply to the "not authorized by" language, then the prosecution would
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Liparota to prove that the Supreme Court has found provisions similar to
0
subsection 207(c) ambiguous.13
This analogy is not persuasive. The food stamp statute in Liparota is
structured differently from subsection 207(c). In the Liparota statute, it is
unclear how far into the statute's language "knowingly" travels. The
knowledge requirement could apply to the entire clause or solely to the
"use" of the coupons. The punctuation of the statute gives no indication
of which actions require knowledge. Conversely, in subsection 207(c)
"knowingly" is readily connected to the appearance offense and separated by two commas and an "or" from the communication offense. Subsection 207(c) prohibits "knowingly act[ing] as agent or attorney for...
anyone other than the United States in any formal or informal appearance
before, or, with the intent 1 to influence, mak[ing] communications [to the
prohibited department]."''
Further, unlike the statute in Liparota, subsection 207(c) includes
within it a separate offense that is subject to its own express mens rea
requirement. The majority opinion argued that "this is a distinction
without a difference."' 1 3 2 The majority stated that "[ilf one removes the
communication offense and its 'intent to influence' modifier from subsection 207(c)" the resulting text would be similar to the ambiguous statute
in Liparota, so the knowledge requirement should be interpreted similarly. 133 The majority, in effect, ignored certain parts of the statute to
find the ambiguity it desired. Rewriting a Congressional statute and then
interpreting the judicially rewritten version, however, is an unacceptable
method of judicial interpretation. 3 4 Instead, a court should strive to interpret a statute so as to give every word and every phrase meaning. 3 5 A
court should not omit material language from a statute to clarify it.
still be required to prove that the defendant intended or knew what he was doing in a physical sense,
as distinguished from the legal significance of the act. As the dissent explained, "[k]nowingly to do
something that is unauthorized by law is not the same as doing something knowing that it is unauthorized by law." Id. at 436 (White, J., dissenting). The distinction is between knowledge of the
physical act and knowledge of its legality.
Thus, limiting the reach of knowingly in the food stamp statute would not subject the defendant
to strict liability. A defendant still could not be convicted if he "was unaware of the circumstances of
the transaction that made it illegal." Id. at 437 (White, J., dissenting). If, unknown to the food
stamp user, a store violated the regulations so that the use of the stamps was unlawful, the user
would not be guilty because he had no knowledge of the circumstances making the use illegal.
130 United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 445-46 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
131 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
132 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 447.
133 Id.
134 Statutory construction should begin by reading the text, not by removing portions of it. See
supra note 32. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court criticized the approach of the Nofziger majority: "courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible to
improvement." Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984).
135 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that each word and each phrase of a statute should be
given meaning. In United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955), it noted that " '[t]he cardinal
principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy' ....
It is our duty 'to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute,' . . . rather than to emasculate an entire section ......
Id. at 538-39 (first quoting Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1936),
second quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882)). See also Connecticut Dept. of
Income Maint. v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 530 n. 15 (1985) (holding that "[it is a familiar principle of
statutory construction that courts should give effect, if possible, to every word that Congress has
used in a statute"). Generally speaking, "[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
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The majority also cited United States v. Johnson & Towers. 13 6 InJohnson
& Towers, the Third Circuit interpreted a statute penalizing any person
who "knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste...
either-(A) without having obtained a permit... or (B) in knowing violation of [the permit]." 13 7 The Johnson court determined that the statute
was ambiguous and that "knowingly" applied to both subparts (A) and
(B). The majority in Nofziger stated that, similarly, "knowingly" should
apply to both offenses in subsection 207(c). But the text of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act inJohnson & Towers is substantially different from the
Ethics in Government Act in Nofziger. The Solid Waste Disposal Act consists of the state of mind "knowingly," the prohibited acts, and then two
subparts describing the surrounding circumstances, with the second subpart containing the state of mind "knowing." The Ethics in Government
Act consists of the state of mind "knowingly," the prohibited act "appear," then the state of mind "intent" and the prohibited act "communicate." This grouping of state of mind and prohibited act is not found in
the Solid Waste Disposal Act interpreted by Johnson & Towers. Because of
the textual differences in the statutes, the Third Circuit's decision is inapplicable. In addition, any comparison to theJohnson & Towers holding is
suspect: a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, interpreting the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, reached a contrary result. 138
After examining these decisions, the majority turned to the text of
the section. But instead of looking first at the statute's language, the majority stated that "[wle begin our analysis of subsection 207(c) with its
genesis, which was President Carter's proposal ....."139 The majority
then recounted the legislative history of subsection 207(c) to support its
ultimate contention that the subsection is syntactically ambiguous. This
reversed the normal order of statutory analysis, 1 40 and it ignored the
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one
section will not destroy another." 2A C. SANDS, supra note 32, § 46.06 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
136 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
137 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1982).
138 In United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1143 (1990),
the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Solid Waste Disposal Act directly contrary to the interpretation of
the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers. In Johnson, the Third Circuit held that employees could be
subjected to criminal prosecution under § 6928(d)(2)(A) only if they knew or should have known
that their employer had failed to obtain the required permit. In Hoflin, the Ninth Circuit stated:
We respectfully decline to follow the Third Circuit's analysis inJohnson & Towers. Had Congress intended knowledge of the lack of a permit to be an element under subsection (A) it
easily could have said so. It specifically inserted a knowledge element in subsection (B), and
it did so notwithstanding the "knowingly" modifier which introduces subsection (2). In the
face of such obvious congressional action we will not write something into the statute which

Congress so plainly left out.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. The Ninth Circuit refused to require knowledge under subsection (A)
because the grammatical structure of the statute did not support such a requirement.
The grammar of § 207(c) lends itself to a similar analysis. If Congress intended to require
knowledge of parts (1) - (3), Congress could have "specifically inserted" the word "knowingly" after
the communication offense to modify parts (1) - (3). Because Congress did not do this, the court
should not have required the prosecution to prove that Nofziger possessed knowledge of the circumstances described in parts (1) - (3).
139 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 448.
140 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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maxim that a court should use legislative history to solve ambiguity, not
to create it.141
Assuming that the majority appropriately examined the legislative
history, the statute's history still does not support the majority's interpretation of subsection 207(c) as requiring the offender to possess knowledge of each element of the offense. The Senate version of the statute
modified the entire subsection with the adverb "knowingly." 14 2 The
House version, on the other hand, contained two separate clauses with
"knowingly" modifying the first clause-the appearance offense-and
"intent to influence" modifying the second clause-the communication
offense.' 43 The Conference Committee adopted the House version. It
stated that "the two elements of the House language, as set forth above
[with 'knowingly' modifying only the appearance offense] are each independent of the other for the purposes of a violation of any subsection
in which those terms appear."1 4 4 The majority contended that the Conference Committee viewed the two versions as containing stylistic, rather
than substantive, differences. 145 It ignored the fact that the House version was chosen over the Senate one. Nonetheless, the Conference
Committee's paraphrasing of the House version into two independent
clauses indicated that the grammatical structure was important in its
choice. The majority opinion disregarded this implication.
The majority's next argument involved an analysis of the grammar
of subsection 207(c). The majority contended that the grammatical
structure of the statute does not point toward only one interpretation. It
agreed that the communication clause is subject to the intent requirement. But the majority argued that the intent requirement for the communication offense "is not inherently incompatible" with an additional
knowledge requirement for the entire statute.' 4 6 The grammatical structure of the statute, however, contradicts the majority's view that "know141 This maxim is particularly true of the committee reports, the type of legislative history on
which the majority relied. The Supreme Court has noted that
such reports [by congressional committees] are given consideration in determining the
meaning of a statute, but only where that meaning is doubtful. They cannot be resorted to
for the purpose of construing a statute contrary to the natural import of its terms.... Like
other extrinsic aids to construction their use is "to solve, but not to create an ambiguity."
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elev. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 83 (1932) (quoting Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
142 The Senate version penalized a former official who "knowingly(1)makes any appearance or attendance before, or
(2) makes any written or oral communication to, and with the intent to influence the action of
." H.R. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4381, 4390-4391 (ellipsis in original).

143 The House version penalized a former official who "(a) 'knowingly acts as agent or attorney
...or otherwise represents ... in any formal or informal appearance before,'; (b) 'or, with the intent
to influence, make[s] any written or oral communication .. .to ....
'" H.R. REP. No. 1756, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4381, 4390 (ellipsis in

original).
144 H.R. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 74, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4381, 4390. The Conference Committee was referring here to the two elements of § 207(a)

(lifetime ban on certain contacts). Nevertheless, the Committee expressly stated that the elements
were independent of each other for every succeeding subsection, including § 207(c).
145 United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 449 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
146 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 451.
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ingly" extends throughout the entire statute. The statute contains two
separate offenses, the appearance offense and the communication offense. Each offense contains its own mens rea requirement-appear
"knowingly" and communicate "with the intent to influence." 14 7 If Congress meant to require "knowingly" to apply the elements of subsection
207(c) coming after the communication offense, it could have drafted the
statute to make "knowingly" clearly modify all the elements of the
148
offense.
The majority cited the Model Penal Code in its fourth argument to
prove that a plausible reading does not limit "knowingly" to the appearance clause. The majority sought to demonstrate that the "intent to influence" requirement of the communication offense does not preclude
"knowingly" from applying to all of subsection 207(c)'s elements because both states of mind can apply to the communication offense. 149
This approach layers the "knowingly" state of mind on top of the "intent
to influence" state of mind instead of applying the two state of mind re1 50
quirements separately.
The majority presented an example from the Model Penal Code to
prove that a higher state of mind expressed in an offense's definition-in
subsection 207(c), the "intent to influence" term-does not necessarily
apply to all elements of the offense.15 1 As to the elements which the
expressed term does not modify, the "[default culpability provision]
'should control elements of this character, and therefore recklessness
should suffice in the absence of special provision to the contrary.' "152
147 See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text; see also Noftiger, 878 F.2d at 455 (Edwards, J.,
dissenting).
148 The requirement of knowledge for parts (1) - (3) could be achieved by drafting § 207(c) as the
Senate did. See supra note 142. Alternatively, § 207(c) could have been drafted as follows:
Whoever ....
within one year after such employment has ceased, knowingly.., represents
anyone other than the United States in any formal or informal appearance before, or, with
the intent to influence, makes any oral or written communication on behalf of anyone other
than the United States, to(1) the department or agency in which he served as an officer or employee, or any

officer or employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with.., any particular matter, and
(3) which is pending before such department or agency or in which such department
or agency has a direct and substantial interestwhile possessing knowledge of the circumstancesdescribed in parts (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined...
or imprisoned ....
The emphasized phrase is the hypothetical addition to § 207(c).
149 "[A] requirement that the communication be made with the 'intent to influence' is not inherently incompatible with a parallel requirement that the other elements of the communication offense
be subject to the 'knowingly' mens rea." Nofiiger, 878 F.2d at 450-51.
150 The majority argued that "knowingly" applies to all elements and that the communication
offense simply has an added requirement of intent to influence. "The Model Penal Code provides
several analogies that would support the applicability of both mens rea requirements to the communication offense." Noftiger, 878 F.2d at 450.
151 The majority cited the example of burglary. Noftiger, 878 F.2d at 450. To be guilty of burglary, the defendant must have entered the dwelling place of another at night with the "purpose to
commit a crime therein." The state of mind of purpose does not apply to the elements of "night"
and "dwelling house." The majority sought to prove that offenses that contain a higher state of
mind (i.e., "with intent to influence," "with purpose to commit a crime") allow for lower state of
mind terms to apply to other elements of the offense.
152 Noftiger, 878 F.2d at 450, quoting the commentary of the Model Penal Code describing the
default culpability provision (MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 6 (Official Draft and Revised
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This section does not support the argument that a single element can have
multiple states of mind; rather, it supports a basic premise of element-byelement analysis, that a single offense can have multiple states of mind
while each element has its own state of mind. 153 The section requires a
court to apply a single, alternative state of mind if the state of mind specified in the statute was not meant to apply to all elements. If this provision were applied to subsection 207(c), the result would be a
requirement of recklessness as to parts (1) - (3), and not the state of mind
of "knowingly."'

15 4

Finally, as the last argument to support its conclusion that knowledge is required for all elements of the statute, the majority cited administrative regulations promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics
(OGE).' 5 5 The majority looked to OGE regulations interpreting subsection 207(b)(i), a provision which has a structure similar to subsection
207(c). Both subsections establish an appearance offense and a communication offense.' 5 6 But subsection 207(b)(i) contains one element-the
fact that the matter was previously under the official's responsibilitythat is not present in subsection 207(c). This prior responsibility element, unique to subsection 207(b)(i), is the specific element for which
the OGE regulation requires knowledge. 5 7 Nevertheless, the majority
used the OGE interpretation of subsection 207(b)(i) to support its view
that knowledge is required for all elements of subsection 207(c).' 5 8 The
Comments 1985)) (insert in original). For the text of the provision, see supra note 114. This requirement, that recklessness be presumed where no other state of mind term applies, assumes that the
provision's expressed state of mind term (immediately modifying at least one element of the offense)
is not meant to apply to all other elements of the offense. This involves the application of Model
Penal Code § 2.02(4) (applying an expressed culpability requirement to all material elements unless
a contrary purpose plainly appears). See supra notes 115-16.
153 For a full discussion of element-by-element analysis, see supra notes 10 1-102 and accompanying text,
154 Because § 207(c) is not clear as to which state of mind ("knowingly" or "with intent to influence") should apply to parts (1) - (3), § 2.02(3) of the Model Penal Code-the default culpability
provision-would apply and require recklessness as to those elements.
155 The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 established the OGE within the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to help prevent conflict of interest problems arising from post-employment
conduct by former executive agency employees. See 5 C.F.R. § 737.1(a) (1989). The OPM published the OGE's regulations relating to section 207 in their final form. See 45 Fed. Reg. 7402 (1980)
(codified at 5 C.F.R. § 737).
156 18 U.S.C § 207(b)(i) (1988) provides:
Whoever, (i) [being a covered government employee], within two years after his employment has ceased, knowingly acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents, any other
person (except the United States), in any formal or informal appearance before, or, with the
intent to influence, makes any oral or written communication on behalf of any other person
(except the United States) to, or (ii) . ..(1) any department, agency, court ...or any officer or employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with any . . . particular matter in which the United States or the
District of Columbia is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, and
(3) as to (i), which was actually pending under his official responsibility ... within a
period of one year prior to the termination of such responsibility or, as to (ii), in which
he participated personally and substantially ...
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
157 5 C.F.R § 737.7(b)(4) (1989) states that a "former employee is not subject to the restriction
unless at the time of the proposed representation of another, he or she knows or learns that the
matter had been under his or her responsibility."
158 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 451. The majority stated that the OGE's interpretation should be followed because "the language being interpreted is identical in both subsections." Id. While the
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majority's use of the OGE regulation was therefore not persuasive because 207(c) does not contain the prior responsibility element.
Further, at the time the OGE issued regulations interpreting subsection 207(b)(i), it also issued detailed regulations interpreting subsection
207(c).1 59 In these regulations, the OGE did not require knowledge for
any of the subsection 207(c) elements. Thus, the OGE interpretation of
subsection 207(b)(i) does not indicate that a court should similarly interpret subsection 207(c). A court should follow the OGE's regulations for
subsection 207(c), which require knowledge only for the appearance
offense.
The majority concluded that subsection 207(c) is ambiguous because more than one plausible reading of the subsection exists. 160 This
conclusion is erroneous. The foregoing analysis revealed that the reading propounded by the majority is not a plausible reading of subsection
207(c). The reach of "knowingly" should be limited to the appearance
offense. This leaves only one plausible reading: "knowingly" applies to
appearance element of the offense, and "intent to influence" applies to
the communication element of the offense.' 6 1 Thus, contrary to the majority's conclusion, the subsection is not ambiguous.
B.

The Majority's Resolution of the Ambiguity

The Nofziger majority invoked two "canons of statutory construction" 16 2 to support its interpretation requiring knowledge of all elements
of subsection 207(c). First, it cited the rule of lenity, which requires
courts to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in the defendant's
favor.163 The application of the rule of lenity to subsection 207(c) is inappropriate. First, the Supreme Court established that "the 'touchstone' of
language defining the conduct of the appearance and communication offenses is the same, the attendant circumstance of subsection 207(b)(i), for which the OGE required knowleage, is not an
element of subsection 207(c).
159 The majority argued that the interpretation of§ 207(b)(i) should apply by analogy to § 207(c)
because "the OGE ...has not issued any regulation interpreting subsection 207(c)." Nofziger, 878
F.2d at 451.
This assertion is mistaken. The OGE issued detailed interpretations of both subsections on Feb.
1, 1980. Examination of the Federal Register reveals that the regulations were implemented simultaneously. See 45 Fed. Reg. 7411-12, 7413-15 (1980). The OGE regulation interpreting subsection
207(b)(i) contains a specific requirement that the former official knew that a matter was pending
under his or her responsibility. See 5 C.F.R. § 737.7(b)(4) (1989). While the regulations for subsection 207(c) set out requirements regarding the element of influence, prior involvement, and other
issues, the regulations require no knowledge for any element of this subsection. See 5 C.F.R
§ 737.11 (1989). This omission indicates that the OGE determined that the knowledge requirement
should only apply to subsection 207(b)(i). In the presence of this statutory construction by the OGE,
a court should not require knowledge in 207(c) because of an analogy to the OGE's interpretation of
207(b)(i).
160 "In sum, we find nothing in the text of subsection 20 7 (c), or in its legislative history, or in
official interpretations of the statute, that will support the government's contention that the subsection unambiguously limits the reach of 'knowingly' to the appearance clause." United States v.
Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989).
161 For an explanation of the proper state of mind that should be required for parts (1) - (3), see
infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
162 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 452.
163 Id.
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the rule of lenity 'is statutory ambiguity.' "164 Because subsection 207(c)
is not ambiguous 165 the rule is inapplicable. Second, the ambiguity that
the majority sought to resolve is not the actual ambiguity. The majority
viewed subsection 207(c) as ambiguous as to whether or not the state of
mind of knowledge is required for all elements of the offense, including
parts (1) - (3). This view of the ambiguity is mistaken. Subsection 207(c)
is actually ambiguous as to whether a state of mind of recklessness is
required for parts (1) - (3), or whether no state of mind at all is required
for parts (1) - (3).166 Thus, even if the rule of lenity is applicable, it
should not be applied to require knowledge for parts (1) - (3).
The majority also relied on the general presumption against strict
liability criminal offenses. The majority stated that "absent evidence of a
contrary legislative intent, courts should presume mens rea is required."1 6 7 According to the majority, the mens rea presumption is particularly strong in this context because subsection 207(c) is a felony, and
"to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range
of apparently innocent conduct." 168 Finally, the offense in Nofziger did
not fit the pattern of "public welfare" offenses that might warrant the
imposition of strict liability. 16 9 The majority, however, failed to understand that limiting "knowingly" to the appearance offense would not
subject the communication offense to strict liability. Instead, the conduct
element of the offense would be subject to its own express "intent to
influence" state of mind.
In sum, the majority erroneously applied the rule of lenity and the
presumption against strict liability and inappropriately disregarded
grammatical structure and legislative intent in interpreting subsection
207(c). By virtue of its misinterpretation of the statute, the majority
skewed the result in favor of Mr. Nofziger.
C.

The Dissent's Analysis

The Nofziger dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's characterization of subsection 207(c) as ambiguous. 170 It argued that the plain
meaning and the legislative intent clearly indicate that "knowingly" modifies the appearance offense and "intent to influence" is the mens rea re164 Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980). See also Crandon v. United States, 110 S.
Ct. 997 (1990), which held that
because the governing standard is set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply
the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage.... [The
rule of lenity] serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of the boundaries of criminal
conduct and that legislatures, not courts, define criminal liability.
Id. at 1001-02 (citations omitted).
165 See Part III(A) of this Comment, supra notes 125-61 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
167 Noftiger, 878 F.2d at 452.
168 Id. at 453 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
169 Id. at 454. Public welfare statutes are an exception to the requirement of mens rea. In these
statutes, the lawmakers have used criminal sanctions as a means of enforcing regulations for the
public good. For a discussion of strict liability criminal offenses, see supra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
170 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 455 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
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quirement for the communication offense. 17 ' As for the other elements
of the statute, including the requirement that the subject of the communication be a matter "of direct and substantial interest,"' 72 the dissent
did not explicitly decide what state of mind should be required. It suggested that strict liability is inappropriate, 17 3 but it did not say which elements require a state of mind.
In fact, the clear consequence of the dissent's analysis is that there is
no state of mind required for parts (1) - (3) of the offense. Thejury instruction did not require the jury to find that Mr. Nofziger possessed any state
of mind as to whether the matter was of direct and substantial to the
White House. The crucial part of the instruction read: "To find the defendants guilty, you must find ...that the particular matters alleged...
were of both direct and substantial interest to the White House .... 174
Because it would sustain the jury's verdict, the dissent would not require
that the prosecution prove that the defendant possess any state of mind
as to elements (1) - (3).
This Comment agrees with the dissent's conclusion that subsection
207(c) is not ambiguous; "knowingly" does not apply to the entire subsection, but only to the appearance offense. This Comment disagrees,
however, with the consequence of the dissent's analysis-requiring no
state of mind as to the elements specified in parts (1) - (3). This Comment argues that courts should require a state of mind where none is
expressed, instead of holding defendants strictly liable for liability
75
elements.1
IV.

Correct Identification and Resolution of the Ambiguities in
Subsection 207(c)

The foregoing analysis of the majority opinion in Noftiger shows that
it incorrectly identified the ambiguities in the statute. This Part identifies
the statute's true ambiguities and resolves them using the analytical
176
framework suggested in Part II(B).
Excess generality does not trouble subsection 207(c). None of the
words in the statute are so general so as to make it impossible to limit the
conceivable number of references. A possible problem with vagueness
1 77
exists, involving the meaning of the phrase "direct and substantial."
171

Id.

172

18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(3) (1988).

173 "By enacting the statute thus. Congress avoided imposing strict liability in a criminal context
while simultaneously fashioning a more appropriate intent standard for the unique nature of the
communication offense." Nofiiger, 878 F.2d at 460 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
174 Record at 4129, supra note 22. For the complete text of the jury instructions on "intent to
influence" and "direct and substantial interest," see supra notes 22-23.
175 See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 93-120 and accompanying text.
177 The appellants in their brief argued that the words "direct" and "substantial" are too vague
to allow a reasonable determination of the criminality of a person's acts. According to the appellants, Nofziger's conduct fell within the "misty borderland" between prohibited and permitted conduct because of the vagueness of the terms "direct and substantial." Opening Brief for Appellant at
61, United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 (1989) (No. 883058). The claim is partially based on the chilling effect on speech by such a vague definition. A
brief from the ACLU, as an amicus, addressed this specific issue of First Amendment problems. It
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In Nofziger, this argument was relegated to footnote in the dissent.' 78 The
majority did not consider this issue. As a practical matter, any vagueness
defects in subsection 207(c) are cured by the creation and operation of
the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). The purpose of the OGE is to
advise former officials regarding possible violations of subsection
207(c). 17 9 If a covered employee is uncertain about whether some contact is prohibited, the OGE will issue an interpretive opinion. Thus, the
statute is not facially unconstitutional due to any vagueness.
A.

Identifying and Resolving the Syntactic Ambiguity

Rather than vagueness or generality, the real problem with subsection 207(c) lies in its ambiguities. 180 The statute is not semantically ambiguous, because no single word in the statute has a double meaning.'188 '2
The subsection's difficulties begin with its syntactic ambiguities.
The Nofziger majority viewed the ambiguity in terms of the following
question: "whether... Congress has manifested an unambiguous intent
to impose strict liability for the communication offense by limiting the
reach of 'knowingly' to the appearance offense."' 18 3 The majority answered its own question when it found "nothing... that will support the
government's contention that the subsection unambiguously limits the
'
reach of 'knowingly' to the appearance clause. 184
The majority's erroneous framing of the issue drove its result. If the
reach of "knowingly" stops after the appearance offense, then in the majority's view there is no applicable state of mind term for the test of the
offense. This would have the effect of making subsection 207(c) strict as
to parts (1) - (3). The majority wanted to avoid this result because strict
liability interpretations of criminal statutes have a "generally disfavored
status."' 8 5 Thus, the majority felt compelled to extend "knowingly"
throughout the statute. This may be the correct answer to the question
asked by the majority-but the majority asked the wrong question. As
noted by Justice Frankfurter, "[i]n law ... the right answer usually depends on putting the right question."' 8 6 The proper initial question to
ask is whether, in a grammatical sense, the word "knowingly" modifies
the elements of the communication offense at all.
argued that strict liability standards in the First Amendment context are unconstitutional. Brief for
Amicus Curiae at 28-33, Nofziger (No. 88-3058).
178 In Nofziger, the dissent forcefully noted: "I find no merit in appellant's or amicus' seemingly
half-hearted claims that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a conviction, or that
the Ethics in Government Act may be constitutionally infirm. In my view, these claims border on
frivolous." Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 460 n.4 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
179 5 U.S.C. § 402 (1982). See also 5 C.F.R. Part 737.11 (1988).
180 For a discussion of the different types of ambiguity, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying
text.
181 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
182 Recall that the definition of a syntactic ambiguity is an uncertainty of reference. See supra note
45 and accompanying text.
183 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 446. See also supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
184 Id. at 452.
185 Nofziger, 878 F.2d at 452 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (citations omitted)).
186 Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943).
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An examination of the grammatical structure of the sentence provides the answer to the correct question. In terms of punctuation, the
appearance offense is set off with commas. When a phrase is set aside
with commas and a conjunction, the phrase should be read independently of other phrases. 18 7 When the phrase beginning with "knowingly"
is read independently, "knowingly" cannot modify the subsequent
phrase.
This does not mean, however, that there is no state of mind for the
communication offense. Rather, the communication offense has its own
state of mind-"with intent to influence." This is a separate and distinct
state of mind from "knowingly."'' 8 8 Courts and statutes commonly interpret intent to mean that "the actor either has a purpose to do the thing
or [to] cause the result specified or believes that his act, if successful, will
cause that result."' 189 "Intent to influence" is effectively equivalent to the
Model Penal Code's "purpose" state of mind, which is a higher degree of
culpability than the "knowingly" requirement. Thus, the phrase "with
intent to influence" is a valid state of mind term which provides the communication offense with its own state of mind requirement. The answer
to the proper question-whether "knowingly" modifies the communication offense at all-is no. The reach of "knowingly" is limited to the
appearance offense.
An application of the suggested analytical framework also provides
the answer to the correct question.' 90 The initial step is to analyze sub187 In United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989), the Supreme Court interpreted § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides: "to the extent that an allowed secured
claim is secured by property the value of which ... is greater than the amount of such claim, there
shall be allowed to the holder ofsuch claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges ....
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988). In construing this statute, the Court noted:
This reading is also mandated by the grammatical structure of the statute. The phrase
"interest on such claim" is set aside by commas, and separated from the reference to fees,
costs, and charges by the conjunctive words "and any." As a result, the phrase "interest on
such claim" stands independent of the language that follows.
Ron PairEnters., 109 S. Ct. at 1030-31. To analogize to § 207(c), the phrase beginning with "knowingly" reads like this: "[Whoever], knowingly acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents,
anyone other than the United States in any formal or informal appearance before, or ....
Note
that there is a comma immediately preceding "knowingly," and that a comma is inserted immediately after the description of the appearance offense. This second comma is followed by the word
"or." Thus, the entire phrase describing the appearance clause is set off with commas, and it is
separated from the clause describing the communication offense by the conjunction "or." Therefore, the reach of "knowingly" should be limited to the phrase in which it appears.
188 See supra notes 96-97 and 100 and accompanying text discussing the difference between
knowledge and purpose.
189 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02(subd. 9)(3) (West 1987); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.23(3)
(West 1982). State statutes are an appropriate place for federal courts to turn when attempting to
define terms in federal statutes. The Supreme Court noted recently in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 1608 (1989) that the fact that
we are dealing with a uniform federal rather than a state definition does not, of course,
prevent us from drawing on general state-law principles to determine "the ordinary meaning of the words used." Well-settled state law can inform our understanding of what Congress had in mind when it employed a term it did not define.
This is particularly true in criminal law, since state and federal laws are directed to a common problem: the jurisprudence of crime. The resolution of this problem is a matter of shared responsibility
between the states and the federal government. The common goal justifies the practice of federal
courts borrowing state definitions for criminal law terms.
190 For a summary of the steps of analysis, see supra text following note 119.
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section 207(c) element-by-element, and classify the elements as conduct,
surrounding circumstances or results. The first element is a conduct element: "acts ... or otherwise represents." The second element is also a
conduct element: "makes." Both elements describe conduct that a covered employee may not be able to do. Since both elements are conduct
elements, the required state of mind must be at least knowing. The next
step is to see if a state of mind term immediately modifies or introduces
the element. In this case, both elements are immediately preceded by a
state of mind term. "Acts" is immediately introduced by "knowingly,"
and "makes" is immediately introduced by "with intent to influence."
Since both elements are modified, then the construction ends here, and
the expressed terms should be applied.
Both examination of grammar and application of the suggested
framework produce the same logical result. The distinction between an
appearance offense and a communication offense is logical because the
impropriety of a communication is less than that of an appearance. Because the possibility of improper influence is greater when a former employee lobbies his former agency in person, Congress would require a
lesser degree of culpability for a conviction. The defendant in such a
case need not have possessed any intent to influence; simply appearing is
enough. Conversely, for the communication offense, Congress may well
have wanted a greater degree of culpability for a conviction. 1 9 ' Mere
communication with an official's former agency is not enough-the communication must be made with the intent to influence the agency.
B. Identifying and Resolving the Contextual Ambiguity
In addition to the syntactic ambiguity, subsection 207(c) also contains a contextual ambiguity. 19 2 The contextual ambiguity arises from a
second question: How do the statements defining the appearance and
communication offenses relate to parts (1), (2), and (3) of the subsection?' 93 Neither state of mind expressed in the subsection ("knowingly"
or "intent to influence") immediately modify these three elements of the
offense. The dissent's reasoning eliminates the requirement of a state of
mind for these elements. This conclusion is invalid because it conflicts
191 Congress did not mean to prevent all communication between an employee and his former
agency, but rather only communication that sought to influence that agency. Normal communications, such as Christmas cards, are acceptable under § 207(c). According to the Senate Report:
The contact must be on a matter of business. Casual, social communication, such as
"cocktail party" conversation, is not included unless it relates to a pending matter of business.
Subsection (c) further excludes contacts concerning matters of a personal and individual nature, such as personal income taxes and pension benefits. That form of self-represen-

tation is reasonable and to be expected.
S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 153, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4216,
4369. See also 5 C.F.R. § 737.11(h) (1989).
192 Recall that contextual ambiguity arises when there is uncertainty as to how a statement is
affected by another statement. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
193 The three additional conditions of § 207(c) are: (1) the communication must be to the employee's former agency; (2) it must relate to a proceeding or other "particular matter"; and (3) the
matter must be one that is either "pending" before the agency or in which the agency has an interest
that is both "direct" and "substantial." 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1988).

1990]

CASE COMMENTS

with the assumption that a state of mind will be read into the definition of
194
an offense.
Application of the suggested analytical framework' 9 5 will resolve the
contextual ambiguity and determine the proper state of mind. The first
step is to analyze the rest of the subsection element-by-element. Two
conduct elements have already been identified. Parts (1) - (3)are readily
identified as elements that serve as surrounding circumstances. 196 These
elements describe circumstances that must be present before criminal liability is incurred. The elements that are surrounding circumstances are
then classified so as to determine if a state of mind is required for them.
The surrounding circumstance elements that do not require a state of
mind relate to jurisdiction, grading, venue, or a question of law.19 7 None
of the three relate to venue or to a question of law. Neither do any relate
to grading, since there is no lesser offense which is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of one of the elements. All three are, to some
extent, jurisdictional, since their presence serves to bring the defendant
into the federal system. The question, though, is whether they are "jurisdictional only."' 98 The three are not, since in the absence of any one
there is no crime. Thus, the three are all surrounding circumstance elements related, in part if not entirely, to liability. Because they are liability
elements, a court should require that state of mind be proven for
them.199
The next step is to apply any express state of mind term that immediately modifies the element. None of the three are so modified. Lacking
an express state of mind modifier, the next step is to apply the assumption that some state of should be read in.2 00 Because the elements are
surrounding circumstances, the correct state of mind to require is
20
recklessness. '
In sum, the proper state of mind requirements are "knowingly" for
the conduct element of "acts.., or represents," "intent to influence" for
the conduct element "makes (communication)," and recklessness for the
surrounding circumstance elements described in parts (1) - (3).
194
195
196

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra text following note 119.
Parts (1) - (3) read as follows:
(1) the department or agency in which he served as an officer or employee thereof, and
(2) in connection with any... particular matter, and
(3) which is pending before such department or agency or in which the department or
agency has a direct and substantial interest...
18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1988).
197 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
198 United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975).
199 See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
201 For an explanation of this assumption, see supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
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Application of the Analytical Framework to the Amended
Subsection 207(c)

Congress amended subsection 207(c) when it passed the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,202 part of which provided for "the first comprehensive
reform of ethics laws in more than a decade." 20 3 After January 1, 1991,
subsection 207(c) will read, in relevant part, as follows:
[A]ny person [who is a covered government employee] and who,
within 1 year after the termination of his or her employment as such
officer or employee, knowingly makes, with the intent to influence, any
communication to or appearance before any officer or employee of the
department or agency in which such person served within 1 year
before such termination, on behalf of any other person (except the
United States), in connection with any matter on which such person
seeks official action by any officer or employee of such department20 or
4
agency, shall be punished as provided in section 216 of this title.
Section 216, a completely new provision, contains the following criminal
penalties:
The punishment for an offense under [section 207] . . . of this title is

the following:
(1) Whoever engages in the conduct constituting the offense shall
be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined in the amount
set forth in this title, or both.
(2) Whoever willfully engages in the conduct constituting the offense shall be imprisoned for not more than
five years or fined in
the amount set forth in this title, or both. 20 5
The new subsection differs in focus from the existing subsection because it eliminates the requirement that the contact relate to a matter "in
which such department or agency has a direct and substantial interest." 20 6 The new subsection instead requires that the contact relate to a
matter "on which such person [the former employee] seeks official action." The new subsection focuses less on the role of the department
lobbied but more on the goal of the person lobbying.
The new subsection also changes the state of mind requirements.
Nevertheless, the legislative history explaining these changes is
202 Pub. L. No. 101-194, §§ 101(a), 102, 103 Stat. 1716, 1717-18, 1724 (1989) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(c) (West Supp. 1990)) (effective Jan. 1, 1991) [hereinafter 18
U.S.C.A. § 207 (West. Supp. 1990)].
203 162 CONG. REC. S15,953 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin). Senator Levin
continued, noting that the "ethics portion" of the bill
imposes some tough new standards on Members of Congress, and on our staffs, and it
strengthens existing ethics laws that apply to all three branches. It addresses key ethics
issues ranging from postemployment lobbying restrictions to financial disclosure, to gifts
and travel restrictions.
... [F]or the first time, through this bill we would bring Members of Congress and top
congressional staff under the postemployment lobbying restrictions of 18 United States
Code section 207.
Id. at S15,953-54.
204 Pub. L. No. 101-194, §§ 101(a), 102, 103 Stat. 1716, 1717-18, 1724 (1989) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990)) (effectiveJan. 1, 1991).
205 Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 407(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1753 (1989) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 216(a)
(West Supp. 1990)).
206 18 U.S.C. § 207(c)(3) (1988).
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sparse. 20 7 The only extended discussion of the changes made in subsection 207(c) is in the floor remarks of Senator Carl M. Levin, co-sponsor
of the bill. Senator Levin specifically referred to the Nofziger decision,
noting that the D.C. Circuit's
interpretation does not reflect congressional intent.... There is no
requirement, here, that the former employee know that the particular
matter on which he or she is lobbying was a matter of interest or was
pending before the subject agency or department.
Thus, we are able
2° s
to set the record straight on this matter.
In its attempt to "set the record straight," Congress instead succeeded in
enacting a statute that is as ambiguous as the one it replaced.
A.

Identifying the Ambiguities in the Revised Subsection

The revised subsection contains two ambiguities. It is syntactically
ambiguous 20 9 because the reader is uncertain how far down the sentence
"knowingly" travels. A court interpreting the subsection is faced with
the question of which elements "knowingly" modifies. The new subsection initially defines the prohibited conduct ("makes ... any communication . . . or appearance") and then lists other elements. For example,
another element of the offense is that the subject of the communication
must be a matter "on which such person [the former employee] seeks
official action." 21 0 An interpretive problem arises because the language
of the statute does not specify if the prosecution must prove that the
former employee knew that the subject of the communication involved
21
official action. '
207 "The Act was moved through Congress in a couple of weeks, and no committee or conference
reports were prepared." Murdock, Finally, Government Ethics as if People Mattered: Some Thoughts on the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 502, 503 (1990).

208

162 CONG. REC S15,954 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin) (emphasis added).

The complete text of Senator Levin's comments on the changes to § 207(c) reads:
One matter we have addressed [in making the changes] in this section has to do with
the knowing standard. In the recently decided case involving former Presidential aide Lyn
Nofziger, the court of appeals held that under the current law, the word "knowing" modified all the elements of the offense including the provision that the particular matter was
pending before the subject department or agency or that the agency had a direct and substantial interest in the particular matter. That judicial interpretation does not reflect congressional intent. We correct that misinterpretation in this bill by including a knowing
standard only for the act of making the communication with the intent to influence and state that
the offense is committed if the former employee seeks official action by an agency or department employee. There is no requirement, here, that the former employee know that the
particular matter on which he or she is lobbying was a matter of interest or was pending
before the subject agency or department. Thus, we are able to set the record straight on
this matter.
Id (emphasis added). The only other mention of the changes to § 207(c) appears in a section-bysection analysis that Senator Levin placed in the Congressional Record. It notes simply that "207(c)
is similar to current law. It bars Executive Branch employees, including members of the Senior
Executive Service, who are paid at or above the GS-17 level and comparable military officers from
lobbying their former agency on behalf of another person, on any matter on which such person seeks
official action. This is a 1 year ban." 162 CONG. REc S15,954-55 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989).
209 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
210 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
211 Consider the factual scenario where an ex-employee contacts his former agency to gain information on the specifics of a contract on which that agency is taking bids. The ex-employee's firm has
yet to make a bid, and the ex-employee does not know if his firm will decide to make a bid. Thus, the
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The ambiguity in the new subsection is similar to the ambiguity in
the statute at issue in Liparota v. United States 2 12 penalizing "whoever
knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses [food stamps] ...
in any manner not authorized by this chapter .... ,,213 In that case, the
Court decided that "knowingly" applied to all the elements that followed
it. Applying this precedent to interpret the new subsection would, however, seem to contradict the little legislative history that discusses the
change. The drafters of the new subsection revised the law to eliminate
the requirement that the former employee know the nature of his
communication.
The revised subsection is also semantically ambiguous. It specifies
that the punishment for violating the subsection is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 216, the new penalty section. The new section establishes misdemeanor penalties for "engag[ing] in the conduct constituting the offense," and felony penalties for "willfully engag[ing] in the conduct
constituting the offense." 2 14 The state of mind term "willfully" is semantically ambiguous because courts have interpreted it as meaning either a
purpose to break the law or simply knowledge of one's conduct.2 1 5
An application of section 216 to subsection 207(c) produces two alternative interpretations of what the prosecution must prove to impose
felony penalties. One alternative would require that an ex-employee
"knowingly make[], with the intent to influence, any communication."
with the purpose to break the law. The other alternative would require
that an ex-employee "knowingly make[], with the intent to influence, any
communication." with knowledge of his own conduct. Either alternative
is possible. The application of this semantic ambiguity to a subsection
that is already syntactically ambiguous creates a gordian knot for a court
faced with the task of determining the states of mind required by the
statute.
B.

Resolving the Ambiguities in the Revised Subsection

An application of the suggested analytical framework resolves the
ambiguities and identifies the states of mind required by the new subsection. The initial step is to apply element-by-element analysis and classify
the elements as conduct, surrounding circumstances, or results. The
new subsection contains two conduct elements: (1) "makes... any communication to"; and (2) "makes... appearance before." The subsection
contains five surrounding circumstance elements. The contact must be:
(1) "within 1 year after the [former employee's] termination"; (2)
"before any officer or employee of the department or agency in which
such person served within 1 year before such termination"; (3) "on behalf of any other person (except the United States)"; (4) "in connection
defendant prosecuted under the new section could argue that when he communicated with his for-

mer agency, he did not know if his firm would seek official action on the subject of the
communication.
212 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
213 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988). See supra notes 45, 127-29 and accompanying text.
214 18 U.S.C.A. § 216(a)(1) - (2) (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
215 See supra note 44.
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with any matter on which such person [the former employee] seeks official action"; and the action sought must be (5) "by any officer or employee of such department or agency."
The next step is to determine which elements require a state of
mind. The determination for the two conduct elements is simple: 2all
16
conduct elements require a state of mind of at least knowledge.
Whether the five surrounding circumstance elements require a state of
mind depends on their role in the offense. Elements that are a basis for
liability for the substantive offense require a state of mind; elements that
determine jurisdiction, grading, venue, or a question of law do not require a state of mind.21 7 None of the five elements serve as a basis for
jurisdiction, grading, 2 18 or venue, and none relate to a question of law.
legislative inThus, all five are liability elements, and absent expressed
2 19
tent, a state of mind must be proven for each element.
The next step is to determine if a particular state of mind term immediately modifies or introduces the element. The conduct elements are
immediately modified by "knowingly . . .with the intent to influence."
Because there is no intervening conduct element between the term
"knowingly" and the phrase "with the intent to influence," as there was
in the original subsection 207(c), the two state of mind terms can be read
together, and treated as one unified state of mind. 22 0 Because the conduct elements are modified by express terms, the construction ends here,
and a court should apply the expressed terms.
The determination of the appropriate state of mind for the five surrounding circumstance elements is not as straightforward as it was for
the two conduct elements. The revised subsection does not contain a
term that immediately modifies any of the five surrounding circumstance
22
elements. Thus, it does not specify a state of mind for these elements. '
The analytical framework of this Comment fills this void. A court should
utilize the assumption that the state of mind of recklessness be proven
for surrounding circumstance elements that serve as a basis for liability.
In interpreting subsection 207(c), a court should require the prosecution
to prove, for example, that the former employee is at least reckless with
respect to whether the subject of his communication is one on which official action is sought.
216 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
218 The offense does have different grades of punishment, but the higher felony punishment is
based on the presence of "willfulness," not on the presence of an additional surrounding
circumstance.
219 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
220 The terms create a unified state of mind because in this sentence, "knowingly" modifies not
only "makes" but also "intent to influence." Thus, the former employee must knowingly intend his
action. The employee must know that he seeks to influence his former agency. This level of state of
mind was envisioned by Judge Edwards in his dissenting opinion in Nojiiger when he noted that
"'intending to influence' and 'knowingly intending to influence' are different standards." United
States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 460 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 564 (1989) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
221 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text for an explanation of the process for determining whether a section "specifies" a state of mind.
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An application of the suggested analytical framework also resolves
the semantic ambiguity caused by the word "willfully" in section 216.
The ambiguity exists because "willfully" can be interpreted to mean
either "knowingly" or "with a purpose to break the law." 22 2 A major
source of the analytical framework is the Model Penal Code § 2.02, and it
can assist in resolving the ambiguity because it addresses the meaning of
"willfully" in an offense definition. The relevant paragraph notes that "a
requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person
acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears." 223 If the term
"willfully" in section 216 is read as meaning "knowingly," the resulting
interpretation is not meaningful. When the two sections are read together, while assuming that "willfully" means "knowingly," felony penalties are imposed on a former employee who "[knowingly] engages in the
conduct constituting the offense," 224 and the conduct is itself "knowingly
mak[ing], with the intent to influence, any communication." 2 2 5 One of
the two "knowingly" modifiers is redundant, and if one was excised the
section would have the same meaning. Read this way, section 216(a)(2)
has the same meaning as section 216(a)(1), even though (a)(1) does not
contain "willfully" as a modifier.
This interpretation of section 216(a)(2) violates the principle of statutory construction which holds that a given section should be interpreted
to give each word and phrase meaning.2 26 The interpretation also contradicts the legislative history of section 216. Section 216 is a new section of
the criminal code, and it was added to "create alternative felony, misdemeanor, and civil penalties for Sections 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, and
209."227 Formerly, subsection 207(c) only provided for felony penalties.
If a statute imposes alternative penalties, it should also specify alternative
levels of criminal culpability.
To give section 216(a)(2) meaning, the term "willfully" should be
interpreted to justify the imposition of the more severe felony penalties.
Interpreting "willfully" as meaning "with the purpose to break the law"
provides the necessary justification. This interpretation follows section
2.02(8) of the Model Penal Code, which conditioned interpreting "willfully" as "knowingly" on the absence of an apparent purpose "to impose
further requirements." The heightened penalties of section 216(a)(2)
exhibit a purpose to impose a further requirement; in this case, section
216(a)(2) imposes the further requirement on the prosecution to prove
that the former employee made a communication with the purpose of
breaking the law.
In sum, the proper state of mind requirements for the revised subsection are "knowingly ...with the intent to influence" for the conduct
222 See supra text accompanying note 215 and note 44.
223 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
224 18 U.S.C.A. § 216(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (substituting "knowingly" for "willfully").
225 18 U.S.C.A. § 207(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
226 See supra note 135.
227 162 CONG. REC S15,956 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (section-by-section analysis of the Ethics
Reform Act of 1989 offered by Sen. Levin).
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elements of "makes . . . any communication" and "makes . . . appearance," recklessness for the five surrounding circumstance elements, and
a purpose to violate the subsection for the imposition of section
216(a)(2) felony penalties.
VI.

Conclusion

The opinions of the court in Nofziger are symbolic of the fundamental problems involved in interpreting the federal criminal code. The revisions of subsection 207(c) are symbolic of the fundamental problems
involved in drafting the federal criminal code. Neither statutes nor case
law provide a useful principle to guide courts when they interpret the
thousands of disparate provisions contained in Title 18. Over ten years
ago, in United States v. Bailey, 2 28 the Supreme Court took the first tentative
steps toward filling the void. The states are leaders in this area, with a
majority of states modernizing their criminal codes and regularizing their
methods of statutory interpretation over the last thirty years. 2 29 A similar
development has not occurred with the federal criminal code, in spite of
the fact that the federal criminal justice system possesses the capacity for
23 0
reform.
228 444 U.S. 400 (1980).
229 MODEL PENAL CODE xi (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
230 The recent enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines demonstrates that federal criminal law can be reformed. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 created the United States
Sentencing Commission, and it gave the Commission "broad authority to review and rationalize the
sentencing process." Federal Sentencing Guidelines § IA2, U. S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (1990 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL].
Pursuant to this goal, the Commission structured the Guidelines so that after the Introduction,
but before the chapters describing the details of the Guidelines, there is a Part entitled "General
Application Principles." The longest and most detailed guideline in this part relates to "Relevant
Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)." Guidelines § IB1.3. The guideline in
force in 1988-89 required that the sentencing court evaluate the conduct in light of several factors:
(a) ... Unless otherwise specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline specifies
more than one base offense level, [and] (ii) specific offense characteristics.., shall be determined on the basis of the following: ...
(3) all harm or risk of harm that resulted from the acts or omissions specified... if the
harm or risk was caused intentionally, recklessly, or by criminal negligence [; and] ....
(4) the defendant's state of mind, intent, motive and purpose in committing the offense ....

Guidelines § 1B1.3(a), id at 360 (amendment effective January 15, 1988) (emphasis added). r'ote
how the Guidelines clearly specify the state of mind levels that a court should consider, with the
lowest state being negligence. Although this Comment argues that the lowest state of mind that
should apply to any of the attendant circumstances is recklessness, this guideline provides a parallel
in sentencing to what this Comment proposes in substantive offenses.
The recent D.C. Circuit decision in United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1989), correctly applied these guidelines to require the prosecution to show a minimum state of mind of negligence before the sentence could be increased. Guideline § 2D 1.1(b) calls for a two level increment
in sentencing if the defendant possessed a firearm. The trial court did not require the prosecution to
prove that the defendant knew he possessed the gun, only that the defendant possessed it. Burke,
888 F.2d at 865. The court decided that
[plossessionwithout prooj ofknowledge will result in an enhancement only when the Government
proves that the defendant was reckless or criminally negligent in order to show that he
should have been aware that he was in possession of a weapon.
Id. at 868 (emphasis in original). In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that "[a]Ithough
section 2D1.1(b) itself is silent as to scienter, section IB1.3-which supplies 'general application
principles'--is not." Id. at 866. Courts can utilize principles of general application if the courts
recognize such principles. The analytical framework outlined by this Comment supplies the general
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The need for reform is obvious, the opportunity is manifest; however, courts are apparently unwilling to introduce reform, 23 1 and Congress is seemingly unable to legislate reform. 23 2 The analytical
framework utilized by this Comment provides a workable model for interpreting federal criminal statutes. The Nofziger decision represents a
lost opportunity for a respected federal appellate court to initiate the
necessary reform for the determination of mens rea in federal criminal
law. The Congressional revision of subsection 207(c) demonstrates the
continued need for a comprehensive model to guide the drafting and
interpretation of federal criminal laws.
Matthew T. Fricker
Kelly Gilchrist

principles federal courts should use to determine the proper states of mind that must be, shown for
the elements of a substantive offense.
Despite the ability of courts to utilize guidelines specifying that particular levels of states of
mind should be considered, the Commission amended Guideline § IB1.3 in November of 1989,
deleting references to state of mind terms. See MANUAL, supra, at 396-97.
231 Appellate courts can be particularly resistant to reform.
[A]ppellate courts are not sufficiently aware of the need to use clear and consistent language or of the difficulty in administration that results if terms are ambiguous and used in
inconsistent ways. Nor do appellate courts feel a responsibility to maintain a coherent criminal code, seemingly because they are unaware of its value. As a result, one ordinarily cannot rely upon appellate courts to clarify a confused statutory definition.
Remington, The Future of the Substantive Criminal Law Codification Movement - Theoretical and Practical
Concerns, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 867, 874 (1988).
232 Congress amended § 207(c) with the ostensible purpose of clarifying the statute. "[S]ome of
the changes we have made to the postemployment law simply reflect an effort to make the statute
more readable." 162 CONG. REC S 15,954 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin). Instead of making the statute clearer, the changes succeeded only in replacing two old ambiguities with
two new ambiguities.

In re Metmor Financial,Inc.: The Better Approach to
Post-Seizure Interest Under the Comprehensive Drug

Abuse Prevention and Control Act
Since 1970, following congressional approval of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (Drug Control Act),' the federal
government has carried out scores of civil forfeitures under its provisions. In re Metmor Financial,Inc.2 is an example of a case arising from
government exercise of the powers granted by the Drug Control Act in
the fight against the drug trade and drug usage in this country. In fact, In
re Metmor is the first federal circuit court of appeals decision addressing
the award of post-seizure interest to an innocent party under the Drug
Control Act. Consistent with a small contingent of district courts addressing the issue at the time, but contrary to the majority, the Fourth
Circuit declared its intent to protect the "innocent owner" from the government's attempt to deny such protection.
Part I of this Comment discusses the facts of In re Metmor and its
holding in favor of post-seizure interest. Part II examines the inconsistent treatment of post-seizure interest to innocent lienholders by various
courts by discussing the primary district court case denying post-seizure
interest, United States v. One Piece Of Real EstateA Part III discusses the
legislative history and analyzes the congressional intent behind the Drug
Control Act and one of its most important amendments. Part IV examines the reliance by both sides in the issue upon United States v. Stowell,4 a
forfeiture case handed down a century ago. Finally, Part V addresses
possible consequences of denying post-seizure interest to an innocent
third party and concludes that the In re Metmor court's protection of postseizure interest is the best approach.
I.

Facts and Ruling of In re Metmor

In re Metmor involved an appeal of an order of forfeiture in favor of
the United States government. 5 The government seized a small horse
ranch located near Dade County, Florida, after the property's owner,
6
Paul Ackley, was implicated as a drug smuggler and declared a fugitive.
The government accomplished the seizure by filing a complaint against
the property with the United States
Marshal's Service, pursuant to sec7
tion 511 of the Drug Control Act.
I
1236
2
3
4
5
6
7

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
(1970) (current version codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988)).
819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987).
571 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
133 U.S. 1 (1890).
In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447.
Id
Id Section 511 of the Drug Control Act is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988), see infra note 32.
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Metmor Financial was an assignee of a mortgage on the horse ranch
prior to Ackley's purchase of it; the property was subsequently purchased
by Ackley who assumed the mortgage held by Metmor Financial.8
Metmor Financial claimed no knowledge of Ackley's alleged connections
with illegal drug activity and filed a claim with the government for an
interest in the property. 9
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
entered an order of forfeiture which condemned and forfeited to the
government Ackley's ranch in Florida.' 0 In addition, the court stated
that the real property remained subject to Metmor Financial's lien, plus
interest up to the time of seizure." On appeal, the sole issue was the
district court's denial of Metmor Financial's claim for post-seizure interest on the mortgage. 12 Such interest had been accruing from the time of
amounted to nearly two years worth of accumuseizure and eventually
3
lated interest.'
At no time did the government deny that Metmor Financial had obtained an interest in the property, but rather, essentially acquiesced to
Metmor Financial's claimed innocent lienholder status. 14 The government did not contest the district court's forfeiture of the property subject
to Metmor Financial's lien, so long as post-seizure interest was denied.' 5
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the district
court's holding, and required that the government pay Metmor Financial
post-seizure interest that had accrued from the time of seizure to the
property's eventual sale.16
II.

United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate and the Controversy Over
Post-Seizure Interest

United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate (One Piece) was the first federal
district court case denying post-seizure interest to lending institutions
claiming an innocent owner status.' 7 This 1983 case from the United
8 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447. In October, 1974, Newton and Nancy Baker purchased the
property and executed a mortgage in favor of Allstate Enterprises Mortgage Corporation. This
mortgage was later assigned to Metmor in 1981. In early 1985, using drug proceeds and a straw
purchaser, Ackley took title to the property. Ackley purchased the property encumbered by Metmor
Financial's lien which subsequently remained on the property. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3-4,
Brief for Appellee at 4-5, In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-3710).
9 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447. According to the court, the government did not deny that
Metmor's interest in the property arose before the property became implicated in any illegal activity.
Id. at 448. Thus, there was no issue as to Metmor Financial's claimed "innocent owner" status as
opposed to many forfeiture actions involving supposed innocent parties.
10 Id.
I I Id. The order of forfeiture stated: "The real property remains subject to a lien by Metmor
Financial, Inc. in the principal amount of $183,914.54, plus interest at the rate of 9.5% from March
1, 1985 [the date when the government's complaint for forfeiture was filed] through March 28, 1985
[the date when the property was seized]." Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, In re Metmor Fin., Inc.,
819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-3710).
12 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 447.
13 Id. at 448.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 451. It is only when the government proceeds with the final sale of the property that an
innocent lienholder obtains satisfaction on his mortgage.
17 Id. at 448 n.5.
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States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania is the precedent setting case for other districts adopting a "no-interest" rule.' 8
I In One Piece, the government sought forfeiture of various parcels of
real-estate because they were purchased with the proceeds of unlawful
drug transactions.' 9 Like In re Metmor, several institutional lienholders
filed claims under section 881 seeking to recover the unpaid principal as
well as post-seizure interest. 20 The government did not deny the
lienholder's right to their unpaid principal and any unpaid interest
charges accrued up to the date of seizure. 2 1 Nonetheless, the government, in what was to become their usual posture in such cases, held firm
22
in their denial of the lienholder's claim to any post-seizure interest.
The court subsequently awarded the lienholder-claimants their remaining principal and interest up to the time of seizure on the liens. 23 The
24
court refused, however, to allow any recovery for post-seizure interest.
In In re Metmor, the Fourth Circuit states at the beginning of its decision that, "[a]s far as we are aware, no court of appeals, and only a handful of district courts, have addressed this issue." 25 With the exception of
In re Metmor, this situation remains unchanged. Among the limited
number of courts addressing this issue, districts in South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida have opted to deny post-seizure interest to innocent
lienholders while districts in Tennessee, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Hawaii have adopted the diametric position. 2 6 All of these decisions resolve
the issue upon either one or both of the following grounds: the interpretation of the federal statute governing these seizures and subsequent forfeitures, or the relation-back doctrine as formulated in United States v.
27
Stowell.
The discussion of the governing statute centers upon the interpretation of a clause purporting to protect "innocent owners." Specifically,
the dispute revolves around the extent of an innocent owner's interest
under the statute. Under the relation-back concept, the dispute arises
over the ability of the doctrine to deny or protect an innocent
lienholder's post-seizure interest. Courts applying Stowell hold that the
relation-back doctrine vests the government's interest in the forfeitable
property at the time it becomes tainted from illegal activity.2 8 Thus, once
18

Id See infra note 26.

19 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 724 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
20 Id
21

Id.

22 Id
23 Id at 726.
24 Id.

25 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 448 (4th Cir. 1987).
26 Cases denying post-seizure interest are: United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel Of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. La. 1987); United States v. 8.4 Acres Of Land, 648 F. Supp. 79 (D.S.C.
1986); United States v. One Condominium Apartment, 636 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United
States v. Escobar, 600 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Fla. 1984). Cases awarding post-seizure interest are: United
States v. Parcel Of Real Property, 715 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Real Property
In Sevier County, Tenn., 703 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Tenn. 1988); United States v. Real Property Titled
In the Name Of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F. Supp. 332 (D. Haw. 1987); United States v. All That Tract &
Parcel Of Land, 602 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
27 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890).
28 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:854

title to the property vests in the government, others, including innocent
lienholders, may not acquire a superior interest or increase their already
present interest. 29 Here, the dispute arises over the ability of the relation-back doctrine to deny or protect an innocent lienholder's postseizure interest. This Comment analyzes these two concepts and discusses how both the In re Metmor and One Piece courts apply them in justification of their opposing positions on this issue.
III.

The Drug Control Act

In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act to curb what was found to be a growing problem of
drug abuse and addiction in this country. 3 0 A House report states that
one of the principal purposes of the bill, "was to deal in a comprehensive
fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States...
through providing more effective means for law enforcement aspects of
3
drug abuse prevention and control." '
The seizures in In re Metmor and One Piece, as well as those in the
other district court cases, were executed pursuant to the civil forfeiture
provisions of the Drug Control Act, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881.32 Sec29
30

Id
H.R. REP. No. 91-1441, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEWS 4566, 4566-68.

31
32

Id
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). Subsection (a) of § 881 reads as follows:
§ 881. Forfeitures
(a) Subject property.
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9),
except that(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of
business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section
unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was
a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter;
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or
omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in
the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States, or of any State; and
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner.
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance
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tion 881 permits the federal government to seize by forfeiture numerous
items, including real property, which were purchased with the proceeds
of illegal narcotics trafficking or were used to facilitate the manufacture
or distribution of illegal narcotics. 3 3 Since these are civil forfeiture proceedings, a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite. 3 4 The proceedings
are in rem actions that are based upon the legal fiction that the property
itself is guilty of wrongdoing.3 5 Congress designed section 881 primarily
to take the profit out of the drug 3trade
and, as is readily apparent, it
6
provides the means to do just that.
Until Congress amended section 881 in 1978, no basis existed for
bringing a lawsuit under that section to recover post-seizure interest. After reviewing the success of the 1970 statute, Congress became concerned that the government could forfeit a person's property even
though that person was in no way connected to the wrongdoing that had
triggered the forfeiture. For instance, prior to the amendment, under
certain circumstances a person could forfeit his automobile to the govin violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any
violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to
the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner.
' (8) All controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this subchapter.
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines,
all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which have been imported, exported,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or intended to be distributed, imported, or exported, in violation of a felony provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter.
For a comprehensive examination of § 881, see Annotation, Fofeiture of PersonalProperty Used in
Illegal Manufacture, Processing, or Sale of Controlled Substances Under § 511 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 USCS § 881), 59 A.L.R. FED. 765 (1982).

33 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). See United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675, 676 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that an entire tract of property is subject to forfeiture even though only a small part of it
was used for illicit purposes). In referring to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), the Reynolds' court stated, "Congress expressly contemplated forfeiture of an entire tract based upon drug-related activities on a
portion of a tract. The statute is so clear that resort to extrinsic aids to seek its meaning are unnecessary." Id.
34 United States v. $152,160.00 United States Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 1988).
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
Public policy supports the use of civil forfeiture proceedings involving narcotics violations in that it
prevents illicit use of real or personal property by imposing an economic penalty rendering unlawful
behavior less profitable. Id at 686-87. See United States v. Premises Known As 2639 Meetinghouse,
633 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1986). The Premises Known court stated that the purpose of civil forfeitures under § 881 includes, "removing the incentive to engage in the drug trade by denying drug
dealers the proceeds of illgotten gains, stripping the drug trade of its instrumentalities, including
money, and financing Government programs designed to eliminate drug trafficking." Id at 994.
35 $152,160.00 United States Currency, 680 F. Supp. at 356.

36 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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ernment even though he never engaged in any illegal activity. If the vehi-

cle happened to be stolen, was used to transport controlled substances,
and then recovered, it could eventually be forfeited because it was used
to facilitate the crime. As the One Piece court points out, prior to 1978,
the statute itself offered no remedy, and the owners only remedy was to
petition the Attorney General of the United States for remission or mitigation-a so-called act of executive clemency. 3 7 This process could be
highly arbitrary, being governed not by a court of law but by the government itself, the original seizor of the property.3 8
The government presently rejects petitions for executive clemency
because the congressional amendment of 1978 provides an alternative
remedy. 39 The new provision, commonly deemed the "innocent owner"
defense, states in part that, "no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omit40
ted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."

This amendment is at the heart of the opposing decisions in In re
Metmor and One Piece. It is not the application of the defense that creates

the controversy, however, but the scope of the defense that proves troublesome. In both cases the government did not even challenge the
37 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 724 (W.D. Tex. 1983). The One
Piece court stated:
Historically, the remedy of the innocent holder of a lien interest in property forfeited under
[s]ection 881 and other statutes has been to petition the Attorney General of the United
States for remission or mitigation, an act of executive clemency. Thus, although innocent
lienholders could not prevent forfeiture of their interests, they could request an administrative determination that certain properties be returned or a portion of the proceeds of sale
be paid to them.
Id.
38 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988) governs remission and mitigation proceedings. The relevant portions state:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury . .. if he finds that such fine, penalty, or forfeiture was
incurred without willful negligence .. .or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture may remit
or mitigate the same upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just, or
order discontinuance of any prosecution relating thereto.
la, (emphasis added).
The courts have consistently held that it is solely within the Attorney General's discretion
whether property should be returned. United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897,
900 (8th Cir. 1977). Remission under § 881 is also considered a matter of grace, not right. United
States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1977). As a result, a district
court has no jurisdiction to consider the Attorney General's determination. United States v. One
Volvo Sedan, 393 F. Supp. 843, 846-847 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
One article notes:
[W]hile a petition for remission or mitigation is an important avenue to ameliorate the
harshness of the forfeiture statute, it is purely a matter of grace ... [s]ince no guidelines
have been published by the Attorney General's Office, there is no framework provided by
which an individual's rights can be protected . . . [t]he petition to the Attorney General
should be considered equivalent to a criminal pardon.
Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some Constitutionaland PracticalConsiderationsof Civil Forfeitures Under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881, 9 WHrrTIER L. REV. 27, 38 (1987).

39 One Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 725. The court notes that the remedy of an innocent owner today,
instead of filing a remission or mitigation petition (although this is still a viable avenue), is to file a
claim in the forfeiture proceeding and establish the existence of his "ownership" interest and his
innocence. Id. "When this showing is made, the claimant's interest survives forfeiture and may be
returned to him in the manner provided by the Court." Id.
40 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). See supra note 32 for the text of the entire subsection.
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lienholder's assertion that it was an innocent owner. In fact, the court in
One Piece was one of the first to acknowledge that a lienholder qualified as
an innocent owner.4 1 Citing the Congressional Record, the One Piece
court states that the term owner, "should be broadly interpreted to include any person with a recognizable interest in the property seized." 4 2
Another court subsequently held that a credit corporation, as lienholder
with a security interest in real property subject to forfeiture proceedings,
was an "owner" according to the statute and, therefore, had standing to
contest the forfeiture action to the extent of its interest in the property.4 3
In addition to recognizing that lienholders could stake a claim using
the innocent owner defense, the cases illustrate that the government will
not challenge the lienholder's recovery of the principal owed to them or
in the interest accrued up to the time of seizure.4 4 The controversy concerning interpretation of the statute therefore comes down to one question:
is the statute, and more specifically the 1978 amendment, broad enough
to allow innocent lienholders post-seizure interest on their investment?
This is of utmost importance, for if post-seizure interest is protected
under section 881(a) (6) it becomes, as the One Piece court states, "statutorily exempt from forfeiture."' 45 Examining the legislative history of the
1978 amendment is the only way to determine the scope of the innocent
owner defense for two reasons. First, the plain language of the statute
does not indicate whether the defense is broad enough to encompass
post-seizure interest. Second, courts have not yet construed the statute
in a manner that would assist in resolving this issue. Without such guidance, the only alternative is a thorough examination of the amendment's legislative history.
The In re Metmor court uses this method very persuasively throughout its decision. The court finds that the issue before it is the extent of
Metmor Financial's interest in the property and the right the government
has to invade such an interest.4 6 In response to their own question, the
court declares that the legislative history of the amendment shows strong
congressional recognition that the government could not disrupt
Metmor Financial's right to the mortgage and the continually accruing
interest, and that a forfeiture cannot change the nature of Metmor Financial's rights as an innocent mortgagee. 4 7 Citing to the Congressional
41 One Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 725.
42 Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 17,649, 12,792 (1978)).
43 United States v. All That Tract & Parcel Of Land, 602 F. Supp. 307,312 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The
court here placed strong reliance upon the legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 881 in arriving at their
decision. Id
44 One Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 725.
45 Id at 726 (emphasis added).
46 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1987).
47 Id at 450. See United States v. Real Property Titled In the Name Of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F.
Supp. 332 (D. Haw. 1987). In discussing a similar fact pattern to the In re Metmor case, the Shashin,
Ltd. court stated:
Under the typical loan agreement which constitutes the basis for a lien, the claimant is
entitled to receive interest until the loan is paid, together with any other charges or costs
provided for in the loan agreement. To interpret section 881 to compel the claimant to
take any lessflies in the face of the statute. It may be true that the forfeiture actually occurs at
the moment of the illegal use and that no third party could thereafter acquire a legally
recognizable interest in the property, but [the innocent party] had already acquired a legally
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Record, the court highlights language from the amendment's legislative
history which states that, "no property would be forfeited... to the extent
of the interest of any innocent owner. .... ,,48 Two congressional leaders
specifically noted the amendment's purpose. Representative Rogers
stated, "[the Senate amendment] expands the rights of innocent parties
who own or have an interest recognized by the law in the seized property,
to assert their claim in court to the extent of their interest in that prop4 9 Even more revealing is the testimony of Senator Nunn, the
erty ....
sponsor of the amendment, concerning the amendment's purpose:
[We] did add a provision ... to make it clear that a bona fide party who
has no knowledge or consent to the property he owns having been
derived from an illegal transaction, that party would be able to establish that fact ... and forfeiture would not occur. That is the purpose
of the wording added to the modification, in addition to some other
wording in the modification making the amendment broaderthan it otherwise
would have been. 50
This language explains the purpose of the amendment: to protect and
enlarge a legally recognizable interest which, in the past, had been marginally protected by archaic administrative practices of remission and
mitigation.
If no dispute exists as to the propriety of allowing an innocent
lienholder to assert the innocent owner defense, that defense should pro-tect the lienholder's entire interest as it would any other interest falling
under the defense. If this interest includes a mortgage granting rights to
a principal monetary amount and continuing interest payments, then that
is the interest to be protected; not just the principal and some interest, but
the principal and all the interest rightfully due. Just as owners are entitled to have their entire automobile returned, so too should mortgagees
be provided with the full value of their mortgages. 5
recognizable interest in the property, represented by the lien, which secured all the rights
and obligations provided in the agreement.
Id. at 336 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Real Property In Sevier County, Tenn., 703 F.
Supp. 1306 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). The Real Property court stated, "I agree that denying the lienholder
entitlement to post-seizure interest.., would result in a diminution of the lienholders' interest, and
that such a result would be contrary to the statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)." Id at 1313.
48 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 449 (quoting 124 CoNG. REc. 36,948 (1978)).
49 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 36,946 (1978)) (Statement of Rep. Rogers,
then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce). The One Piece court was not unaware of this quote, but they have
misinterpreted it. The One Piece court claims that, "[no member of Congress] made any reference to
any right to greater financial recovery under Subsection (a)(6) than was already available," and that
the amendment's purpose was merely to allow an innocent party to assert their claim in court. One
Piece, 571 F. Supp. at 726 n.3. This clearly ignores the amendment's other legislative history. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text and infra note 50 and accompanying text.
50 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 449 (emphasis added) (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 23,057 (1978))
(Statement of Sen. Nunn, sponsor of the amendment). See also Note, An Analysis of Federal DrugRelated Civil Forfeiture, 34 ME. L. REV. 435 (1982). Subsection 881 (a)(6) was designed to "avoid inequities present in prior legislation." Id. at 438. In referring to the class the new subsection protects,
the author notes that now, "a broader class can claim relief from forfeiture. These protections indicate a congressional awareness of the punitive effects of the forfeiture laws." Id. at n.31.
51 A common definition of a mortgage is, "a pledge or security of particular property for the
payment of a debt." BIACK's LAw DICTMONARY 911 (5th ed. 1979). The debt in this context would
have to be the full value of all the principal and interest outstanding that would be paid to the
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The language of section 881 does not grant more protection to individuals in certain circumstances and limit it in others. If Congress had
intended to distinguish interests, for example, by granting more protection for automobile owners and less for lienholders, they would have so
specified. Alternatively, if Congress intended such a distinction, once it
became aware the distinction was not self-evident, Congress should have
amended the statute again to make such a distinction apparent.5 2 Congress, however, has not responded in this manner. It is, therefore, more
likely that Congress is content with the broad protection granted by the
1978 amendment. 53 Thus, absent a clear legislative prohibition against
such a practice, a lienholder's entire interest should be protected as
would any other interest of an innocent owner.
The One Piece court, while highlighting this legislative history, fails to
recognize its importance in reaching its final conclusion. In One Piece, the
court states that the legislative history "reveals only a concern about protecting the 'interest' of innocent owners, with no precise explanation as
to what the interest represents... [and] [in the absence of any legislative...
guidance... the [c]ourt fooks to the nature of civil forfeiture actions...
used prior to the enactment of [s]ubsection (a)(6). ' ' 54 Obviously, the One
Piece court decided that the statute's legislative history was valueless in
determining the scope of the innocent owner defense. Yet, when legislative language is vague or ambiguous it is standard practice to look to the
legislative history for guidance. 5 5 The legislative history of the amendmortgagee out of the proceeds from ajudicial sale of the mortgaged property. To claim otherwise,
that the debt includes the principal and only a portion of the interest, is ridiculous.
52 Beginning in 1983 and continuing to the present, the disagreement in the courts over the
amendment's protection of post-seizure interest is readily apparent. Seesupra note 26 and accompanying text.
The In re Metmor court noted that the government was attempting to find legislative history
supporting its contention of the fact that, in its 1978 and 1984 legislative enactments relating to
forfeitures, Congress chose not to disturb either the ruling in Stowell or the administrative practice of
denying post-seizure interest. 819 F.2d at 449 n.6. The In re Metmor court, in response to the government, stated that, "there is no indication that Congress was aware of the administrative practice
of denying post-seizure interest, such that a failure explicitly to eliminate the practice [from the
legislative enactments] could be viewed as an endorsement [of the prior administrative practice]."
Id The In re Metmor court then stated that even if one assumes congressional awareness, the legislative history of the 1978 amendment is clear that it intended to "expand[] the rights of innocent
parties." Id The language of the statute itself, (no property shall be forfeited ... to the extent of
the interest of an [innocent] owner), "plainly covers all aspects of an innocent owner's stake in otherwise forfeitable property." Id, The United States v. Real Property Titled In the Name Of Shashin,
Ltd. court also addressed this issue. 680 F. Supp. 332, 336 (D. Haw. 1987). The Shashin, Ltd. court,
in response to the One Piece court's claim that the prior administrative practice should be followed,
noted that:
[In my opinion, by adding subsection (a)(6), Congress specifically provided for a procedure differing from the administrative process previously followed by requiring the government, in the event it wishes to retain the property, to pay to the claimant just compensation
for such possession as determined by the court based upon applicable damage standards.
In this case such compensation should consist of principal in full, interest, including that
acquired post-seizure ....
Id.
53 The legislative history of the amendment clearly shows that the statute should be broadly interpreted. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
54 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (emphasis
added). See supra note 52.
55 The notion that in the interpretation of statutes legislative history is the controlling factor has
been well established. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 142-146 (1974).
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ment clearly shows the congressional intent to protect all the rights that
an innocent party may have in a piece of forfeitable property. 5 6 By refusing to recognize this, the One Piece court does an injustice to the proponents and drafters of the amendment and ignores the congressional
intent in passing the amendment.
IV. United States v. Stowell
Both the One Piece and In re Metmor courts, however, do not end their
examination with the scope of the innocent owner defense. Rather, both
courts proceed to place great reliance upon a case the Supreme Court
handed down a century ago. United States v. Stowell established the doc57
trine known today as the "relation-back" doctrine.
Stowell stands for the proposition that when property is subject to
forfeiture due to its involvement in an illegal act, forfeiture takes place
immediately upon the commission of the act.5 8 At the time the act
occurs, title vests in the government, transferring ownership of that
property to the government.5 9 Actual judicial condemnation of the
property-forfeiture-is only used to formalize the transfer. 60 The basis
for such reasoning was, "to prevent any subsequent alienation [by the
offender] before seizure and condemnation," thereby avoiding some of
the consequences of his wrongdoing. 61 Thus, no third party could acquire a legally valid interest in the property after the activity that subjects
it to forfeiture occurred. Considering the prior automobile hypothetical
as an example, the relation-back doctrine applies to the situation in
which an owner uses his vehicle to transport an illegal substance and
then attempts to sell the vehicle to a third party. Under Stowell, the third
party purchaser could not acquire a valid interest in the vehicle because
the prior owner did not have the right to transfer title; the title to the
vehicle vested with the government at the time of the illegal activity.
Both the One Piece and In re Metmor courts interpret and place different levels of significance upon the Stowell decision. The One Piece court
notes that a lienholder's argument for post-seizure interest is untenable
in light of Stowell. 6 2 It states, "to hold that an innocent lienholder's interest continues to grow, necessarily at the expense of the government, results in a diminution of the government's forfeited interest... [which] is
contrary to the holding in Stowell that the interest of the government is
fixed as of the date of the illegal act." 63 The court then further claims
56 Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
57 See Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine:A More ReasonableApproach to Civil Forfeiturein Drug
Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165 (1990), for a comprehensive discussion advocating a narrowing of the
relation-back doctrine under 21 U.S.C. § 881.
58 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16 (1890).
59 Id. at 17.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 17-18.
62 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
63 Id. Obviously, if an innocent lienholder takes a portion of the seized property's worth there
will be less left for the government, but if the whole mortgage were ignored the government receives
even more. This, however, should not be the way to rationalize the government's interest, for their
rights in a particular piece of seized property should be set. And here, that interest should be set at
what the government acquired through drug enforcement: the property value minus the lien an inno-
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that, under a strict reading of Stowell, an innocent third party's interest
would be cut off at the date when property is purchased with drug money
or used illegally, not at the time of seizure.r 4
The One Piece court then reasons, however, that the lienholder's interest will only be cut off at the time of seizure, and not when the illegality occurs. The court emphasizes the generosity of the government in
detailing how the government has chosen to afford lienholders greaterprotection than what they are entitled to. 6 5 The court bases this statement on
the government's practice qf remission and mitigation used prior to the
enactment of the section 881(a)(6) amendment. The One Piece court
states, however, that although Congress enacted subsection (a)(6), nothing has changed because Congress made no effort to "provide some specific guideline supporting a different interpretation when enacting [the
amendment] .... "66 This is where the One Piece court's disregard for the
legislative history of the amendment fails them. For if the amendment
serves no purpose except to legislatively codify the government's previous actions, why would there be such a clamoring by the members of
Congress to protect the innocent owner's interest?6 7 According to the
One Piece court it is already protected. 68 This view fails to explain subsequent congressional action. While the court mentions that the amendment was enacted to remove the arbitrariness of the prior executive
actions, surely the statements from the members of Congress show their
intent to exempt from forfeiture not just a part of an innocent owner's
interest, but his entire interest in the forfeitable property.
The In re Metmor court interprets Stowell differently and declares that
the case actually supports and upholds Metmor Financial's claim to postseizure interest. In fact, the court demonstrates how the positions of the
innocent lienholders in both cases are similar. The In re Metmor court
recognizes that, in Stowell, the plaintiff also obtained a mortgage interest
in the property before the illegality occurred. 6 9 According to the In re
innocent
Metmor court, it is, therefore, imperative to the decision that the
70
lienholder acquired his or her interest prior to any illegality.
In Stowell, where the lienholder was able to recover his mortgage, the
Supreme Court held that, "the mortgage is valid as against the United
States, and... so far as concerns the real estate, the judgment of concent lienholder acquired pre-illegal activity. Since an innocent lienholder does not acquire his interest through drug related activities, it should not be reduced by such.
64 Id..
The One Piece court through its language seems to imply that the government's current practice
of allowing the return of the mortgagee's principal and interest up to the time of seizure should be
looked on as an act of generosity. Id. It is incredulous to think that an innocent lienholder has no
right to collect its pre-illegal activity mortgage principal and interest, and must rely instead on the
altruism of the government.
65 Id
66 It at 726. See supra note 52.
67 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
68 United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
69 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 448 (4th Cir. 1987).
70 It
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demnation must be against the equity of redemption only." ' 7 1 The In re
Metmor court interprets this as allowing the government to succeed only
to the interest that belonged to the wrongdoer. 72 "[Since] Ackley
purchased the property encumbered by Metmor's secured note, with interest accring... [h]is equity was subject to an obligation to repay the
borrowed principal and to pay interest on the unpaid balance until all of
the principal was repaid. ' 73 Essentially, the court holds that legally, the
government only had an ownership interest equivalent to that which belonged to Ackley: a stake in property carrying a pre-existing mortgage
74
with continually accruing interest.
As was the case in Stowell, Metmor Financial was entitled to complete
satisfaction of its mortgage, which included the continually accruing interest, with the government's "equity" interest being the remainder. 75
This is entirely consistent with Stowell's emphasis upon not diminishing
any rights of the innocent lienor. The innocent owner in Stowell, with
whom the Court eventually sides, gave an amusing example that is analogous to a current innocent lienholder scenario:
Suppose that a person drives his horse upon premises secretly used as
a distillery for some innocent and legitimate purpose and while there
the distillery and the horse are seized, cannot he claim it? . . . [I]t
71 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 20 (1890)). There was no
mortgage interest at stake in Stowell, and therefore the court did not address the issue.
72 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 448-49.
73 Id. at 449. Examined through another approach it is easy to see how the government in these
cases never owned more than that which belonged to the wrongdoer. When the wrongdoer took
title to the property he assumed certain obligations to the lending institution. The government
upon taking title should not now be able to say that they will take free of these obligations. The
government seeks to impose a fictional freeze period wherein the government owns the property but
is exempt from the incidents of ownership. When the government succeeded to the property just as
the wrongdoer did, the interest bearing lien should have remained unchanged. To hold otherwise is
to say that the government succeeded to a larger interest than its predecessor, i.e., that the government is capable of transforming notes with interest accruing into interest free notes.
74 Id. See United States v. All That Tract & Parcel Of Land, 602 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
The court found the One Piece court's reading of Stowell erroneous and declared:
As this court reads Stowell, that case does not prohibit allowing an innocent lienholder to
recover interest on a loan up to the date the principal is paid off when the secured property
is forfeited. The lienholder's propertyinterest at the time of the seizure amounts to the unpaid
principal and interest on the principal until the principal is fully paid (the "loan interest");
the government's forfeited interest is the equitable interest which remains. Contrary to
what the [One Piece] court suggests, the lienholder's property interest does not grow at the
expense of the government's forfeited interest by allowing the lienholder to recover the
loan interest to which it was entitled all along. (Perhaps the [One Piece] court confused the
distinction between the two types of "interest.")
Id. at 313 n. 11 (emphasis in original). If the government is really interested in acquiring proceeds
through the forfeiture process, they could always speed up the forfeiture proceedings (which in In re
Metmor took two years from the time of seizure) thus allowing the government to payoff the
lienholders earlier.
The In re Metmor, court, in an alternative theory, examined the awarding of post-seizure interest
through a fifth amendment takings perspective. 819 F.2d at 450. The court noted that under such
an argument:
[A] plaintiff is entitled to 'just compensation'-typically defined as 'fair market value of the
property on the date it is appropriated'-the government must pay Metmor the fair market
value of the mortgage as of the date of the transfer of title, a value which would include the
interest that accrues under the mortgage terms.
Id. See generally Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
75 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 451.
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ought to be enough to simply state our position. If a man leaves his
property and parts with control of it for a legal and proper purpose,
no act of the tenant, unknown
to him, and without his consent, can
76
deprive him of his property.

The purpose of forfeiture laws is to discourage an underlying illegal act
by denying the wrongdoer the fruits of his illegal enterprise. 77 In these
cases, the innocent owner's interest predated that of the wrongdoer, therefore, no purpose exists for depriving the innocent owner of a part of its
property. The wrongdoer receives no benefit if the innocent owner continues to receive its rightful interest. As such, the innocent owner should
not be denied its continuing interest on the mortgage because of the
wrongdoer's presence. It would be inconsistent with Stowell to deny such
interest. Even under Stowell, the innocent lienholder's mortgage interest
remains unaffected by the forfeiture proceedings. In Stowell, the Court
noted that the mortgaged estate, even after the illegal activity, remained
78
exactly the same as it was prior to the illegal act.
One final note, relating to Stowell, concerns the 1984 amendment to
section 881, subsection (h). It states, "[a]ll right, title, and interest in
[forfeitable] property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest
in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
under this section." 79 This unmistakably incorporates the relation-back
doctrine into the statute.8 0 However, some would go further and state
76 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 9, 19-20 (1890).
77 "When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended
to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly in a criminal enterprise." United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-722 (1971).
78 Stowell, 133 U.S. at 19.
79 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
80 Prior to this amendment there was a considerable lack of consensus as to the application of
the relation-back doctrine to 21 U.S.C. § 881. The dispute revolved around the permissiveness of
the language in § 881. According to the court in United States v. Thirteen Thousand Dollars In
United States Currency, 733 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1984), the relation-back doctrine was inapplicable to cases involving 21 U.S.C. § 881. The court juxtaposed § 881 against the forfeiture statute in
Stowell which mandatorily required that upon the commission of a specified act certain property shall
be forfeited. lId The Thirteen Thousand Dollarcourt then posed the notion that since § 881 uses the
language "shall be subject to forfeiture," it was a permissive statute and hence the relation-back doctrine was inapplicable. Id (emphasis in original). See United States v. Currency Totalling
$48,318.08, 609 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1980) (Although a different statute other than 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 was at issue, the court used the same reasoning that with a permissive statute the relation-back
doctrine as announced in Stowell does not apply where the statute provides only for possibility of
subsequent forfeiture). Accord United States v. A Fee Simple Parcel Of Real Property, 650 F. Supp.
1534, 1542 (E.D. La. 1987); United States v. $319,820,00 In United States Currency, 634 F. Supp.
700, 703 (N.D. Ga. 1986). But see Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1112 (1990) (where the Tenth Circuit in a well written opinion seemed to clarify the
dispute). In overturning the district court decision, the court denied the Colorado Department of
Revenue's contention that § 881 is permissive and therefore the relation-back doctrine is inapplicable. Id. at 243. In arriving at their decision, the court set down four rationales for holding that the
relation-back doctrine applies to § 881. First, the Eggleston court states that the language of 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a), "the following.., shall be subject to forfeiture to the United states and no property right
shall exist in them," makes it clear that property rights are divested immediately at the moment such
property is used in a manner or context prescribed by § 881. Id. at 246. "The language 'subject to
forfeiture' is merely used in this statute to give notice of the scope of property that shall be forfeited." Id Second, the court notes that since there is no option for the government to institute
forfeiture proceedings the statute cannot be permissive. Id. (referring to United States v. Grundy &
Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 336, 350-52 (1806)). "Although the government apparently could
choose to forgo forfeiture altogether ... governmental discretion that is not founded on explicit
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that this amendment would deny Metmor Financial's post-seizure interest because the illegal act predated Metmor Financial's actual date for
receiving any post-seizure interest. It does nothing of the sort. It does not
destroy the innocent owner defense, but merely says what the In re
Metmor court recognized-that a third party cannot acquire a valid interest in forfeitable property after an illegality occurs. 8 ' This does not impact upon an interest, whether it be a mortgage with continuing interest
payments or otherwise, acquired and vested prior to the illegality.
Here again, the legislative history of the amendment is helpful. The
Senate report explaining the amendment shows that Congress relied
upon the common-law "taint" theory in enacting subsection (h); property is considered tainted from the time of its prohibited use or acquisition.8 2 It states, '[a]s discussed above, [the 'relation-back' doctrine] is
well established in the current law." 8 3s The discussion referred to merely
relates what Stowell holds, and states that the purpose of the provision is
to "close a potential loophole in current law whereby the ... forfeiture
sanction could be avoided by transfers that were not 'arms length' transactions." 8 4 Obviously, its concern was post-illegality transfers and notpreillegality acquired interests.8 5 Thus, the 1984 amendment does nothing
to diminish or cast doubt on the In re Metmor decision.
V.

Ramifications of Denying Post-Seizure Interest

This final Part discusses some of the unique issues arising from the
award of post-seizure interest. First, it focuses on the government's dubious contention that an innocent lienholder who is denied his postseizure interest still has another means of recourse. Second, it briefly
touches upon the problems a lending institution would face if the courts
follow the One Piece rationale and deny post-seizure interest to innocent
lienholders. Third, this Part examines what the government receives
language of the statute does not make the statute permissive." Id. at 246. Third, the court rejects
the department's argument that since § 881 has an exception for an innocent owner, regardless of
everything else, the statute is still permissive. Id. at 246-47. The court notes that the Supreme
Court's decision in Stowell made clear that an exception for innocent holders did not prevent a forfeiture from relating back. Id. at 247 (citing Stowell, 133 U.S. at 17-18). Finally, the court discusses the
legislative history of § 881(h). Id. at 246-47. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. While
the other circuits have not conclusively lined up behind the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Eggleston
case appears to offer the best reasoning and logic in holding that the relation-back doctrine applies
to 21 U.S.C. § 881. In light of the 1984 amendment to § 881 adding subsection (h), it would be
difficult to hold otherwise at this time.
See Note, State and Federal Forfeiture of Property Involved in Drug Transactions, 92 DicK. L. REV. 461
(1988). "The Drug Control Act codified the relation back doctrine as part of its 1984 amendments
to the forfeiture provisions." Id. at 473. The note also provides a brief discussion of the status of
the relation-back doctrine today. Id. See also Note, supra note 57, at 176. "In enacting section 881,
Congress codified the relation-back doctrine in subsection 881(h)."
81 See Note, supra note 57, at 177. ("Whereas subsection 881(a)(6) provides a safe harbor against
the application of in rem forfeitures, there is no corresponding protection for the subsequent purchaser ...." (emphasis added)).
82 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 196, 215, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3182, 3379, 3398.
83 Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3398.
84 Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3383, 3384.

85 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 57, at 176-78 (for a claim
that subsection 881 (h) needs to be amended to protect innocent, subsequent purchasers).
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under both the One Piece and In re Metmor scenarios. Finally, it examines
the future of the post-seizure interest issue.
The In re Metmor court refers to a government suggestion that
Metmor Financial can always collect their post-seizure interest from
other sources.8 6 One of these sources would obviously be Ackley, the
wrongdoer, who was a fugitive at the time Metmor Financial attempted to
collect its money.8 7 It is ironic that the government offers this as an alternative when the government admits that Ackley's assets, "would probably be unavailable to Metmor even if he could be found."8 8 The In re
Metmor court makes this assessment based on the fact that the government had seized or was in the process of seizing the remainder of Ackley's property. Since Metmor Financial would not have an interest
superior to the government's interest in this other property, it is an unrealistic alternative.
The court ,also notes that even if Metmor Financial could pursue
other sources that had not been tainted through illegal use, they are essentially transformed from a secured to an unsecured creditor.8 9 To impair innocent lienholder's rights in their collateral was clearly not the
intent of the drafters of section 881(a) (6), nor the purpose of the forfeiture laws.90
A second issue to consider is how the decision in One Piece effects the
business of lending institutions. To what extent is tle court going to
burden the innocent lienholders in their efforts to prevent future losses?
Apparently, in addition to the usual background checks required before
money is lent, a bank would be forced to constantly monitor a person
and his property for illegal activity. For instance, if a lending institution
has a mortgage on a piece of property and no illegal activity has occurred, must they monitor it every day in fear that if it becomes tainted,
the government will seize the property and deny the bank any interest on
their mortgage? Under the One Piece decision, the bank will still receive
their principal and interest up until the date of seizure, as long as the
bank is "innocent." 9' 1 However, the bank will face a significant loss if not
allowed to collect post-seizure interest. 9 2 A bank's only option to avoid
this loss is to anticipate illegal activity and foreclose on the mortgage. Of
course, the difficulty lies in the bank attempting to foreclose on a mort86 In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1987).
87 Id
88

Id. The In re Metmor court notes that as an alternate theory to awarding post-seizure interest,

Metmor Financial's enforceability rights had been impaired and therefore constituted a fifth amendment taking. Id. See generally Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
89 In re Memor, 819 F.2d at 451. If such a transformation from secured to unsecured creditor did
occur, Metmor Financial, or any innocent lienholder, would be in no better position then someone
contesting the forfeiture who had no interest in the property. See United States v. One 1965 Cessna
320C Twin Engine Airplane, 715 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Ky. 1989). "The federal courts have consistently held that an unsecured creditor has no standing to contest the forfeiture of seized property."
Id. at 812. "Under the civil forfeiture statute, [21 U.S.C. § 881] which requires a greater degree of
ownership interest in seized property, an unsecured creditor does not have a legally cognizable interest in the property sufficient to challenge the forfeiture." Id. at 813.

90 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text and note 77 and accompanying text.
91 See Note, supra note 57, at 189-93 (for a discussion concerning the reasonable precautions
necessary to remain an "innocent owner").
92 See infra note 97.
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gage upon the mere speculation of impending illegal activity. If, however,
banks were to wait for the illegal act to occur and then attempt to foreclose, even if they were to foreclose within twenty-four hours, the application of the relation-back doctrine would nevertheless deny the bank its
post-seizure interest on the mortgage.
Thirdly, what would the government receive under both the One
Piece and In re Metmor decisions? As the In re Metmor court accurately
points out, under a One Piece analysis, the government is essentially receiving the benefit of an interest-free loan. 9 3 As the court states,
"[a]lthough no formal loan from Metmor has been obtained, the government has use of the mortgaged property, without paying the interest due
on the mortgage, until such time as it chooses to sell."'9 4 It is widely held
that governmental delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings after
seizure of such property can violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, if the delay is substantial or unreasonably long.9 5 However,
there has been no uniformity as to what constitutes an unreasonable
length of time. At least one court has held that a forty-eight month delay
did not violate the claimant's due process rights. 9 6 Thus, despite the fact
a lending institution's ability to survive is based upon interest earned
from money lent, under the One Piece decision, the institution would receive no income while the government took its time to institute forfeiture
97
proceedings.
On the other hand, under In re Metmor, the government receives only
what it is entitled to-the wrongdoer's interest in the property. If the In
re Metmor decision is followed to its logical result, an innocent owner's
lien will be respected in its entirety. This respect is not the result of the
government's generosity. Instead, it is a statutory right, existing since the
1978 amendment to the Drug Control Act, to receive what rightfully belongs to the innocent owner. The government usually sells the property,
but is entitled to only that which belonged to the guilty party. The statute states, "no property shall be forfeited . . . to the extent of the interest
93 In re Metmor, 819 F.2d at 451. The In re Metmor court noted that, "the only purpose served by
retaining an innocent lienor's mortgage interest is to boost the federal treasury." Id. at 450 n.7.
94 Id at 451.
95 United States v. $62,972 In United States Currency, 539 F. Supp. 586, 588 (D. Nev. 1982).
For an extensive discussion of this issue see Annotation, Delay Between Seizure of Personal Property by
Federal Government and Institution of Proceedingsfor Foreiture Thereof as Violative of Fifth Amendment Due
Process Requirements, 69 A.L.R. FED. 373 (1984), and Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Due Process
Requirements of Forfeitures, 76 L. ED. 2D 852 (1989).
96 United States v. $10,755.00 In United States Currency, 523 F. Supp. 447, 449-50 (D. Md.
1981). While in this case the property at issue was currency, the case is illustrative of the fact that the
government is granted considerable discretion in their decisions to institute forfeiture proceedings
or continue to keep the property in a state of "limbo."
97 Lending institutions are in the business of lending money and charging for its use over time.
The government in these forfeiture cases wants to use that money without paying interest, although
lending institutions must continue to pay third parties for the use of the funds until the government
eventually forfeits the property and pays them their principal. Meanwhile, the government's "equity" interest continues to grow through appreciation. Essentially, the procedure is a money maker
for the government, not at the expense of a drug dealer but rather at the expense of an innocent
third party.
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of an owner." 98 The reasoning of the In re Metmor court will protect this
interest.
Finally, three years have passed since the court handed down the In
re Metmor decision and, surprisingly, there has been little activity in the
courts concerning the post-seizure interest issue. However, two district
courts rendered important decisions on the issue in 1989. One of these
cases implies that the post-seizure interest issue no longer exists.
In United States v. Parcel Of Real Property,99 the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania faced a situation much like the one in In
re Metmor and in One Piece. In the government's forfeiture proceeding
against a rental property, an innocent lienholder of the property moved
for summary judgment and sought an order entitling them to postseizure interest.10 0 After examining all relevant authority, the Parcel Of
Real Property court agreed with the In re Metmor court and allowed the
lienholder to collect its post-seizure interest.10 1 The court noted that,
"to conclude otherwise would be to allow the United States the benefit of
an interest-free loan at [the bank's] expense." 10 2 This case, decided in
July, 1989, two years after In re Metmor, demonstrates that the government is still challenging innocent lienholder's claims to post-seizure interest. This challenge, however, should not be taken as the automatic
response of the United States Justice Department and all United States
Attorneys as to this issue.
Another district court case, handed down in April, 1989, indicates
that the post-seizure interest issue has now been resolved. In United
States v. Certain Real Property,103 the district court held that a Justice Department regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 9, allowed for the awarding of postseizure interest to innocent lienholders.10 4 This regulation is titled "Remission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal Forfeitures."' 10 5 Nonetheless,
the court held that the section was applicable for determining the "interest" of an innocent owner under section 881.106 Whether this regulation
98
99
100

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
715 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
Id. at 1325.

101

Id at 1326.

102 Id. While the court went on to note that to deny post-seizure interest would be particularly
disturbing in light of the fact that the government had been accumulating rent monies for managing
and maintaining the property, the court emphasized that their decision to award post-seizure interest
was not dependent on that fact. Id
103 710 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
104 Id at 796. Note, that this same court previously held that an innocent lienholder was not
entitled to post-seizure interest. United States v. Escobar, 600 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
105 Remission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal Forfeitures, 28 C.F.R. § 9 (1989). Subsection
9.2(h) states as a definition:
The term 'net equity' means the amount of a lien-holder's monetary interest in property
subject to forfeiture. Net equity is to be computed by determining the amount of unpaid
principal and unpaid interest at the time of seizure, and by adding to that sum unpaid
interest calculated from the date of seizure through the last full month prior to the date of
the notification granting the petition ....
Id
106 United States v. Certain Real Property, 710 F. Supp. 792, 796 (S.D. Fla. 1989). In 1983, the
One Piece court attempted a similar argument by claiming that in the absence of any case law addressing the issue, "the [c]ourt looks to the nature of civil forfeiture actions under Section 881 and to the
practice that was used to protect an innocent lienholder's interest prior to the enactment of Subsec-
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governs claims filed by innocent lienholders under section 881 remains
debatable. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the government recognizes
a right to post-seizure interest if a remission or mitigation petition is
filed, but does not explicitly recognize such a right if an innocent owner
files a claim at a forfeiture proceeding. This puzzling stance of the government is irrelevant considering the position that post-seizure interest is
statutorily protected under section 881, as this Comment advocates.
Nevertheless, the government's stance illustrates the government's failure to recognize the innocent lienholder's right to claim post-seizure interest and its insistence, despite In re Metmor and its progeny, to treat
post-seizure interest as a grace conferred at the government's discretion.
In addition, the government's confusing position permits dissimilar
treatment of the post-seizure interest issue by the United States attorneys. 10 7 If some decide that post-seizure interest is protected either
under section 881 or 28 C.F.R. § 9, then no problem exists. If however,
a United States attorney takes the converse position and argues that such
interest is not protected, then an innocent owner has only the courts to
protect his interest-courts that are themselves in disagreement over the
issue. This issue is, therefore, just as controversial today as when the One
Piece court handed down their decision, and accordingly, should not yet
be dismissed as resolved.
VI. Conclusion
Until the Fourth Circuit handed down its In re Metmor decision in
1987, no other federal appellate court had confronted the issue of awarding or denying post-seizure interest to an innocent owner under the
Drug Control Act. Some district courts follow a Texas district court's
decision denying such interest.1 0 8 A few others take the position announced in In re Metmor. 10 9 The issue is significant to many aspects of
our legal system today because it confronts the issues of property rights
and property interests, as well as our society's current war against drugs.
tion (a)(6)." United States v. One Piece Of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
The One Piece court was referring to 28 C.F.R. § 9. Id- at 724. The Certain Real Property court, however, used the regulation to award post-seizure interest, unlike the One Piece court, because 28 C.F.R.
§ 9 was revised in August, 1987. Prior to this date, § 9.2(d) expressly disallowed awarding postseizure interest. 28 C.F.R. § 9 (1987). The legislative history of the revision in 1987, however,
specifically notes that, "[tihis revision also will permit payment of post-seizure interest to innocent
petitioners holding liens on property forfeited." Summary, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,785 (1987).
107 It is clear that some United States attorneys will continue to challenge innocent owners claims
to post-seizure interest. In talking to the government attorney in the Parcel Of Real Property case it
was this author's impression that although the attorney lost the post-seizure interest issue in court,
he would continue to challenge claims to post-seizure interest if they continued to arise. Telephone
interview with James J. Ross, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief of Erie Division, Western District of Pennsylvania (Mar. 16, 1990). Conversely, in talking to the Office of Asset Forfeiture in
Washington, at least one attorney there stated that he advised United States attorneys not to contest
post-seizure interest for purely equitable reasons. Telephone interview with Roger Weiner, Trial
Attorney, Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (Mar. 16, 1990). Another United States attorney in Los Angeles stated that she merely cited to In re Metmor in concluding
that the awarding of post-seizure interest would not be challenged. Telephone interview with
Carolyn Reynolds, Assistant United States Attorney, Special Counsel for Real Property Forfeitures,
Los Angeles, California (Mar. 15, 1990).
108 See supra note 26.
109 Id.
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The In re Metmor court's decision invites a comprehensive examination of an innocent owner's right to post-seizure interest, which is sure to
come soon. The In re Metmor court correctly determined that an innocent
owner's interest should be protected to its fullest extent. The court's
decision holds true to the legislative intent behind the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, and attends to Congress' concern with the plight of the innocent owner in our society's war on drugs.
Also, the In re Metmor decision clearly falls in line with the decision in
Stowell, and does nothing to compromise the validity of the relation-back
doctrine. Further, if the government recognizes and awards post-seizure
interest to those parties granted a petition for remission or mitigation,
such protection and recognition should also be extended to those filing
claims at the forfeiture proceeding. In the future, courts should follow
the lead of In re Metmor in upholding an innocent owner's statutorily protected interest and abandon the misguided approach of the One Piece
court.
ChristopherM. Neronha

